Abstract:
The present invention provides for streamlined issuance of certificates and other tokens that are contingent on key attestation of keys from a trusted platform module within a computing platform. Various methods are described for wrapping the requested token in a secret, such as an AES key, that is encrypted to a TPM based key in a key challenge. If the requesting platform fails the key challenge, the encrypted certificate or token cannot be decrypted. If requesting platform passes the challenge, the encrypted certificate or token can be decrypted using the AES key recovered from the key challenge.
Abstract:
Methods, systems, apparatuses, and computer-readable storage mediums described herein enable executable code of a hardware security platform (HSP) circuit to communicate with a hypervisor in a separate processor. The hypervisor generates and manages virtual machines. The HSP code comprises trusted platform module (TPM) logic, that processes TPM commands received via the hypervisor, and in response to the processing, communicates security information (e.g., measurements, keys, authorization data) with the virtual machines via the hypervisor. The TPM logic receives security information related to a virtual machine from the hypervisor and stores the security information in non-volatile memory of the HSP circuit, where security information from a particular VM is distinguishable from security information from another VM in the HSP memory. The hypervisor (and VMs) communicate via a network fabric with the HSP circuit within an SOC, or the HSP may reside on a discrete chip and communicate via a secure encrypted channel.
Abstract:
Embodiments described herein are directed to firmware policy enforcement of a computing device. For example, a security processor of the computing device is utilized to boot the computing device. During a boot session, the security processor loads and executes specialized firmware. The specialized firmware, when executed, causes the security processor to determine whether other types of firmware to be executed on the computing device is in compliance with a policy specified by the specialized firmware. Based at least on a determination that the other firmware is in compliance with the policy, the security processor executes the other firmware. Based at least on a determination that the other firmware is not in compliance with the policy, the security processor performs a mitigation with respect to the other firmware.
Abstract:
The present invention provides for streamlined issuance of certificates and other tokens that are contingent on key attestation of keys from a trusted platform module within a computing platform. Various methods are described for wrapping the requested token in a secret, such as an AES key, that is encrypted to a TPM based key in a key challenge. If the requesting platform fails the key challenge, the encrypted certificate or token cannot be decrypted. If requesting platform passes the challenge, the encrypted certificate or token can be decrypted using the AES key recovered from the key challenge.
Abstract:
The present invention provides for streamlined issuance of certificates and other tokens that are contingent on key attestation of keys from a trusted platform module within a computing platform. Various methods are described for wrapping the requested token in a secret, such as an AES key, that is encrypted to a TPM based key in a key challenge. If the requesting platform fails the key challenge, the encrypted certificate or token cannot be decrypted. If requesting platform passes the challenge, the encrypted certificate or token can be decrypted using the AES key recovered from the key challenge.
Abstract:
Embodiments described herein are directed to transferring the ownership of a computing device from one entity to another entity. For example, a security processor is utilized to boot the computing device. During a boot session, the security processor loads and executes boot code, which determines whether specialized firmware authorized by the current owner indicates whether a transfer of ownership is to occur. In response to determining that the specialized firmware indicates that a transfer of ownership is to occur, the secure processor loads and executes the specialized firmware. The specialized firmware, when executed, causes the security processor to program a set of fuses with the public key of the new owner. Execution of the specialized firmware also causes the security processor to invalidate the public key of the original owner, which is stored in another set of fuses.
Abstract:
Embodiments described herein are directed to transferring the ownership of a computing device from one entity to another entity. For example, a security processor is utilized to boot the computing device. During a boot session, the security processor loads and executes boot code, which determines whether specialized firmware authorized by the current owner indicates whether a transfer of ownership is to occur. In response to determining that the specialized firmware indicates that a transfer of ownership is to occur, the secure processor loads and executes the specialized firmware. The specialized firmware, when executed, causes the security processor to program a set of fuses with the public key of the new owner. Execution of the specialized firmware also causes the security processor to invalidate the public key of the original owner, which is stored in another set of fuses.
Abstract:
A device boots in a secure manner that allows measurements reflecting which components are loaded during booting to be generated. Measurements of such components, as well as of a device management agent and the security state of the device, are also obtained. The device management agent accesses an attestation service for an enterprise, which is a collection of resources managed by a management service. The device management agent provides the obtained measurements to the attestation service, which evaluates the measurements and based on the evaluation determines whether the device is verified for use in the enterprise. The management service uses this verification to ensure that the device management agent is running in a secure manner, is accurately providing indications of the state of the device to the management service, and is implementing policy received from the management service.
Abstract:
The present invention provides for streamlined issuance of certificates and other tokens that are contingent on key attestation of keys from a trusted platform module within a computing platform. Various methods are described for wrapping the requested token in a secret, such as an AES key, that is encrypted to a TPM based key in a key challenge. If the requesting platform fails the key challenge, the encrypted certificate or token cannot be decrypted. If requesting platform passes the challenge, the encrypted certificate or token can be decrypted using the AES key recovered from the key challenge.
Abstract:
A device boots in a secure manner that allows measurements reflecting which components are loaded during booting to be generated. Measurements of such components, as well as of a device management agent and the security state of the device, are also obtained. The device management agent accesses an attestation service for an enterprise, which is a collection of resources managed by a management service. The device management agent provides the obtained measurements to the attestation service, which evaluates the measurements and based on the evaluation determines whether the device is verified for use in the enterprise. The management service uses this verification to ensure that the device management agent is running in a secure manner, is accurately providing indications of the state of the device to the management service, and is implementing policy received from the management service.