Abstract:
Methods and apparatus are provided for signing data transactions using one-time authentication passcodes. User authentication passcodes are generated by generating a time-based user authentication passcode based on a forward-secure pseudorandom number, wherein the generated time-based user authentication passcode is used for authentication of the user; and generating an event-based user authentication passcode based on a forward-secure pseudorandom number, wherein the generated event-based user authentication passcode is used to sign one or more data transactions. The generation of an event-based user authentication passcode can be performed on-demand. The generation of the event-based user authentication passcode can optionally be performed substantially simultaneously with the generation of the time-based user authentication passcode.
Abstract:
A method includes receiving, in a first device, an access request. The method further includes measuring a motion of the first device to determine a first motion value, performing a pairing protocol with a second device, and granting the access request responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol. The pairing protocol comprises a cryptographic commitment process. The successful pairing is based at least in part on a determination that a second motion value supplied by the second device substantially matches the first motion value. The cryptographic commitment process comprises sending a committed first motion value to the second device prior to receiving the second motion value from the second device.
Abstract:
An authentication system comprises multiple servers and a controller coupled to or otherwise associated with the servers. The controller is configured to control storage in the servers of respective chaff sets or other types of value sets, each including at least one secret value obscured within a distinct arrangement of other values. Each of the servers comprises a local verifier configured to generate an indication as to whether or not a received input value corresponds to one of the values in its value set. The controller comprises a global verifier configured to authenticate the received input value based on the indications generated by at least a subset of the servers. By way of example, the secret value may comprise a common value which is the same for all of the value sets, with the value sets otherwise including distinct values such that their intersection yields only the common value.
Abstract:
A distributed challenge-response protocol is carried out between a verifier and a prover. The verifier comprises servers storing respective shares of a set of challenge-response pairs. A particular challenge of one of the challenge-response pairs is sent to the prover, and a response to the challenge is received from the prover. The received response is authenticated as an appropriate response to the particular challenge based on indications from respective ones of at least a subset of the servers as to whether or not the received response matches respective reconstructed responses computed by those servers. A given one of the servers may be configured to reconstruct the particular challenge using information associated with the share stored in the given server and information associated with at least one other share stored in at least one other server, with the reconstructed challenge being to be sent to the prover as the particular challenge.
Abstract:
A first cryptographic device is configured to store a set of keys that is refreshed in each of a plurality of epochs. The first cryptographic device computes for each of at least a subset of the epochs at least one view based on at least a portion of the set of keys for that epoch, and transmits the views to a second cryptographic device in association with their respective epochs. At least one view computed for a current one of the epochs is configured for utilization in combination with one or more previous views computed for one or more previous ones of the epochs to permit the second cryptographic device to confirm authenticity of the set of keys for the current epoch. The first cryptographic device may include an authentication token and the second cryptographic device may include an authentication server.
Abstract:
In one aspect, a method comprises the steps of deriving a base point on an elliptic curve in a first processing device, generating authentication information in the first processing device utilizing the base point and a private key of the first processing device, and transmitting the authentication information from the first processing device to a second processing device. The base point on the elliptic curve may be derived, for example, by applying a one-way function to a current time value, or by computation based on a message to be signed.
Abstract:
A method comprises sending a set of values from a first party to a second party, the set of values being usable to compute a solution to a first problem involving inversion of a first one-way function. The method further comprises receiving a given value from the second party and utilizing the given value as an input for computing a solution to a second problem involving inversion of a second one-way function, wherein a valid solution to the second problem uses as input a valid solution to the first problem.
Abstract:
Time correction records are created for correcting timestamps of network logs to identify timing of network events in a predetermined time reference frame, the network logs being created by logging devices generating the timestamps in device time reference frames. For each logging device, one or more network events are generated or identified at respective event times in the predetermined time reference frame, each network event having a corresponding event-related network log from the logging device and a respective timestamp in a device time reference frame. For each network event, a respective difference value is calculated as a difference between the event time and a respective timestamp from a network log. For each logging device, a selection function is applied to the difference values to calculate a correction value, and the correction value is stored along with an identifier of the logging device in a time correction record.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus are provided for generation of forward secure pseudorandom numbers that are resilient to such forward clock attacks. A forward secure pseudorandom number is generated by obtaining a first state si corresponding to a current leaf node νi in a hierarchical tree, wherein the current leaf νi produces a first pseudorandom number ri−1; updating the first state si to a second state si+t corresponding to a second leaf node νi+t; and computing a second pseudorandom number ri+t−1 corresponding to the second leaf node νi+t, wherein the second pseudorandom number ri+t−1 is based on a forward clock reset index that identifies an instance of the hierarchical tree, wherein the instance of the hierarchical tree is incremented when one or more criteria indicating a forward clock attack are detected. The forward clock reset index can be encoded in a forward secure manner in the hierarchical tree.
Abstract translation:提供了用于产生对这种前向时钟攻击具有弹性的前向安全伪随机数的方法和装置。 通过获得与分层树中的当前叶节点&ngr; i对应的第一状态si来生成正向安全伪随机数,其中当前叶子n产生第一伪随机数ri-1; 将第一状态si更新为对应于第二叶节点ngr i + t的第二状态si + t; 并且计算与第二叶节点&ngr; i + t对应的第二伪随机数ri + t-1,其中第二伪随机数ri + t-1基于标识分层树的实例的前向时钟重置索引, 其中当检测到指示前向时钟攻击的一个或多个准则时,分层树的实例被增加。 正向时钟复位索引可以以分层树中的前向安全方式进行编码。
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a set of servers generates at least one challenge that is sent to a client. The servers receive from the client a response that includes a message generated as a function of the challenge. The response also includes a digital signature computed on the message using a secret key of a key pair generated for a current epoch. The client is authenticated based on indications from respective ones of the servers as to whether or not the received response is accepted as valid by that server. Other embodiments involve interaction between a set of servers and a relying party in authenticating a passcode, password or other information received from a client. The client in some embodiments may comprise a connected authentication token or other type of hardware or software authentication token.