Abstract:
In order for supporting separate ciphering at an MeNB (20) and an SeNB (30), the MeNB (20) derives separate first and second keys (K UPenc-M , K UPenc-S ) from a third key (K eNB ). The first key (K UPenc-M ) is used for confidentially protecting first traffic transmitted over U-Plane between the MeNB (20) and a UE (10). The first key (K UPenc-M ) may be the same as current KUPenc or a new key. The second key (K UPenc-S ) is used for confidentially protecting second traffic transmitted over the U-Plane between the UE (10) and the SeNB (30). The MeNB (20) sends the second key (K UPenc-S ) to the SeNB (30). The UE (10) negotiates with the MeNB (20), and derives the second key (K UPenc-S ) based on a result of the negotiation.
Abstract:
A MTC device (10) and a MTC interworking function, MTC-IWF, (20) form a communication system and conduct communication with each other. In this communication system, a root key (K iwf) is securely shared between the MTC device (10) and the MTC-IWF (20). The MTC device (10) and the MTC-IWF (20) use the root key (K iwf) to respectively derive temporary keys (K di (K di conf, K di int)) for protecting the communication. The temporary keys provide integrity protection and confidentiality. The root key can be derived by the HSS or MME/SGSN/MSC and provided to the MTC-IWF. The root key can also be derived by the MTC-IWF based on received key derivation material. The described system is useful for the security of small data transmission in MTC system.
Abstract translation:MTC设备(10)和MTC互通功能MTC-IWF(20)形成通信系统并进行通信。 在该通信系统中,在MTC设备(10)和MTC-IWF(20)之间安全地共享根密钥(K iwf)。 MTC设备(10)和MTC-IWF(20)使用根密钥(K iwf)分别导出用于保护通信的临时密钥(K di(K di conf,K di int))。 临时密钥提供完整性保护和保密性。 根密钥可以由HSS或MME / SGSN / MSC导出并提供给MTC-IWF。 根密钥也可以基于接收的密钥导出材料由MTC-IWF导出。 所描述的系统对于MTC系统中的小数据传输的安全性是有用的。
Abstract:
A network node (21), which is placed within a core network, stores a list of network elements (24) capable of forwarding a trigger message to a MTC device (10). The network node (21) receives the trigger message from a transmission source (30, 40) placed outside the core network, and then selects, based on the list, one of the network elements to forward the trigger message to the MTC device (10). The MTC device (10) validates the received trigger message, and then transmits, when the trigger message is not validated, to the network node (21) a reject message indicating that the trigger message is not accepted by the MTC device (10). Upon receiving the reject message, the network node (21) forwards the trigger message through a different one of the network elements, or forwards the reject message to transmission source (30, 40) to send the trigger message through user plane.
Abstract:
[Technical Problem] If the related secure communication method is applied to the system which includes a plurality of the MTC devices (1101), traffic in a network (1100) would increase in proportion to the number of MTC devices (1101). [Solution to Problem] A communication apparatus (1000) in the present invention, which is connected to a network (1100) and a plurality of communication terminals (1101), includes: a group information sending means (1001) for sending group information, which is received from the network (1100); an access control means (1002) for 1) receiving a reply from the communication terminal (s) (1101) which responded to the group information and 2) sending the reply to the network (1100); and a temporary identifier and group key sending means (1003) for sending a temporary identifier and a group key to the communication terminal (1101) which responded to the group information, when the communication apparatus (1000) received the temporary identifier and the group key from the network (1100).
Abstract:
A UE (10) provides information on potential S'eNB(s). The information is forwarded from an MeNB (20_1) to an M'eNB (20_2) such that the M'eNB (20_2) can determine, before the handover happens, whether the M'eNB (20_2) will configure a new SeNB (S'eNB) and which S'eNB the M'eNB (20_2) will configure. In one of options, the MeNB (20_1) derives a key S'-KeNB for communication protection between the UE (10) and the S'eNB (30_1), and send the S'-KeNB to the M'eNB (20_2). In another option, the M'eNB (20_2) derives the S'-KeNB from a key KeNB* received from the MeNB (20_1). The M'eNB (20_2) sends the S'-KeNB to the S'eNB (30_1). Moreover, there are also provided several variations to perform SeNB Release, SeNB Addition, Bearer Modification and the like, in which the order and/or timing thereof can be different during the handover procedure.
Abstract:
An SeNB (30) informs an MeNB (20) that it can configure bearers for the given UE (10). At this time, the MeNB (20) manages the DRB status, and then sends a key S-KeNB to the SeNB (30). The MeNB (20) also sends a KSI for the S-KeNB to both of the UE (10) and the SeNB (30). After this procedure, the MeNB (20) informs an EPC (MME (40) and S-GW (50)) about the new bearer configured at the SeNB (30), such that the S-GW 50 can start offloading the bearer(s) to the SeNB 30. Prior to the offloading, the EPC network entity (MME (40) or S-GW (50)) performs verification that: 1) whether the request is coming from authenticated source (MeNB); and 2) whether the SeNB (30) is a valid eNB to which the traffic can be offload.
Abstract:
In order for effectively ensuring security for direct communication in ProSe, a ProSe Function (20) acquires from a 3rd party root keys for each of UEs (10_1-10_m) to derive a pair of session keys for securely conducting direct communication with different UEs, and distributes the acquired root keys to each of the UEs (10_1-10_m). Each of the UEs (10_1-10_m) derives the session keys by using one of the distributed root keys. Moreover, a plurality of UEs, which form a communication system, and are allowed to conduct direct communication with each other when the UEs are in proximity to each other, share public keys of the UEs therebetween through a node which supports the direct communication upon successfully registering the UEs with the node. Each of the UEs verifies at least a request for the direct communication by using one of the public keys.
Abstract:
In order to improve security upon distributing a group key, there is provided a gateway (20) to a core network for a group of MTC devices (10_1-10_n) communicating with the core network. The gateway (20) protects confidentiality and integrity of a group key, and distributes the protected group key to each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n). The protection is performed by using: a key (Kgr) that is preliminarily shared between the gateway (20) and each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n), and that is used for the gateway (20) to authenticate each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n) as a member of the group; or a key (K_iwf) that is shared between an MTC-IWF (50) and each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n), and that is used to derive temporary keys for securely conducting individual communication between the MTC-IWF (50) and each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n).
Abstract:
A method of performing authentication and authorization in Proximity based Service (ProSe) communication by a requesting device (31) which sends a request of a communication and a receiving device (32) which receives the request from the requesting device (31) and (32), the method including deriving session keys Kpc and Kpi from an unique key Kp at the requesting and receiving devices (31) and (32), using the session keys Kpc and Kpi for ProSe communication setup and direct communication between the requesting and receiving devices (31) and (32), starting the direct communication with the requesting and receiving devices (31) and (32). The key Kpc is confidentiality key and the key Kpi is integrity protection key.
Abstract:
A secure system 1 includes a requesting device (L01) which requests a communication, and a receiving device (L03) which receives a communication request from the requesting device (L01). The requesting device (L01) and the receiving device (L03) are members of a specific group when the requesting device (L01) discovers the receiving device (L03). The requesting device (L01) is allowed to communicate with the requesting device (L01) by a network used by the specific group or by the receiving device upon a proof being provided by a network used by the specific group, the devices (L01) and (L03) being able to perform a mutual authentication over a direct wireless interface, or the receiving device (L03) checking a list maintained by a user on members of the specific group of devices for ProSe service purpose.