Abstract:
A method of protecting a Rijndael-type algorithm executed by an electronic circuit against side channel attacks, wherein: each block of data to be encrypted or to be decrypted is masked with a first mask before a non-linear block substitution operation is applied based on a substitution box, and is then unmasked with a second mask after the substitution; and the substitution box is recalculated, block by block, before the non-linear operation is applied, the processing order of the blocks of the substitution box being submitted to a random permutation, commutative with the non-linear substitution operation.
Abstract:
A method of verifying the sensitivity of an electronic circuit executing a Rijndael-type algorithm to side channel attacks, wherein: each block of data to be encrypted or to be decrypted is masked with a first mask before a non-linear block substitution operation is applied based on a substitution box, and is then unmasked with a second mask after the substitution; the substitution box is recalculated, block by block, before the non-linear operation is applied, the processing order of the blocks of the substitution box being submitted to a permutation; and a side channel attack is performed on the steps of recalculating, block by block, the substitution box.
Abstract:
A method of protecting a Rijndael-type algorithm executed by an electronic circuit against side channel attacks, wherein: each block of data to be encrypted or decrypted is masked with a first mask before applying a non-linear block substitution operation from a first substitution box, and is then unmasked by a second mask after the substitution; the substitution box is recalculated, block by block, before applying the non-linear operation, the processing order of the blocks of the substitution box being submitted to a random permutation; and the recalculation of the substitution box uses the second mask as well as third and fourth masks, the sum of the third and fourth masks being equal to the first mask.
Abstract:
A method of protecting a Rijndael-type algorithm executed by an electronic circuit against side channel attacks, wherein: each block of data to be encrypted or to be decrypted is masked with a first mask before a non-linear block substitution operation is applied based on a substitution box, and is then unmasked with a second mask after the substitution; and the substitution box is recalculated, block by block, before the non-linear operation is applied, the processing order of the blocks of the substitution box being submitted to a random permutation, commutative with the non-linear substitution operation.
Abstract:
A method of protecting a Rijndael-type algorithm executed by an electronic circuit against side channel attacks, wherein: each block of data to be encrypted or decrypted is masked with a first mask before applying a non-linear block substitution operation from a first substitution box, and is then unmasked by a second mask after the substitution; the substitution box is recalculated, block by block, before applying the non-linear operation, the processing order of the blocks of the substitution box being submitted to a random permutation; and the recalculation of the substitution box uses the second mask as well as third and fourth masks, the sum of the third and fourth masks being equal to the first mask.
Abstract:
A method of verifying the sensitivity of an electronic circuit executing a Rijndael-type algorithm to side channel attacks, wherein: each block of data to be encrypted or to be decrypted is masked with a first mask before a non-linear block substitution operation is applied based on a substitution box, and is then unmasked with a second mask after the substitution; the substitution box is recalculated, block by block, before the non-linear operation is applied, the processing order of the blocks of the substitution box being submitted to a permutation; and a side channel attack is performed on the steps of recalculating, block by block, the substitution box.