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公开(公告)号:US11281383B2
公开(公告)日:2022-03-22
申请号:US15940799
申请日:2018-03-29
Applicant: Intel Corporation
Inventor: Ting Lu , Sean R. Atsatt , Andrew Martyn Draper , Eric Michael Innis
IPC: G06F12/00 , G06F13/00 , G06F13/28 , G06F3/06 , G06F21/79 , G06F12/16 , G11C17/18 , G06F21/60 , G06F21/76 , G06F21/85 , G06F21/75
Abstract: The disclosed systems and methods may secure the fuse programming process in programmable devices to reduce or eliminate malicious discovery of data (e.g., the encryption key, the configuration bitstream) stored in nonvolatile memory via side-channel attacks. A processor may generate a randomized fuse list and the fuses may be blown in the randomized order. Additionally or alternatively, the processor may randomize the wait time between programming of each fuse. Further, the processor may generate a simplified fuse list including only fuses to be blown. The disclosed security systems and methods may be used individually or in combination to prevent determination of sensitive data, such as the encryption key, by monitoring, for example, power consumption in side-channel attacks.
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公开(公告)号:US20190042118A1
公开(公告)日:2019-02-07
申请号:US15940799
申请日:2018-03-29
Applicant: Intel Corporation
Inventor: Ting Lu , Sean R. Atsatt , Andrew Martyn Draper , Eric Michael Innis
Abstract: The disclosed systems and methods may secure the fuse programming process in programmable devices to reduce or eliminate malicious discovery of data (e.g., the encryption key, the configuration bitstream) stored in nonvolatile memory via side-channel attacks. A processor may generate a randomized fuse list and the fuses may be blown in the randomized order. Additionally or alternatively, the processor may randomize the wait time between programming of each fuse. Further, the processor may generate a simplified fuse list including only fuses to be blown. The disclosed security systems and methods may be used individually or in combination to prevent determination of sensitive data, such as the encryption key, by monitoring, for example, power consumption in side-channel attacks.
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