Abstract:
A user of a mobile communications device may access services in a target domain using a source domain identity that is used to access services in a source domain. To enable such a use of the source domain identity in the target domain, the source domain identity may first be enrolled in the target domain. The enrollment may be facilitated by an enrollment entity at the target domain, such as a gateway or an OpenID server for example. The enrollment entity may establish a secure channel with the user's device for enabling enrollment of the source domain identity. Once enrolled, the source domain identity may be used for authentication of the user in the target domain. Enrollment of the source domain identity and/or authentication of the user based on the enrolled source domain identity may be implemented using a local OpenID provider (OP) residing on the user's device.
Abstract:
Persistent communication layer credentials generated on a persistent communication layer at one network may be leveraged to perform authentication on another. For example, the persistent communication layer credentials may include application- layer credentials derived on an application layer. The application-layer credentials may be used to establish authentication credentials for authenticating a mobile device for access to services at a network server. The authentication credentials may be derived from the application- layer credentials of another network to enable a seamless handoff from one network to another. The authentication credentials may be derived from the application- layer credentials using reverse bootstrapping or other key derivation functions. The mobile device and/or network entity to which the mobile device is being authenticated may enable communication of authentication information between the communication layers to enable authentication of a device using multiple communication layers.
Abstract:
A trusted computing environment, such as a smartcard, UICC, Java card, global platform, or the like may be used as a local host trust center and a proxy for a single-sign on (SSO) provider. This may be referred to as a local SSO provider (OP). This may be done, for example, to keep authentication traffic local and to prevent over the air communications, which may burden an operator network. To establish the OP proxy in the trusted environment, the trusted environment may bind to the SSO provider in a number of ways. For example, the SSO provider may interoperate with UICC-based UE authentication or GBA. In this way, user equipment may leverage the trusted environment in order to provide increased security and reduce over the air communications and authentication burden on the OP or operator network.
Abstract:
Secure communications may be established amongst network entities for performing authentication and/or verification of the network entities. For example, a user equipment (UE) may establish a secure channel with an identity provider, capable of issuing user identities for authentication of the user/UE. The UE may also establish a secure channel with a service provider, capable of providing services to the UE via a network. The identity provider may even establish a secure channel with the service provider for performing secure communications. The establishment of each of these secure channels may enable each network entity to authenticate to the other network entities. The secure channels may also enable the UE to verify that the service provider with which it has established the secure channel is an intended service provider for accessing services.
Abstract:
A trustworthiness of a sender and/or a sending device of a network communication may be assessed prior to enabling a connection between the sending device and a receiving device. A scorecard associated with the sender may be used to assess the trustworthiness of the sender and/or the sending device. The scorecard may include information, such as a claim, a category of claim types, a score, and/or an attribute/state field, that is used to indicate the trustworthiness associated with the sender and/or the sending device. The trustworthiness of the sender may also be assessed based on a verification of the information in the scorecard. The information in the scorecard be verified by a network entity and an indication may be added to the scorecard indicating that the information in the scorecard has been verified.
Abstract:
Systems, methods, and apparatus are provided for generating verification data that may be used for validation of a wireless transmit-receive unit (WTRU). The verification data may be generated using a tree structure having protected registers, represented as root nodes, and component measurements, represented as leaf nodes. The verification data may be used to validate the WTRU. The validation may be performed using split-validation, which is a form of validation described that distributes validation tasks between two or more network entities. Subtree certification is also described, wherein a subtree of the tree structure may be certified by a third party.
Abstract:
Systems, methods, and instrumentalities are disclosed that may provide for integration of trusted OpenID (TOpenID) with OpenID. The authentication may be accomplished, in part, via Communications between a trusted ticket server on a UE and a network application function. The UE may retrieve platform validation data (e.g., from a trusted platform module on the UE). The UE may receive a platform verification in response to the platform validation data. The platform verification may indicate that the network application function has verified the platform validation data and the user. The platform verification may indicate that the platform validation data matches a previously generated reference value.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus are disclosed to provide protection against Unsolicited Communication (UC) in a network, such as, without limitation, an Internet Protocol (IP) Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). A communication may originate from a sending device (210) and may be intended for delivery to a receiving device (250). A network may determine authentication information associated with the sending device. The network may send the authentication information to a receiving entity to evaluate if the communication is unsolicited using the authentication information. If the communication is determined to be acceptable, a connection associated with the communication may be allowed.
Abstract:
Users desire useable security or a seamless means for accessing internet services whereby user interaction in the provisioning of credentials may be kept to a minimum or even eliminated entirely. The Single Sign-On identity management concept enables user- assisted and network- assisted authentication for access to desired services. To enable seamless authentication services to users, a unified framework and a protocol layer interface for managing multiple authentication methods may be used. A user equipment, UE, comprises a user application (202, 204) configured to communicate with a service provider to access a service and a plurality of network- assisted authentication modules (208 - 216), each network-assisted authentication module corresponding to a different network-assisted authentication protocol. The UE further comprises a single sign-on subsystem (206) configured to authenticate a user of the UE based on user-assisted authentication information at the UE and/or network and to select one of the network-assisted authentication modules based on one more policies.