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    GAME THEORY MODEL FOR PATROLLING AN AREA THAT ACCOUNTS FOR DYNAMIC UNCERTAINTY
    1.
    发明申请
    GAME THEORY MODEL FOR PATROLLING AN AREA THAT ACCOUNTS FOR DYNAMIC UNCERTAINTY 审中-公开
    用于计算动态不确定性帐户的游戏理论模型

    公开(公告)号：US20140279818A1

    公开(公告)日：2014-09-18

    申请号：US14216449

    申请日：2014-03-17

    申请人： Albert Xin Jiang ,  Zhengyu Yin ,  Chao Zhang ,  Milind Tambe ,  Sarit Kraus

    发明人： Albert Xin Jiang ,  Zhengyu Yin ,  Chao Zhang ,  Milind Tambe ,  Sarit Kraus

    IPC分类号： G06N5/04

    CPC分类号： G06N5/048 ,  G06N7/005 ,  G06Q10/047

    摘要： Game theory models may be used for producing a strategy and schedule for patrolling an area like a rail transportation system. In some instances, the model may account for events that cause a patrol unit to deviate from a patrol schedule and route. For example, a patrol schedule may be generated for one or more patrol units using a Bayesian Stackelberg game theory model based on a map of the public transportation system, a schedule of the transports, a list of the one or more patrolling units, a probability distribution for the occurrence of the passenger not paying to ride the transports, a list of the one or more possible events that would delay the patrol units, and a probability distribution for the occurrence of the one or more possible events that would delay the patrolling units represented by a Markov-decision process.

    摘要翻译： 游戏理论模型可用于制定巡视像铁路运输系统这样的区域的战略和时间表。 在某些情况下，该模型可能会导致巡视单位偏离巡逻进度和路线的事件。 例如，可以使用基于公共交通系统的地图，运输时间表，一个或多个巡逻单元的列表，一个或多个巡逻单元的列表，使用贝叶斯Stackelberg游戏理论模型来生成针对一个或多个巡逻单元的巡逻时间表 分配用于不支付乘坐运输工具的乘客的发生，将延迟巡逻单位的一个或多个可能的事件的列表，以及发生一个或多个可能的事件的概率分布，这些事件将延迟巡逻单位 由马尔科夫决定过程代表。

    Agent security via approximate solvers
    2.
    发明授权
    Agent security via approximate solvers 有权

    公开(公告)号：US08364511B2

    公开(公告)日：2013-01-29

    申请号：US13479884

    申请日：2012-05-24

    申请人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    发明人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    IPC分类号： G06Q10/00 ,  G06G7/48

    CPC分类号： G06N7/005 ,  G06F17/11 ,  G06Q10/063

    摘要： Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.

    Agent security via approximate solvers
    3.
    发明授权
    Agent security via approximate solvers 有权
    代理安全通过近似解算器

    公开(公告)号：US08195490B2

    公开(公告)日：2012-06-05

    申请号：US12251766

    申请日：2008-10-15

    申请人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    发明人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    IPC分类号： G06Q10/00 ,  G06G7/48

    CPC分类号： G06N7/005 ,  G06F17/11 ,  G06Q10/063

    摘要： Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.

    摘要翻译： 描述了有效的启发式方法，用于近似来自未知对手的威胁的安全域的最优引导策略。 这些问题可以被建模为Bayes-Stackelberg游戏。 启发式方法的实施例可以包括将巡逻或安全域问题定义为混合整数二次方案。 混合整数二次方程可以转换为混合整数线性程序。 对于单个追随者（例如强盗或恐怖分子）场景，混合整数线性程序可以在适当的约束条件下得到解决。 对于适用于多个跟随者情况的实施例，相关的混合整数二次方程和相关的混合整数线性程序可以被分解，例如通过在各种纯跟随器策略中将从追随者的响应函数从纯策略改变为加权组合， 权重是每个跟随器类型的发生概率。

    AGENT SECURITY VIA APPROXIMATE SOLVERS
    4.
    发明申请
    AGENT SECURITY VIA APPROXIMATE SOLVERS 有权
    代理安全通过近似解决方案

    公开(公告)号：US20120330727A1

    公开(公告)日：2012-12-27

    申请号：US13479884

    申请日：2012-05-24

    申请人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    发明人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    IPC分类号： G06Q10/04

    CPC分类号： G06N7/005 ,  G06F17/11 ,  G06Q10/063

    摘要： Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.

