Abstract:
Technologies are generally described for a framework to automatically estimate cross-VM covert channel capacity for channels such as central processing unit (CPU) load, CPU L2 cache, memory bus and disk bus. In some examples, the framework may include automated parameter tuning for various cross-VM covert channels to achieve high data rate and automated capacity estimation of those cross-VM covert channels through machine learning. Shannon Entropy formulation may be applied to estimate the capacity of cross-VM covert channels established on any given cloud platform. Furthermore, the noise of a cross-VM covert channel under a specific cloud platform may be statistically modeled to eliminate the covert channel implementations which perform poorly, thereby narrowing the parameter space. A number of sample signals may be collected with their corresponding ground truth labels, and machine learning tools may be utilized to cross-validate the samples and estimate the capacity of the covert channels.
Abstract:
Technologies are generally described to mitigate of sensor-based covert channels. In some examples, a foreground application may cause particular interactions with a device sensor to occur, where the interactions may encode potentially sensitive information. A background application may then attempt to retrieve the interactions from the device sensor and leak the encoded information. In order to address this, a sensor virtualization module may restrict background application access to the sensor, for example by preventing sensor access or by providing intentionally-degraded sensor data to background applications.
Abstract:
Technologies are described to mitigate cross-VM covert channel attacks in a cloud-computing network. A covert channel capacity for potential cross-VM covert channels may be monitored and trade-off factors for mitigations associated with different potential cross-VM covert channels determined. The trade-off factors may define a trade-off between a victim data loss if the corresponding mitigation is not deployed and a cloud-computing network performance loss if the corresponding mitigation is deployed. One or more of the mitigations may then be deployed or switched based on the trade-off factor. In some examples, a different one of the mitigations may be selected such that a payoff for a defender deploying the mitigations is increased. The payoff may be determined using Nash equilibriums.
Abstract:
Technologies are generally described to provision virtual machines with security requirements in datacenter. In some examples, a scheduler at a datacenter may receive a request to provision a virtual machine, where the virtual machine has an associated security requirement. Based on the security requirement, the scheduler may compute a maximum co-run probability of the virtual machine with at least one other virtual machine. The scheduler may then attempt to determine whether the virtual machine can be accommodated on an already-operational server while satisfying both the maximum co-run probability and a computing resource capacity associated with the virtual machine. If so, the virtual machine may be provisioned on the working server. Otherwise, the virtual machine may be provisioned on a new server if possible.