Abstract:
The invention relates to a method for generating a list signature for a message to be signed, said method comprising steps which are carried out by an electronic material support of a member of a list. During said step, the electronic material support only generates an electronic signature according to a sequence number supplied to the electronic material support by a certifying authority, according to evidence of belonging to the list of members, to data relating to the electronic material support, and optionally to a key of an authority qualified to lift the anonymity of the generated signature.
Abstract:
A method and system for electronic voting over a network, from a terminal (Te) connected to an administrative server (SA) and to a vote-counting server (SCV). An authentication certificate (CA) and a single-use password (UPWe) are calculated and transmitted (A) from the server (SA) to the voter (Eu), an electronic ballot paper (EB) and an anonymous reference (AREu) are transmitted (B) from the terminal (Te) to the server (SCV) and, upon verification (B1) of the anonymous reference, the vote and the paper are validated (B3), the paper is counted, a confirmation of receipt (ACW) and an electoral register document (DVR) are transmitted from the server (SCV) to the terminal (Te). The terminal (Te) signs the register and transmits (C) the signed register (SDVR) to the server (SA) which closes (D1) the vote of the voter (Eu).
Abstract:
The invention concerns a system enabling a member (M) of a group (G) to produce, by means of customized data (z; K), a message (m) accompanied by a signature (8) proving to a verifier that the message originates from a member of the group (G). The invention is characterized in that the customized data is in the form of an electronic physical medium (26). Advantageously, the latter also incorporates: encrypting means (B3) for producing a customized cipher (C) from the customized data prior to the signature S of the message (m), means (B5) for producing a combination of a message m to be signed and the cipher (C) associated with said message, for example in the form of a concatenation of the message (m) with the cipher (C), and means (B6) for signing (Sig) the message (m) with the customized data (z; K) in the form of a cipher (C) associated with said message. Advantageously, the physical medium is a smart card (26) or the like.
Abstract:
A method and system for electronic voting over a network, from a terminal (Te) connected to an administrative server (SA) and to a vote-counting server (SCV). An authentication certificate (CA) and a single-use password (UPWe) are calculated and transmitted (A) from the server (SA) to the voter (Eu), an electronic ballot paper (EB) and an anonymous reference (AREu) are transmitted (B) from the terminal (Te) to the server (SCV) and, upon verification (B1) of the anonymous reference, the vote and the paper are validated (B3), the paper is counted, a confirmation of receipt (ACW) and an electoral register document (DVR) are transmitted from the server (SCV) to the terminal (Te). The terminal (Te) signs the register and transmits (C) the signed register (SDVR) to the server (SA) which closes (D1) the vote of the voter (Eu).
Abstract:
In a fair blind signature process, a user interacts with a signer in order to complete a 7-tuple (A,e,s,t,xu,x,m) such that Ae=a0α1x α2m α3u α4t α5s (mod n), where a0, a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5 and n are elements of the Signer's public key (PUBKs). During the signature-issuing phase the user (U) provides the signer (S) with a data element (α1x) encrypted according to a key (f) known to a trusted authority (TA), and this data element (α1x) is disclosed during transmission of the signed message. Similarly, the signed message is transmitted associated with second encrypted data comprising a second data element (α3xu) encrypted according to a key (f) known to the trusted authority (TA), and this second data element (α3xu) is disclosed to the Signer during the signature-issuing phase. Thus, the trusted authority (TA) can revoke the anonymity of the digital signature.
Abstract:
A cryptographic method and apparatus for anonymously signing a message. Added to the anonymous signature is another signature which is calculated (operation 13) using a private key common to all the members of a group authorized to sign and unknown to all revoked members. The private key is updated (operations 8, 11) at group level on each revocation within the group and at member level only on anonymous signing of a message by the member.
Abstract:
The present invention relates to a method of access to a service consisting in i) identifying and registering a client (C), ii) authenticating the client to an anonymous certification authority, iii) authenticating the client by producing an anonymous signature and opening and maintaining an anonymous authentication session with a server (Se), and iv) selectively allowing contact between the server (Se) and the anonymous certification authority (ACA) to revoke the anonymity of the client (C) using the signature provided in step iii). The invention also relates to a system for opening and maintaining an authentication session guaranteeing non-repudiation.
Abstract:
The invention relates to a method for unique authentication of a user (U) by at least one service provider (SP), said method including a preliminary identity federation stage of federating an identity (user@sp) of said user for said service provider and an identity (user@idp) of the user (U) for an identity provider (IdP). According to the invention, said preliminary identity federation stage includes the steps of: the user (U) generating a user alias ([alias]) for that service provider (SP) and sending said identity provider (IdP) a masked alias ([alias]masked) deduced from said alias, the identity provider (IdP) associating said masked alias ([alias]masked) for that service provider (SP) with the identity (user@idp) of the user for the identity provider (IdP) and sending the user (U) elements for calculation by the user of a signature (σ) of a message (msg) containing the non-masked alias ([alias]), the user (U) calculating said signature (σ) and sending the service provider (SP) said message (msg) with said signature (σ), and the service provider (SP) verifying said signature (σ), authenticating the user (U), and associating said alias ([alias]) with the user's identity (user@sp) for the service provider (SP).
Abstract:
In a fair blind signature process, a user interacts with a signer in order to complete a 7-tuple (A,e,s,t,xu,x,m) such that Ae=a0a1xa2ma3xua4ta5s (mod n), where a0, a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5 and n are elements of the Signer's public key (PUBKs). During the signature-issuing phase the user (U) provides the signer (S) with a data element (a1x) encrypted according to a key (f) known to a trusted authority (TA), and this data element (a1x) is disclosed during transmission of the signed message. Similarly, the signed message is transmitted associated with second encrypted data comprising a second data element (a3xu) encrypted according to a key (f) known to the trusted authority (TA), and this second data element (a3xu) is disclosed to the Signer during the signature-issuing phase. Thus, the trusted authority (TA) can revoke the anonymity of the digital signature.
Abstract:
A cryptographic method and a chip card which is used to carry out the method. Before any calculation is performed by a computing means of the chip card, the chip card reads (2) an integral list, in a storage means of a second entity, of identifiers of first proprietary entities of a chip card. Such list is linked to each status assigned to each of the first entities by the second entity. Subsequently, the chip card compares (3) the identifier stored in a storage means of the chip card with the contents of the list, in order to authorize (5) or prohibit (4) any calculation by the computing means depending on the result of the comparison.