    摘要翻译： 描述了有效的启发式方法，用于近似来自未知对手的威胁的安全域的最优引导策略。 这些问题可以被建模为Bayes-Stackelberg游戏。 启发式方法的实施例可以包括将巡逻或安全域问题定义为混合整数二次方案。 混合整数二次方程可以转换为混合整数线性程序。 对于单个追随者（例如强盗或恐怖分子）场景，可以在适当的约束条件下解决混合整数线性程序。 对于适用于多个跟随者情况的实施例，可以分解相关的混合整数二次方程和相关的混合整数线性程序，例如通过将各种纯粹的跟随器策略的纯粹策略的追随者的响应函数改变为加权组合， 权重是每个跟随器类型的发生概率。

    Optimizing a security patrolling strategy using decomposed optimal Bayesian Stackelberg solver
    5.
    发明授权
    Optimizing a security patrolling strategy using decomposed optimal Bayesian Stackelberg solver 有权
    使用分解最优贝叶斯Stackelberg求解器优化安全巡逻策略

    公开(公告)号：US08224681B2

    公开(公告)日：2012-07-17

    申请号：US12253695

    申请日：2008-10-17

    申请人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    发明人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordóñez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    IPC分类号： G06Q10/00 ,  G06G7/48

    CPC分类号： G06F15/16 ,  G06F17/11 ,  G06N7/005 ,  G06Q10/063

    摘要： Techniques are described for Stackelberg games, in which one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by other agents (the followers or adversaries) before they choose their own strategies, in which the leader is uncertain about the types of adversaries it may face. Such games are important in security domains, where, for example, a security agent (leader) must commit to a strategy of patrolling certain areas, and robbers (followers) have a chance to observe this strategy over time before choosing their own strategies of where to attack. An efficient exact algorithm is described for finding the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in these games. This algorithm, Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver or “DOBSS,” is based on a novel and compact mixed-integer linear programming formulation. The algorithm can be implemented in a method, software, and/or system including computer or processor functionality.

    摘要翻译： Stackelberg游戏描述了一些技巧，其中一个代理人（领导者）必须承诺在选择自己的策略之前，其他代理商（追随者或对手）可以遵守的策略，其中领导者不确定 对手可能会面对。 这样的游戏在安全领域很重要，例如，安全代理（领导者）必须承诺对某些地区进行巡逻的策略，强盗（追随者）有机会在选择自己的策略之前，随时随地观察此策略 去攻击。 描述了一种有效的精确算法，用于找到领导者在这些游戏中承诺的最佳策略。 该算法，分解最优贝叶斯堆栈解算器或“DOBSS”是基于一种新颖紧凑的混合整数线性规划公式。 该算法可以在包括计算机或处理器功能的方法，软件和/或系统中实现。

    DECOMPOSED OPTIMAL BAYESIAN STACKELBERG SOLVER
    6.
    发明申请
    DECOMPOSED OPTIMAL BAYESIAN STACKELBERG SOLVER 有权
    分解最佳BAYESIAN STACKELBERG解决方案

    公开(公告)号：US20090099987A1

    公开(公告)日：2009-04-16

    申请号：US12253695

    申请日：2008-10-17

    申请人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordonez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    发明人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordonez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    IPC分类号： G06F15/18

    CPC分类号： G06F15/16 ,  G06F17/11 ,  G06N7/005 ,  G06Q10/063

    摘要： Techniques are described for Stackelberg games, in which one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by other agents (the followers or adversaries) before they choose their own strategies, in which the leader is uncertain about the types of adversaries it may face. Such games are important in security domains, where, for example, a security agent (leader) must commit to a strategy of patrolling certain areas, and robbers (followers) have a chance to observe this strategy over time before choosing their own strategies of where to attack. An efficient exact algorithm is described for finding the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in these games. This algorithm, Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver or “DOBSS,” is based on a novel and compact mixed-integer linear programming formulation. The algorithm can be implemented in a method, software, and/or system including computer or processor functionality.

