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公开(公告)号:US20230067830A1
公开(公告)日:2023-03-02
申请号:US17788561
申请日:2020-12-24
Applicant: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Inventor: Kundan TIWARI , Hoyeon LEE , Lalith KUMAR , Anikethan Ramakrishna Vijaya KUMAR , Rajavelsamy RAJADURAI , Narendranath Durga TANGUDU , Varini GUPTA , Nivedya PARAMBATH SASI
Abstract: The present disclosure relates to a pre-5th-Generation (5G) or 5G communication system to be provided for supporting higher data rates Beyond 4th-Generation (4G) communication system such as Long Term Evolution (LTE). According to embodiments of the present disclosure, a method for managing network slice specific authentication and authorization (NSSAA) procedure in wireless communication network is provided.
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公开(公告)号:US20230413057A1
公开(公告)日:2023-12-21
申请号:US18252501
申请日:2021-11-10
Applicant: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
Inventor: Rajavelsamy RAJADURAI , Nivedya PARAMBATH SASI , Rohini RAJENDRAN
IPC: H04W12/121
CPC classification number: H04W12/121
Abstract: The present disclosure relates to a communication method and system for converging a 5th Generation (5G) communication system for supporting higher data rates beyond a 4th Generation (4G) system with a technology for Internet of Things (IoT).
The method includes comparing plurality of parameters (e.g. TAI) received in message (e.g. initial NAS message, registration request, first protected NAS message) from UE and plurality of parameters (e.g. TAI) broadcasted/received/stored by AMF entity and/or genuine gNB. AMF entity and/or genuine gNB sends an accept message (e.g. NAS accept) or reject message (e.g. NAS reject, RRC reject or RRC reconfiguration.) with appropriate error cause value to UE to mitigate the MitM attack. Based on received message from AMF entity and/or genuine gNB, UE detects that UE is camped on genuine gNB or fake gNB. UE performs action(s) (e.g. cell reselection), when UE is camped on fake gNB/eNB to mitigate MitM attack.-
公开(公告)号:US20230354037A1
公开(公告)日:2023-11-02
申请号:US18017002
申请日:2021-07-23
Applicant: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Inventor: R ROHINI , Nivedya PARAMBATH SASI , Rajavelsamy RAJADURAI
IPC: H04W12/63 , H04W4/02 , H04W12/08 , H04W12/06 , H04W12/0431
Abstract: Methods and systems for identifying AUSF and accessing related keys in 5G ProSe. The AUSF corresponding to a remote UE is identified by an AMF based on routing indicator or SKI. The AUSF is capable of key management of ProSe UE-to-Network relay communication. The AUSF authorizes the remote UE to access a 5G core network through one or more UE-to-network relays. The authorization of the remote UE is performed based on a SUPI corresponding to the remote UE. The SUPI is obtained from a UDM. Once the remote UE is authorized, the AUSF can derive keys that enable the remote UE to access the 5G core network through the one or more UE-to-network relays. The keys derived by the AUSF 803 can be referred to as authentication keys. The derived keys include REAR key, KNR_ProSe, KD, and KNRP.
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