公开(公告)号：US20190065405A1

公开(公告)日：2019-02-28

申请号：US16002872

申请日：2018-06-07

Applicant: QUALCOMM Incorporated

Inventor： Kevin Christopher GOTZE ,  Can ACAR ,  David HARTLEY ,  Qing LI ,  Daniel GODAS-LOPEZ

IPC: G06F12/14 ,  G06F21/78 ,  G06F3/06

Abstract: Several features pertain to computing systems equipped to perform speculative processing and configured to access device memory (e.g. non-speculative or unspeculatable memory) and non-device memory (e.g. speculative or speculatable memory). Malicious attacks may seek to obtain sensitive information from such systems by exploiting speculative code execution. Herein, techniques are described whereby sensitive data is protected from such attacks by placing the data in a page of memory not ordinarily used as device memory, and then designating or marking the page as device memory (e.g. marking the page as unspeculatable). By designating the page as unspeculatable device memory, the processor does not speculatively access the sensitive information (e.g. speculation stops once a branch is invoked that would access the page) and so certain types of attacks can be mitigated. In some examples, additional malicious attack defenses or mitigations are performed such as address space un-mapping, address space layout randomization, or anti-replay-protection.