Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor comprises: a first register to store a first bound value for a stack to be stored in a memory; a second register to store a second bound value for the stack; a checker logic to determine, prior to an exit point at a conclusion of a function to be executed on the processor, whether a value of a stack pointer is within a range between the first bound value and the second bound value; and a logic to prevent a return to a caller of the function if the stack pointer value is not within the range. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor includes at least one execution unit and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) detection logic. The ROP detection logic may determine a ROP metric based on a plurality of control transfer events. The ROP detection logic may also determine whether the ROP metric exceeds a threshold. The ROP detection logic may also, in response to a determination that the ROP metric exceeds the threshold, provide a ROP attack notification.
Abstract:
Techniques and mechanisms to provide indemnification for a transaction involving communications between networked devices. In an embodiment, attestation logic of a first device sends to a second device attestation information to indicate a trustworthiness level of first device. Based on the attestation information, indemnification logic of the second device determines an indemnification value representing a cost of an indemnification for a first transaction. Indemnification logic of the first device receives the indemnification value and determines, based on the indemnification value, whether a participation in the transaction is to take place.
Abstract:
Technologies for control flow exploit mitigation include a computing device having a processor with real-time instruction tracing support. During execution of a process, the processor generates trace data indicative of control flow of the process. The computing device analyzes the trace data to identify suspected control flow exploits. The computing device may use heuristic algorithms to identify return-oriented programming exploits. The computing device may maintain a shadow stack based on the trace data. The computing device may identify indirect branches to unauthorized addresses based on the trace data to identify jump-oriented programming exploits. The computing device may check the trace data whenever the process is preempted. The processor may detect mispredicted return instructions in real time and invoke a software handler in the process space of the process to verify and maintain the shadow stack. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor includes at least one execution unit and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) detection logic. The ROP detection logic may determine a ROP metric based on a plurality of control transfer events. The ROP detection logic may also determine whether the ROP metric exceeds a threshold. The ROP detection logic may also, in response to a determination that the ROP metric exceeds the threshold, provide a ROP attack notification.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor includes at least one execution unit and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) detection logic. The ROP detection logic may determine a ROP metric based on a plurality of control transfer events. The ROP detection logic may also determine whether the ROP metric exceeds a threshold. The ROP detection logic may also, in response to a determination that the ROP metric exceeds the threshold, provide a ROP attack notification.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor comprises: a first register to store a first bound value for a stack to be stored in a memory; a second register to store a second bound value for the stack; a checker logic to determine, prior to an exit point at a conclusion of a function to be executed on the processor, whether a value of a stack pointer is within a range between the first bound value and the second bound value; and a logic to prevent a return to a caller of the function if the stack pointer value is not within the range. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor comprises: a first register to store a first bound value for a stack to be stored in a memory; a second register to store a second bound value for the stack; a checker logic to determine, prior to an exit point at a conclusion of a function to be executed on the processor, whether a value of a stack pointer is within a range between the first bound value and the second bound value; and a logic to prevent a return to a caller of the function if the stack pointer value is not within the range. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor includes at least one execution unit and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) detection logic. The ROP detection logic may determine a ROP metric based on a plurality of control transfer events. The ROP detection logic may also determine whether the ROP metric exceeds a threshold. The ROP detection logic may also, in response to a determination that the ROP metric exceeds the threshold, provide a ROP attack notification.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor comprises: a first register to store a first bound value for a stack to be stored in a memory; a second register to store a second bound value for the stack; a checker logic to determine, prior to an exit point at a conclusion of a function to be executed on the processor, whether a value of a stack pointer is within a range between the first bound value and the second bound value; and a logic to prevent a return to a caller of the function if the stack pointer value is not within the range. Other embodiments are described and claimed.