    摘要翻译： Stackelberg游戏描述了一些技巧，其中一个代理人（领导者）必须承诺在选择自己的策略之前，其他代理商（追随者或对手）可以遵守的策略，其中领导者不确定 对手可能会面对。 这样的游戏在安全领域很重要，例如，安全代理（领导者）必须承诺对某些地区进行巡逻的策略，强盗（追随者）有机会在选择自己的策略之前，随时随地观察此策略 去攻击。 描述了一种有效的精确算法，用于找到领导者在这些游戏中承诺的最佳策略。 该算法，分解最优贝叶斯堆栈解算器或“DOBSS”是基于一种新颖紧凑的混合整数线性规划公式。 该算法可以在包括计算机或处理器功能的方法，软件和/或系统中实现。

    Agent security via approximate solvers
    7.
    发明申请
    Agent security via approximate solvers 有权
    代理安全通过近似解算器

    公开(公告)号：US20090119239A1

    公开(公告)日：2009-05-07

    申请号：US12251766

    申请日：2008-10-15

    申请人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordonez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    发明人： Milind Tambe ,  Praveen Paruchuri ,  Fernando Ordonez ,  Sarit Kraus ,  Jonathan Pearce ,  Janusz Marecki

    IPC分类号： G06N5/02 ,  G06F17/00

    CPC分类号： G06N7/005 ,  G06F17/11 ,  G06Q10/063

    摘要： Efficient heuristic methods are described for approximating the optimal leader strategy for security domains where threats come from unknown adversaries. These problems can be modeled as Bayes-Stackelberg games. An embodiment of the heuristic method can include defining a patrolling or security domain problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program. The mixed-integer quadratic program can be converted to a mixed-integer linear program. For a single follower (e.g., robber or terrorist) scenario, the mixed-integer linear program can be solved, subject to appropriate constraints. For embodiments applicable to multiple follower situations, the relevant mixed-integer quadratic program and related mixed-integer linear program can be decomposed, e.g., by changing the response function for the follower from a pure strategy to a weighted combination over various pure follower strategies where the weights are probabilities of occurrence of each of the follower types.

    摘要翻译： 描述了有效的启发式方法，用于近似来自未知对手的威胁的安全域的最优引导策略。 这些问题可以被建模为Bayes-Stackelberg游戏。 启发式方法的实施例可以包括将巡逻或安全域问题定义为混合整数二次方案。 混合整数二次方程可以转换为混合整数线性程序。 对于单个追随者（例如强盗或恐怖分子）场景，可以在适当的约束条件下解决混合整数线性程序。 对于适用于多个跟随者情况的实施例，可以分解相关的混合整数二次方程和相关的混合整数线性程序，例如通过将各种纯粹的跟随器策略的纯粹策略的追随者的响应函数改变为加权组合， 权重是每个跟随器类型的发生概率。

    Apparatus and method for agent-based feedback collection in a data broadcasting network
    9.
    发明授权
    Apparatus and method for agent-based feedback collection in a data broadcasting network 有权
    数据广播网络中基于代理的反馈收集的装置和方法

    公开(公告)号：US06449632B1

    公开(公告)日：2002-09-10

    申请号：US09285214

    申请日：1999-04-01

    申请人： Esther David ,  Shlomo Kipnis ,  Sarit Kraus ,  David Richardson

    发明人： Esther David ,  Shlomo Kipnis ,  Sarit Kraus ,  David Richardson

    IPC分类号： G06F1516

    CPC分类号： H04H60/46

    摘要： A system for collecting user feedback in a data broadcasting system, the system for collecting user feedback including a multiplicity of user profile agents, each user profile agent being associated with one of a multiplicity of users of the data broadcasting system and being operative to create a user profile based on activity of the one user, a user profile subsystem associated with a plurality of user profile agents chosen from among the multiplicity of user profile agents and operative to derive an integrated user profile based on the plurality of user profiles created by the plurality of user profile agents, and a broadcasting agent operatively associated with a broadcast center of the data broadcasting system and in operative communication with the user profile subsystem and receiving therefrom the integrated user profile.

    摘要翻译： 一种用于在数据广播系统中收集用户反馈的系统，用于收集包括多个用户简档代理的用户反馈的系统，每个用户简档代理与数据广播系统的多个用户之一相关联并且可操作以创建 基于一个用户的活动的用户简档，与从多个用户简档代理中选择的多个用户简档代理相关联的用户简档子系统，并且可操作以基于由多个用户简档代理创建的多个用户简档来导出集成用户简档 用户简档代理，以及与数据广播系统的广播中心可操作地相关联并与用户简档子系统进行操作性通信并从其接收集成用户简档的广播代理。