Abstract:
A method includes receiving (610, 712), from a device (302), (i) a certificate request for a certification authority (304) and (ii) a first digital certificate (404). The certificate request is digitally signed by the first device, and the first digital certificate is stored in the device. The method also includes verifying (612, 714), at the certification authority, the first digital certificate using a second digital certificate of another certification authority (320). The method further includes verifying (614, 718) a digital signature of the certificate request using the first digital certificate. In addition, the method includes, after verifying the first digital certificate and the digital signature, transmitting (618, 722) a second digital certificate (406) to the device.
Abstract:
A method includes transmitting (403), over a virtual private network (VPN) (234) to a remotely-located control platform (210), a request (316) for first information associated with a BOOTP protocol synchronization process (310). The method also includes receiving (405), from the control platform, a first response (318) comprising the requested first information. The method further includes receiving (407), over a local network (228) from an embedded device (106, 220a-220b) in a distributed control system (100, 200), a request (322) for second information associated with the BOOTP protocol. In addition, the method includes transmitting (409), to the embedded device, a second response (326) comprising the requested second information.
Abstract:
An apparatus includes a first distributed control system (DCS) node (202). The first DCS includes at least one interface configured to communicate, over a network (128), with a second DCS node (204). The first DCS node also includes at least one processing device. The processing device is configured to exchange a security association policy (411) with the second DCS node. The processing device is also configured to exchange public keys (412) with the second DCS node using the security association policy. The processing device is also configured to send a public key (542) of the second DCS node to a field programmable gate array (402) of the first DCS node. The processing device is also configured to receive a shared secret (544) from the field programmable gate array. The processing device is also configured to generate a hash (546) of a message using the shared secret.
Abstract:
A method includes receiving (304), at a first distributed control system (DCS) node (202) over a network, information associated with a security manager (208). The method also includes establishing (306, 310) multiple communication channels between the first DCS node and the security manager over the network using the information, where the communication channels include a non-secure channel and a secure channel. The method further includes receiving (308) security credentials from the security manager at the first DCS node over the non-secure channel and receiving (312) a security policy and an activation time from the security manager at the first DCS node over the secure channel. In addition, the method includes transitioning (316) the first DCS node to communicate with a second DCS node over the network using the security policy at the activation time.
Abstract:
A method includes verifying (402) that firmware of a device (200) is trusted and contains a root of trust. The method also includes verifying (406) that a protected storage (214) of the device contains a private or secret key associated with a device certificate (DevCert) that is stored in a persistent storage (204, 210, 212) of the device. The method further includes verifying (414) the device certificate of the device using the root of trust. In addition, the method includes, in response to verifying that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate and verifying the device certificate, determining that the device is a genuine device. The root of trust could include a trusted certificate or a trusted public key.
Abstract:
A method includes securely booting a device (106, 114, 116, 122, 124, 130, 132, 138, 140, 142, 200) using a bootloader (FSBL, SSBL), where the bootloader is digitally signed (FSBL.sig, SSBL.sig) using a first cryptographic key (SSK) associated with the bootloader. The method also includes executing one or more kernel or user applications using the device, where the one or more kernel or user applications are digitally signed (Partition1.sig, Partition2.sig, Partition3.sig) using one or more second cryptographic keys (TSK) associated with the one or more kernel or user applications. In addition, the method includes using (800) an in-band channel to update or replace the first cryptographic key.