Abstract:
Embodiments of the invention can establish secure communications using a single non-traceable request message from a first computer and a single non-traceable response message from a second computer. Non-traceability may be provided through the use of blinding factors. The request and response messages can also include signatures that provide for non-repudiation. In addition, the encryption of the request and response message is not based on the static keys pairs, which are used for validation of the signatures. As such, perfect forward secrecy is maintained.
Abstract:
Embodiments can provide methods for securely provisioning sensitive credential data, such as a limited use key (LUK) onto a user device. In some embodiments, the credential data can be encrypted using a separate storage protection key and decrypted only at the time of a transaction to generate a cryptogram for the transaction. Thus, end-to-end protection can be provided during the transit and storage of the credential data, limiting the exposure of the credential data only when the credential data is required, thereby reducing the risk of compromise of the credential data.
Abstract:
Embodiments extend protocols for secure communication between two parties to allow a party to securely communicate with multiple parties using a single message. For example, the sending party can determine a unique shared secret for each recipient and encrypt data for a recipient using a session key generated from the corresponding shared secret. The encrypted data can be combined into a single message, and each recipient can decrypt only the subset of the message that it is authorized to.
Abstract:
Embodiments of the invention relate to systems and methods for confidential mutual authentication. A first computer may blind its public key using a blinding factor. The first computer may generate a shared secret using its private key, the blinding factor, and a public key of a second computer. The first computer may encrypt the blinding factor and a certificate including its public key using the shared secret. The first computer may send its blinded public key, the encrypted blinding factor, and the encrypted certificate to the second computer. The second computer may generate the same shared secret using its private key and the blinded public key of the first computer. The second computer may authenticate the first computer by verifying its blinded public key using the blinding factor and the certificate of the first computer. The first computer authenticates the second computer similarly.
Abstract:
Systems and methods are provided for confidential communication management. For instance, a server computer can include a protected server key identifier in a response message to a client computer. The protected server key identifier can include a server key identifier that identifies a server private key used to encrypt the response message. The client computer can pass the protected server key back in a subsequent request, so that the server computer can identify the proper server private key to use for decrypting the request message. In another example, a message may include encrypted protocol data (e.g., cipher suite) and separately encrypted payload data. The encrypted payload data can include a plurality of individually encrypted payload data elements.
Abstract:
Systems and methods are disclosed for performing a secure exchange of encryption keys (e.g., public keys) between two devices. One or more initialization keys are stored at both devices. In some embodiments, at least one device (e.g., a reader device) stores the initialization key(s) (e.g., a symmetric key, an asymmetric key pair) in local memory as part of performance of a manufacturing process for the device. The second device (e.g., a thin client device) may receive the initialization key(s) from an acceptance cloud (e.g., a server computer configured to perform terminal processing). The initialization key(s) are utilized to perform a secure exchange of the devices' respective public keys. Once these public keys are exchanged, the devices may proceed to establishing a secure connection with which subsequent operations may be performed.
Abstract:
Methods and systems for consensus-based online authentication are provided. An encryption device may be authenticated based on an authentication cryptogram generated by the encryption device. The encryption device may transmit a request for security assessment to one or more support devices. The support devices may individually assess the encryption device, other security devices, and contextual information. The support devices may choose to participate in a multi-party computation with the encryption device based on the security assessments. Support devices that choose to participate may transmit one or more secret shares or partial computations to the encryption device. The encryption device may use the secret shares or partial computations to generate an authentication cryptogram. The authentication cryptogram may be transmitted to a decryption device, which may decrypt the authentication cryptogram, evaluate its contents, and authenticate the encryption device based on its contents.
Abstract:
Some embodiments provide systems and methods for confidentially and securely provisioning data to an authenticated user device. A user device may register an authentication public key with an authentication server. The authentication public key may be signed by an attestation private key maintained by the user device. Once the user device is registered, a provisioning server may send an authentication request message including a challenge to the user device. The user device may sign the challenge using an authentication private key corresponding to the registered authentication public key, and may return the signed challenge to the provisioning server. In response, the provisioning server may provide provisioning data to the user device. The registration, authentication, and provisioning process may use public key cryptography while maintaining confidentiality of the user device, the provisioning server, and then authentication server.
Abstract:
Systems and methods are provided for protecting identity in an authenticated data transmission. For example, a contactless transaction between a portable user device and an access device may be conducted without exposing the portable user device's public key in cleartext. In one embodiment, an access device may send an access device public key to a portable user device. The user device may return a blinded user device public key and encrypted user device data. The access device may determine a shared secret using the blinded user device public key and an access device private key. The access device may then decrypt the encrypted user device data using the shared secret.
Abstract:
An initiator device can broadcast a witness request to one or more authentication devices. The one or more authentication devices can then determine an assurance level from a range of assurance levels and determine a token share corresponding to the assurance level. The initiator device can then receive, from the one or more authentication devices, at least one witness response comprising the token share corresponding to the assurance level. The initiator device can generate an authentication token using a set of token shares. The initiator device can then transmit the authentication token to an authentication server, wherein the authentication server verifies the authentication token.