Abstract:
Authentication and signature process with reduced number of calculations.The process involves a first entity called the “prover”, which possesses a public key v and a secret key s, these keys verify the relation v=s−t (mod n), where n is an integer called modulus and t is a parameter, and a second entity called a “verifier”, which knows the public key v. This process implies exchange of information following a “zero-knowledge protocol” between the verifier and the prover and cryptographic calculations on this information, some calculations being carried out “modulo n”. The process of the invention is characterised by the fact that the modulus n is specific to the prover that communicates this modulus to the verifier.
Abstract:
A method for authenticating an entity by a verifier, the entity having an identifier, the verifier having a pair of private and public keys, comprising: sending to the entity a first random number selected by the verifier; a step wherein the entity encrypts a value by means of the public key of the verifier, said value including the first random number and an authentication datum on which the identifier of the entity depends; and the entity of said encrypted value sending a reply to authenticate said entity. The invention can be applied to the field of low-cost cryptography, especially the field of radio-identification.
Abstract:
A method and device for performing a cryptographic operation by a device controlled by a security application executed outside thereof in which a cryptographic value (y) is produced a calculation comprising at least one multiplication between first and second factors containing a security key (s) associated with the device and a challenge number (c) provided by the security application. The first multiplication factor comprises a determined number of bits (L) in a binary representation and the second factor is constrained in such a way that it comprises, in a binary representation, several bits at 1 with a sequence of at least L−1 bits at 0 between each pair of consecutive bits to 1 while the multiplication is carried out by assembling the binary versions of the first factor shifted according to positions of the bits at 1 of the second factor, respectively.
Abstract:
An asymmetrical cryptographic method of protecting an electronic chip against fraud in transactions between the electronic chip and an application, involving calculating an authentication value V from input parameters in the electronic chip. The chip produces a pseudo-random number r specific to the transaction by means of a serial pseudo-random generator included in the chip. The chip sends the application a parameter x calculated by the application prior to the transaction, linked to the random number r by a mathematical relationship, and stored in a data memory of the chip. The chip calculates a parameter y constituting the whole or a portion of the authentication value V by means of a serial function whose input parameters are at least the random number r specific to the transaction and a private key s belonging to an asymmetrical pair of keys. The chip sends the authentication value V to the application, and the application verifies the authentication value V by means of a verification function whose input parameters consist exclusively of public parameters including at least the public key p.
Abstract:
A method of pre-authentication of a first entity (10) by a second entity (1) communicating with each other via a wireless connection. The second entity (1) sends (23′) a challenge value (c). If the first entity (10) receives (23) a challenge value (c′), it applies to the received challenge value a predefined transformation (g) known to the second entity to obtain a first transformed value (r) and then sends (24) the first transformed value (r) obtained. If the second entity receives (24′) a transformed value (r′), it compares (25′) the received transformed value to a second transformed value (r″) obtained by applying the predefined transformation (g) to the challenge value sent and considers the pre-authentication to have succeeded if the result of comparing the second transformed value obtained and the transformed value received is below a predefined threshold (m).
Abstract:
A cryptographic method and a chip card which is used to carry out the method. Before any calculation is performed by a computing means of the chip card, the chip card reads (2) an integral list, in a storage means of a second entity, of identifiers of first proprietary entities of a chip card. Such list is linked to each status assigned to each of the first entities by the second entity. Subsequently, the chip card compares (3) the identifier stored in a storage means of the chip card with the contents of the list, in order to authorize (5) or prohibit (4) any calculation by the computing means depending on the result of the comparison.
Abstract:
The invention relates to a group of public-key cryptography schemas that use the discrete logarithm problem with the purpose of reducing the cost of developing, producing and maintaining a cryptographic unit. One of the entities (10) performs a calculation comprising at most a small number of additions, subtractions and multiplications of integers, said calculation being common to all of the schemas of the group. The aforementioned calculation is preferably the main calculation to be performed by the entity in question while most of the other calculations can be performed in advance. In particular, said calculation is of the y=ar+bs type, wherein r is a random number and s is a secret key that is specific to the entity (10). The calculation is common to a group of schemas for entity authentication, message authentication, digital signatures and key exchange.
Abstract translation:本发明涉及使用离散对数问题的一组公钥加密方案,其目的是降低开发,生产和维护加密单元的成本。 实体(10)中的一个执行包括至少少量的整数的加法,减法和乘法的计算,所述计算对于组的所有模式是共同的。 上述计算优选地是由所讨论的实体执行的主要计算,而大多数其他计算可以预先执行。 特别地,所述计算是y = ar + bs类型,其中r是随机数,s是对于实体(10)特有的秘密密钥。 该计算对于用于实体认证,消息认证,数字签名和密钥交换的一组模式是通用的。
Abstract:
Authentication and signature process with reduced number of calculations.The process involves a first entity called the “prover”, which possesses a public key v and a secret key s, these keys verify the relation v=s−t (mod n), where n is an integer called modulus and t is a parameter, and a second entity called a “verifier”, which knows the public key v. This process implies exchange of information following a “zero-knowledge protocol” between the verifier and the prover and cryptographic calculations on this information, some calculations being carried out “modulo n”. The process of the invention is characterised by the fact that the modulus n is specific to the prover that communicates this modulus to the verifier.
Abstract translation:验证和签名过程减少计算次数。 该过程涉及称为“证明者”的第一实体,其具有公钥 v和秘密密钥,这些密钥验证关系v = s -t SUP> mod n),其中 n是一个称为模数的整数,而 t是一个参数,称为“验证者”的第二个实体知道公钥 v。 该过程意味着在验证者和证明者之间的“零知识协议”之后交换信息,并且对该信息进行密码计算,一些计算被执行为“模” n“。 本发明的过程的特征在于,模数 n对于将该模量传递给验证者的证明者是特定的。
Abstract:
The invention concerns a list signature method comprising: an organization phase whereby reliable authority defines parameters for implementing an anonymous electronic signature; a phase which consists in registering persons on a list of authorized members to generate a list signature, during which each person calculates a private key, and the reliable authority delivers to each person a certificate for membership of the list; a phase which consists in defining a serial number; a phase wherein a member of the list generates by means of certificate a signature containing an element common to all the signatures issued by one single member with one single serial number; a phase which consists in verifying whether the signature has been generated by a member of the list and whether the serial number has been used to generate the signature.
Abstract:
A cryptographic method and a chip card which is used to carry out the method. Before any calculation is performed by a computing means of the chip card, the chip card reads (2) an integral list, in a storage means of a second entity, of identifiers of first proprietary entities of a chip card. Such list is linked to each status assigned to each of the first entities by the second entity. Subsequently, the chip card compares (3) the identifier stored in a storage means of the chip card with the contents of the list, in order to authorize (5) or prohibit (4) any calculation by the computing means depending on the result of the comparison.