Abstract:
Disclosed herein are methods and systems for encrypting communications using a secure element. An embodiment takes the form of a method including the steps of performing a key- exchange procedure with an endpoint via a voice-communication device to obtain a symmetric seed key for a secure voice session with the endpoint; generating first and second symmetric session keys for the secure voice session based on the obtained symmetric seed key; receiving outbound voice packets from the voice-communication device in connection with the secure voice session, each outbound voice packet including a header and an unencrypted payload; using a first symmetric encryption algorithm and the first symmetric session key, followed by a second symmetric encryption algorithm and the second symmetric session key to generate and output twice-encrypted outbound-voice-packet payloads to the voice-communication device for transmission to the endpoint in connection with the secure voice session.
Abstract:
A system and method are described for establishing a secondary communication channel between an IoT device and a client device. For example, one embodiment of a method comprises: establishing a primary secure communication channel between the IoT device and an IoT service using a primary set of keys; performing a secondary key exchange using the primary secure communication channel, the client device and the IoT device each being provided with a secondary set of keys following the secondary key exchange; detecting that the primary secure communication channel is inoperative; and responsively establishing a secondary secure wireless connection between the client device and the IoT device using the secondary set of keys, the client device being provided with access to data and functions made available by the IoT device over the secondary secure wireless connection.
Abstract translation:描述了用于在IoT设备和客户端设备之间建立辅助通信信道的系统和方法。 例如,方法的一个实施例包括:使用主要密钥集建立IoT设备和IoT服务之间的主要安全通信信道; 使用所述主安全通信信道执行次密钥交换,所述客户端设备和所述IoT设备均在所述次密钥交换之后被提供有次密钥集合; 检测到主安全通信信道不起作用; 以及响应地使用辅助密钥集在客户端设备和IoT设备之间建立辅助安全无线连接,向客户端设备提供对由IoT设备通过辅助安全无线连接可用的数据和功能的访问。 p >
Abstract:
Embodiments of the invention provide methods and apparatuses for session key generation, which use Diffie-Hellman procedure in both user equipment and network to prevent an attacker from breaking the session key by simply listening to signal exchanges passively when the attacker possesses credentials of a USIM card.
Abstract:
In an example, there is disclosed a computing apparatus, comprising : a trusted execution environment (TEE); and a security engine operable to: identify a key negotiation for an encrypted connection between a first device and a second device; request a service appliance key for the key negotiation; receive the service appliance key; and perform a service appliance function on traffic between the first device and the second device. There is also disclosed a method of providing the security engine, and a computer-readable medium having stored thereon executable instructions for providing the security engine.
Abstract:
Systems, methods, and non-transitory computer-readable storage media for a non-replayable communication system are disclosed. A first device associated with a first user may have a public identity key and a corresponding private identity. The first device may register the first user with an authenticator by posting the public identity key to the authenticator. The first device may perform a key exchange with a second device associated with a second user, whereby the public identity key and a public session key are transmitted to the second device. During a communication session, the second device may transmit to the first device messages encrypted with the public identity key and/or the public session key. The first device can decrypt the messages with the private identity key and the private session key. The session keys may expire during or upon completion of the communication session.
Abstract:
Systems and methods used to securely communicate a shared key to devices. One embodiment describes a method to securely communicate a shared key to a first device (32) and a second device (34) that includes receiving (52), using the first device, a shared key and unique identifier pairing associated with the first device (32) from a key generator (36); receiving (54), using a trusted third party (38), the shared key and unique identifier pairing from the key generator (36); generating (80), using the first device (32), a signature using the unique identifier and the shared key; transmitting (82), using the first device (32), the signature and the unique identifier to the trusted third party (38); verifying (86), using the trusted third party (38), the unique identifier based on the signature; determining, using the trusted third party (38), the shared key when the unique identifier is verified; and transmitting (88), using the trusted third party (38), the shared key to the second device (34) to enable the first device (32) and the second device (34) to communicate securely by encoding and decoding communicated data using the shared key.
Abstract:
Fast mobile device authentication can be achieved during inter-domain handovers between administrative domains operating under a federated service agreement using pseudonym identifications (PID). Specifically, the mobile device may derive a PID when obtaining authentication in a first wireless network, and then use the PID to obtain fast authentication in a second wireless network. The PID may be generated during an Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) authentication procedure using public keys associated with the mobile device and the first wireless network. The PID (or a derivative thereof) may then be provided to an authentication server in a second wireless network for validation. The PID may be validated by the second authentication server via online or offline validation procedures. The PID can also be used as an electronic coupon for accessing the second network.
Abstract:
Systems and methods for more efficient mesh associations are disclosed. In some aspects, a non-member device may join a mesh network via a four way message exchange with any member device of the mesh network. The four way message exchange between the mesh member device and the non-member device provides for authentication and association between the two devices. As a result of the four way message exchange, a common group key is provided to the non-member device. The common group key is utilized by all mesh member devices to encrypt and decrypt group addressed mesh messages exchanged between any of the mesh member devices. Association identifiers for each of the two devices are also provided during the exchange. PHY/MAC capabilities may also be exchanged. In some aspects, IP address assignment for the two devices may also be accomplished during the four way message handshake.
Abstract:
L'invention concerne un procédé de génération d'une clé d'authentification dans un module de sécurité (10) qui mémorise une première clé maîtresse (K_root_A) partagée avec une première entité réseau (MNOA), le procédé comprenant les étapes suivantes : - envoi (E0, E0') à une deuxième entité réseau (MNOB) d'une requête de transfert, - réception (E5, E10') de la deuxième entité d'un premier secret (S_b1), - génération (E8, E11') d'une clé secrète de génération (Kb1) à partir de la première clé maîtresse et du premier secret, - réception (E13, E10') de la deuxième entité d'un deuxième secret (S_b2) et d'un message d'authentification du deuxième secret calculé au moyen de la clé secrète de génération transmise à la deuxième entité par la première entité, - vérification (E14, E12') du message d'authentification au moyen de la clé secrète de génération, - génération (E15, E13') d'une deuxième clé maîtresse (K_root_B) si la vérification est positive, ladite deuxième clé maîtresse étant générée à partir du deuxième secret (S_b2) et de la clé secrète de génération (Kb1), et utilisée pour générer une clé d'authentification pour accéder à un réseau de la deuxième entité réseau.