Abstract:
Undesirable electronic messages, such as the unsolicited broadcast e-mail known as spam, is not only a nuisance, but wastes both computer and user resources. Conversely, desirable electronic messages with sensitive content is important to secure, so that it is not forged, tampered or revealed. Accordingly, the present invention provides cryptographic methods that simultaneously secures electronic communication and helps fight spam.
Abstract:
A partial revocation list and a system and method for using the partial revocation list for tracking the authenticity of replacement cartridges in a manufactured device to inhibit cloning of the cartridges is provided. A revocation pool is maintained by a manufacturer who chooses a partial revocation list from the revocation pool to store in the memory of the cartridge. The device stores its own revocation list, informs the manufacturer of cartridges which have been used and checks when a new device is installed to ensure a cloned replacement is not being used. The partial revocation list distributes enough revocation information to devices to statistically impair the cartridge yield of a cloning operation.
Abstract:
Improper re-use of a static Difhe-Hellman (DH) private key may leak information about the key. The leakage is prevented by a key derivation function (KDF), but standards do not agree on key derivation functions. The module for performing a DH private key operation must somehow support multiple different KDF standards. The present invention provides an intermediate approach that neither attempts to implement all possible KDF operations, nor provide unprotected access to the raw DH private key operation. Instead, the module performs parts of the KDF operation, as indicated by the application using the module. This saves the module from implementing the entire KDF for each KDF needed. Instead, the module implements only re-usable parts that are common to most DFs.Furthermore, when new KDFs are required, the module may be able to support them if they built on the parts that the module has implemented.
Abstract:
Methods for choosing groups for a static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol to inhibit active attacks by an adversary are provided. In mod p groups, an even h is chosen of value approximately (9/16)(log 2 n) 2 , values r and n are determined using sieving and primality testing on r and n, and a value t is found to compute p = tn + 1 wherein p is prime. In elliptic curve groups defined over a binary filed, a random curve is chosen, the number of points on the curve is counted and this number is checked for value of 2n wherein n is prime and n-1 meets preferred criteria. In elliptic curve groups defined over a prime field of order q, a value n = hr + 1 is computed, wherein n is prime and n-1 meets preferred criteria, and a complex multiplication method is applied on n to produce a value q and an elliptic curve E defined over q and having an order n.
Abstract:
A method of transmitting messages from a sender to a recipient over a wireless channel, the messages including a sequence counter and a frame counter. The method comprises establishing initial values of the sequence counter and the frame counter at the sender. Initial values of the frame counter and the sequence counter are provided to the recipient. The sender sends compressed messages including the value of the sequence counter and not the frame counter and monitors for an acknowledgement of receipt by the recipient. When no acknowledgment is received, the sender sends uncompressed messages until an acknowledgement of receipt is received from the recipient. The sequence counter is incremented and the next value of the frame counter is established as the integer next larger than previous value of the frame counter which is congruent to the sequence counter modulo 256.
Abstract:
A key establishment protocol based on exponential key exchange techniques included the generation of a value of cryptographic function, typically a hash, of a session key and public information. This value is transferred between correspondents together with the information necessary to generate the session key. Provided the session key has not been compromised, the value of the cryptographic function will be the same at each of the correspondents. The value of the cryptographic function cannot be compromised or modified without access to the session key.
Abstract:
A method of authenticating a pair of correspondents C, S to permit the exchange of information therebetween, each of the correspondents having a respective private key, e, d and a public key, Q?u? and Q?s? derived from a generator element of a group and a respective ones of the private keys, e, d, the method comprising the steps of: a first of the correspondents C generating a session value x; the first correspondent generating a private value t, a public value derived from the private value t and the generator and a shared secret value derived from the private value t and the public key Q?s? of the second correspondent; the second correspondent generating a challenge value y and transmitting the challenge value y to the first correspondent; the first correspondent in response thereto computing a value h by applying a function H to the challenge value y, the session value x, the public value an of the first correspondent; the first correspondent signing the value h utilizing the private key e; the first correspondent transmitting to the second correspondent the signature including the session value x, and the private value t; and the second correspondent verifying the signature utilizing the public key Q?u? of the first correspondent and whereby verification of the signature authenticates the first correspondent to the second correspondent.
Abstract:
A finite field multiplier in GF2 is formed from a pair of m-celled shift registers and an m-celled accumulating cell. Logical connections are established to generate grouped terms in respective cells of the accumulating cell upon retention of the vector of the subfield elements in each shift register. Each cell contains a subfield element in the form of an n-tuple and the logical connections perform arithmetic operations in accordance with the inherent subfield arithmetic to provide an n-tuple in each cell of the accumulating register. A product of two vectors can be obtained in m clock cycles. By mapping between registers, squaring of a vector can be obtained in one clock cycle.
Abstract:
A method for providing Cheon-resistance security for a static elliptic curve Diffie- Hellman cryptosystem (ECDH), the method including providing a system for message communication between a pair of correspondents, a message being exchanged in accordance with ECDH instructions executable on computer processors of the respective correspondents, the ECDH instructions using a curve selected from a plurality of curves, the selecting including choosing a range of curves; selecting, from the range of curves, curves matching a threshold efficiency; excluding, within the selected curves, curves which may include intentional vulnerabilities; and electing, from non-excluded selected curves, a curve with Cheon resistance, the electing comprising a curve from an additive group of order q , wherein q is prime, such that q-1 = cr and q +1 = ds , where r and s are primes and c and d are integer Cheon cofactors of the group, such that cd ≤ 48.
Abstract:
Methods, systems, and computer programs for generating cryptographic function parameters are described. In some examples, source code that defines seed information and a pseudorandom function is accessed. A parameter for a cryptographic function by operation of one or more data processors is generated. The parameter is generated from the seed information and the pseudorandom function. The parameter has a larger size in memory than the source code that defines the seed information and the pseudorandom function.