Abstract:
In various implementations, an electronic signature platform implements an electronic signing workflow that includes receiving, from a signer device, annotations made by a signer role to an electronic document in response to a request to sign the electronic document. A reply is received, from an advisor device, is made by an advisor role and is responsive to the annotations. Based on providing the reply to the signer device, an electronic signature is received that is provided by the signer role in response to the request to sign the electronic document. An audit trail is maintained that includes descriptions for events associated with the electronic signature, and timestamps associated with the events. The annotations and the reply are recorded by one or more of the events.
Abstract:
Improved document processing workflows provide a secure electronic signature framework by reducing attack vectors that could be used to gain unauthorized access to digital assets. In one embodiment an electronically signed document is removed from an electronic signature server after signed copies of the document are distributed to all signatories. The electronic signature server optionally retains an encrypted copy of the signed document, but does not retain the decryption password. This limits the amount of data retained by the electronic signature server, making it a less attractive target for hackers. However, the electronic signature server still maintains audit data that can be used to identify a signed document and validate an electronic signature. For example, a hash of the document (or other document metadata) can be used to validate the authenticity of an electronically signed document based on a logical association between an electronic signature and the signed document.
Abstract:
A document originator establishes rules for authenticating an electronic signature. Such rules may require that any user who wishes to assent to the document terms provide biometric data in the form of an ocular image. In one implementation, such rules, as well as the document itself, are provided to a document recipient. If the document recipient assents to the document, an electronic signature is acquired from the document recipient, along with the required ocular image. The image is acquired using an infrared-enabled camera in the case of an iris image, or a retinal scanner in the case of a retina image. The acquired image can be authenticated by comparison to a trusted reference image, for example which may have been obtained from the document recipient during an initial registration process. If the comparison matches with a sufficiently high degree of confidence, then the electronic signature is considered authentic.
Abstract:
An E-signing workflow enables an E-document to be signed by multiple parties including a document signer and a third-party, such as a guarantor. The E-signing workflow employs various online detours that enable addition of third parties to an E-document. The E-signing workflow enables a complete audit trail to be easily and automatically developed for a document sender and signers, and associated with a particular E-document. Privacy concerns are addressed by way of secure electronic communications that take place between the parties within the E-signing workflow. The E-signing workflow reduces reliance on e-mail for document execution insofar as most if not all relevant activities in the E-signing workflow take place within the workflow and result in storage of the E-document and all relevant information within the E-signing solution itself.
Abstract:
The present disclosure is directed toward systems and methods for managing electronic documents. For example, systems and methods described herein can enable parties to an agreement outlined in an electronic document to add, track, and save electronic signatures associated with the electronic document. Furthermore, systems and methods described herein automatically identify expiration information associated with the electronic document and generate alerts for the electronic document based on the expiration information.
Abstract:
An electronic signature comprises an authenticated audio and/or visual recording of a spoken assent that conforms to a pre-established phrase. Alternatively, an electronic signature comprises an authenticated visual recording of a series of physical gestures that conforms to a pre-established sequence. Rules are established with respect to how the assent is to be recorded and authenticated. These rules, as well as the document itself, are provided to a document recipient. If the document recipient assents to the document, an audio and/or visual recording of the assent is generated. Location information that defines or approximates the geographical location where the document recipient recorded the assent is also optionally recorded as well. Once recorded, the assent can be authenticated using any of a variety of suitable authentication processes. An authenticated assent can be considered a legally binding electronic signature that forms a part of, or is otherwise associated with, the document.
Abstract:
In various implementations, a digital media recording is received from a user for conversion into an authenticated instrument of an oral agreement. The digital media recording is embedded into an electronic agreement document that is configured to represent an instrument of the oral contract terms between two or more contracting parties. The digital media recording forms a content portion of the electronic agreement document, which is reviewed by each of the contracting parties. A playback status associated with the content portion is monitored to determine that each of the contracting parties have substantially reviewed the terms of the agreement. Upon determining that the content portion has been substantially reviewed by all parties, the contracting parties are requested to electronically sign the electronic agreement document.
Abstract:
Improved document processing workflows provide a secure electronic signature framework by reducing attack vectors that could be used to gain unauthorized access to digital assets. In one embodiment an electronically signed document is removed from an electronic signature server after signed copies of the document are distributed to all signatories. The electronic signature server optionally retains an encrypted copy of the signed document, but does not retain the decryption password. This limits the amount of data retained by the electronic signature server, making it a less attractive target for hackers. However, the electronic signature server still maintains audit data that can be used to identify a signed document and validate an electronic signature. For example, a hash of the document (or other document metadata) can be used to validate the authenticity of an electronically signed document based on a logical association between an electronic signature and the signed document.
Abstract:
Improved workflows allow delegation of authority to electronically sign a document according to a delegation rule. The delegation rule specifies a document criterion and a delegate who is authorized to sign documents meeting the criterion. The criterion may be based on subject matter, document originator, or receipt time. Delegation rules can also be invoked in response to specified conditions or events, such as receipt of an automated out-of-office notification, or failure to receive any response to a signature request within a certain time. When an electronic signature system processes a document meeting the specified criterion, or detects one of the specified conditions or events, the document is sent to the delegate for signature instead of the originally intended signatory. The workflow initiator and delegator are optionally notified of such delegation before the document is sent to the delegate, thus giving him/her a degree of control over the delegation.
Abstract:
Improved document processing workflows provide a secure electronic signature framework by reducing attack vectors that could be used to gain unauthorized access to digital assets. In one embodiment an electronically signed document is removed from an electronic signature server after signed copies of the document are distributed to all signatories. The electronic signature server optionally retains an encrypted copy of the signed document, but does not retain the decryption password. This limits the amount of data retained by the electronic signature server, making it a less attractive target for hackers. However, the electronic signature server still maintains audit data that can be used to identify a signed document and validate an electronic signature. For example, a hash of the document (or other document metadata) can be used to validate the authenticity of an electronically signed document based on a logical association between an electronic signature and the signed document.