Abstract:
A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.
Abstract:
Instructions and logic provide advanced paging capabilities for secure enclave page caches. Embodiments include multiple hardware threads or processing cores, a cache to store secure data for a shared page address allocated to a secure enclave accessible by the hardware threads. A decode stage decodes a first instruction specifying said shared page address as an operand, and execution units mark an entry corresponding to an enclave page cache mapping for the shared page address to block creation of a new translation for either of said first or second hardware threads to access the shared page. A second instruction is decoded for execution, the second instruction specifying said secure enclave as an operand, and execution units record hardware threads currently accessing secure data in the enclave page cache corresponding to the secure enclave, and decrement the recorded number of hardware threads when any of the hardware threads exits the secure enclave.
Abstract:
The present application is directed to establishing ownership of a secure workspace (SW). A client device may provide a SW data structure (SWDS) to a SW configurator. A SWDS may comprise a hash of an original SW and a public key, and may be signed by a private key corresponding to the public key. The SW configurator may cause an execution container (EC) to be generated including a SW initiated using the SWDS. The client device may claim SW ownership using a request (signed by the private key) transmitted along with a copy of the public key. SW ownership may be determined by an ownership determination module that verifies the signature of the request using the public key received with the request, determines a hash of the received public key and compares the hash of the received public key to a hash of the public key in the SWDS.