Abstract:
A system, computer program product and method for booting to a partition in a non-volatile storage unit without a local operator. In one embodiment, one or more bits in a BOOT register may be set by an operating system indicating if the BIOS should boot to the partition. The BIOS may then read the BOOT register to determine if the BIOS is to boot to the partition as well as any activities to perform if the BIOS is to boot to the partition. In another embodiment, a network interface card may insert directive information received from a packet in a register within the network interface card. The BIOS may then read the register within the network interface card to determine if the BIOS is to boot to the partition as well as any activities to perform if the BIOS is to boot to the partition.
Abstract:
A method and system for enabling security attestation for a computing device during a return from an S4 sleep state. When the computing device enters into the S4 state following a successful boot up, the attestation log is appended to the TPM tick count and the log is signed (with a security signature). When the device is awaken from S4 state, the BIOS obtains and verifies the log created during the previous boot. The CRTM maintains a set of virtual PCRs and references these virtual PCRs against the log. If the values do not match, the return from S4 state fails and the device is rebooted.
Abstract:
A system and method for access control of a hardfile responsive to a computer system having an operating system is disclosed. The method includes detecting a special boot condition during a pre-boot test of the computer system; and altering, in response to the special boot condition, an operating system access configuration of the hardfile. The system includes a computer system that adjusts an operating system access to a hardfile based upon various boot conditions.
Abstract:
During power up initialization, security data such as passwords and other sensitive data which are stored in a lockable memory device are read and copied to protected system management interrupt (SMI) memory space, subject to verification by code running in the SMI memory space that the call to write the security data originates with a trusted entity. Once copied to SMI memory space, the security data is erased from regular system memory and the lockable storage device is hard locked (requiring a reset to unlock) against direct access prior to starting the operating system. The copy of the security data within the SMI memory space is invisible to the operating system. However, the operating system may initiate a call to code running in the SMI memory space to check a password entered by the user, with the SMI code returning a “match” or “no match” indication. The security data may thus be employed after the lockable memory device is hard locked and the operating system is started.
Abstract:
In a computer network including a plurality of interconnected computers, one of the computers being a sleeping computer in a power down state, the sleeping computer listening for a packet associated with the sleeping computer, a method of waking the sleeping computer from the computer network. An incoming packet of data is transmitted from an administration system in the network to the sleeping computer. When the sleeping computer detects the incoming packet, it determines if the incoming packet contains a data sequence associated with the sleeping computer. If the incoming packet matches the particular data sequence associated with the sleeping computer, the sleeping computer transmits a reply message to the administration system. Upon receiving the reply, the administration system modifies the reply message in a predetermined manner and transmits the modified reply to the sleeping computer. If the sleeping computer determines the reply message was modified in the predetermined manner, then a signal is issued to wake the sleeping computer. Otherwise, the incoming packet is discarded and the sleeping computer is not awakened.
Abstract:
A computer system processor incorporates a special S-latch which may only be set by secure signals. One state of the S-latch sets the processor into a secure mode where it only executes instructions and not commands from an In Circuit Emulator (ICE) unit. A second state of the S-latch sets the processor into a non-secure mode. A non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM) is written with secure data which can only be read by boot block code stored in a BIOS storage device. The boot block code is operable to read the secure data in the NVRAM and set the S-latch to an appropriate security state. If the boot block code cannot set the S-latch, then remaining boot up with BIOS data is stopped. On boot up the boot block code reads the NVRAM and sets the S-latch into the appropriate security state.
Abstract:
A method for remotely powering up a computer, includes: receiving a telephone call by a device coupled to a powered down computer; determining an originator's telephone number for the telephone call; determining if the originator's telephone number matches one of a plurality of authorized telephone numbers; and powering up the computer if the originator's telephone number matches one of the plurality of authorized telephone numbers. The method and system utilizes the well known “Caller-ID” technology to determine the originator's telephone number for a telephone call received by a modem coupled to the computer. If there is no match, the computer remains in a powered down state. In this manner, the system discriminates between the received telephone calls, and avoids powering up the computer when the received call is not for this purpose. This avoids wasting power.
Abstract:
A periodic system “wake-up” is implemented during S1, S2 or S3 states utilizing a hardware timer. A memory scrubbing routine is initiated that reads out all memory locations and writes back any memory locations that have single bit (correctable) Error Correction Code errors. This procedure minimizes the chances of a multiple bit error build up over time that may cause an unrecoverable error. The scrubbing routine is invoked whenever the system is brought out of S1, S2, or S3 state to insure that there are no single bit errors present when full system operation is resumed.
Abstract:
A computer program product and system for reducing the boot time of a TCPA based computing system. A flash memory in the TCPA based computing system may include a register comprising bits configured to indicate whether the segments of the flash memory have been updated. The flash memory may further include a table configured to store measurements of the segments of the flash memory. The flash memory may further include a boot block code that includes a Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM). The CRTM may read the bits in the register to determine if any of the segments of the flash memory have been updated. The CRTM may further obtain the measurement values in the table for those segments that store the POST BIOS code that have not been updated thereby saving time from measuring the POST BIOS code and consequently reducing the boot time.
Abstract:
In the event of a virally infected MBR on a hard disk drive that might prevent booting, a service MBR in a hidden protected area (HPA) can be used to boot a service O.S., and then the service MBR can be replaced with a previously backed-up MBR, also in the HPA, to mount any missing partitions.