Abstract:
A method and a circuit for checking data transferred between a circuit and a processing unit, in which: the data originating from the circuit transit through a first buffer element having a size which is a multiple of the size of data to be subsequently delivered over a bus of the processing unit; an address provided by the processing unit for the circuit is temporarily stored in a second element; and the content of the first element is compared with current data originating from the circuit, at least when they correspond to an address of data already present in this first element.
Abstract:
A method for providing security to a chaining of useful operations of the same type, performed by an electronic circuit executing an algorithm, randomly introduces one or more dummy operations in the chaining of operations. This prevents any fraudulent access to protected data through a statistical analysis of electrical currents.
Abstract:
A circuit and a method are provided for securing a coprocessor dedicated to cryptography. The disclosed circuit includes a scrambling register and an accessory input register to convey scrambling information in the form of electrical signals that disturb the visibility of certain electrical signals associated with confidential information such as digital keys.
Abstract:
A method and a circuit for checking the coherence between data read from a first area of a memory of a microcontroller and the address of these data, including calculating a current digital signature of the read data by a function also taking into account the address of these data in the memory, and checking the coherence between the current signature and a previously-recorded signature.
Abstract:
The invention concerns a method for encrypting, with a random quantity (r), a calculation using at least a modular operation (3), the method consisting in multiplying a first modulo (n) by said random quantity, in taking as modulo of the operation, the result (m) of said multiplication and in carrying out a modular reduction of the result of the operation, on the basis of the first modulo (n).
Abstract:
A secured method of cryptographic computation to generate output data from input data and from a secret key includes a derived key scheduling step to provide a derived key from the secret key according to a known key scheduling operation. The method also includes a masking step, performed before the derived key scheduling step, to mask the secret key so that the derived scheduled key is different at each implementation of the method. The present method and component can be used in transfer type applications, such as bank type applications.
Abstract:
A method and a circuit for checking the coherence between data read from a first area of a memory of a microcontroller and the address of these data, including calculating a current digital signature of the read data by a function also taking into account the address of these data in the memory, and checking the coherence between the current signature and a previously-recorded signature.
Abstract:
A portable object includes an antenna and a processor coupled to the antenna. The processor is configured to communicate with an item of equipment according to a contactless communication protocol that contains an anticollision procedure. The processor is also configured to execute a plurality of software modules. The software modules include application modules and a triggering module, which is configured to cause a triggering of the anticollision procedure between the single portable object and the item of equipment. The processor is configured to cause a signal, which is generated by executing the triggering module, to be transmitted from the antenna to the time of equipment.
Abstract:
A method of secure cryptographic calculation includes formulating a first list of first random quantities, formulating a first non-linear substitution operator masked with at least part of the first list, and formulating a second list determined from the first list. The second list includes second random quantities respectively determined from the first random quantities. A second non-linear substitution operator masked with at least part of the second list is formulated. At least two successive implementations of a cryptographic calculation algorithm are performed that includes N rounds of calculations carried out successively to obtain output data based on input data and of a secret key, with a data path of the cryptographic calculation algorithm being masked.
Abstract:
A method for masking a digital quantity used by a calculation executed by an electronic circuit and including several iterations, each including at least one operation which is a function of at least one value depending on the digital quantity, the method including at least one first step of displacement of at least one operand of the operation in a storage element selected independently from the value.