Abstract:
An agreement apparatus P(i) (where i=0, . . . , n−1) which executes a consensus protocol generates an opinion value with a signature Xij=(xi, sig_i(xi)) including an opinion value xi indicating an opinion and a signature sig_i(xi) on the opinion value xi or information different from the opinion value with the signature Xij as an opinion value with a signature X′ij=(x′ij, e′ij) and outputs the opinion value with the signature X′ij to an agreement apparatus P(j) (where j=0, . . . , n−1, i≠j). The agreement apparatus P(j) accepts the opinion value with the signature X′ij and outputs the opinion value with the signature X′ij or information different from the opinion value with the signature X′ij to an agreement apparatus P(m) (where m=0, . . . , n−1, m≠i, m≠j) as an opinion value with a signature X″ij.
Abstract:
A secure equijoin technique of generating one table from two tables while curbing the volume of communications traffic is provided. The technique includes: a first permutation generating means 110 that generates a permutation from an element sequence which is generated from the first column of a table L and the first column of a table R; a first column generating means 120 that generates, for j=2, . . . , a, by using the permutation , a prefix sum, and an inverse permutation , the j-th column of a table J from an element sequence which is generated from the to j-th column of the table L; a join-result element sequence generating means 130 that generates a join-result element sequence from an element sequence ([[1]], . . . , [[1]], [[0]], . . . , [[0]], [[−1]], . . . , [[−1]]) by using the permutation , the prefix sum, and the inverse permutation ; a second column generating means 140 that generates, for j=a+1, . . . , a+b−1, the j-th column of the table J by using the join-result element sequence and the j−a+1-th column of the table R; and a third column generating means 150 that generates the first column of the table J by using the join-result element sequence and the first column of the table R.
Abstract:
A vector generation unit generates a vector xn so that xn[i]≠xn[j] if kn[i]=kn[j] at i≠j. A set generation unit generates a set Bn,j so that individual elements correspond to combinations of the N−1 pieces of elements, which are individually selected from sets M0, . . . , MN−1 other than a set Mn, and xn[j] and the elements for all of the combinations are included. A matrix generation unit generates a matrix Tn′ so that the matrix Tn′ includes rows identical to Tn[j] in the number equal to the number of elements of the set Bn,j. A key generation unit generates a vector kn′ so that elements of the matrix Tn′ which correspond to a row identical to Tn[j] correspond to combinations of kn[j] and elements of the set Bn,j and further, the elements of the set Bn,j are different from each other when there are a plurality of rows identical to Tn[j].
Abstract:
The positions in a text in which partial character strings in a pattern appear are efficiently detected. A partial-character-string position detecting device 1 takes inputs of a secret text [t] of a text t, a secrete text of a pattern p, a secret text of a vector c, and a secret text of a matrix E and outputs a secret text of a matrix H. A first matrix generating part 20 generates a secret text of a matrix F, in which F[i][j]=E[i][j+i mod n+1] (where it is assumed that E[i][n]=¬c[i]). A second matrix generating part 30 generates a secret text of a matrix F′, in which F[i][j]=1 is set if c[i]=0 or if c[i]=1 and F[k][j]=1 for every k that is successively c[k]=1, otherwise F[i][j]=0 is set, where k=i, . . . , n−1. A third matrix generating part 40 computes = ∧ ∧¬ to generate the secrete text .
Abstract:
A secret quotient transfer device that can reduce the communication cost. On the assumption that u denotes a natural number and represents a boundary value, m denotes an integer that satisfies a relation m≤2u, i denotes an integer from 0 to m−1, a plain text a is an integer that is equal to or greater than 0 and smaller than an arbitrary modulo p, the integers a and 0 are congruent modulo 2u, and the plain text a is expressed as a sum of m sub-shares x0, . . . , xm-1, the secret quotient transfer device computes a quotient q of the division of a total sum aZ of the sub-shares by p according to q=Σ(i
Abstract:
A secret sharing system transforms shares in ramp secret sharing to shares in homomorphic secret sharing. On a data distribution apparatus, a division part divides information a into N shares fa(n) using an arbitrary ramp secret sharing scheme S1. On each of distributed data transform apparatuses, a random number selecting part generates a random number vector ri whose elements are L random numbers ri1. A first random number division part divides the random number vector into N shares fri(n) using a ramp secret sharing scheme S1. A second random number division part divides each of the L random numbers ri1 into N shares gri,1(n) using an arbitrary secret sharing scheme S2. A disturbance part generates a share Ui by using a share fa(i) and shares frλ(i). A reconstruction part reconstructs L pieces of disturbance information c1 from shares Uλ by using the ramp secret sharing scheme S1. A redivision part divides each piece of disturbance information c1 into N using the secret sharing scheme S2 to generate shares gc1(n). A transform part generates shares ga1(i) of the information a by using a share gc1(i) and the shares grλ,1(i).
Abstract:
A secret sharing system transforms shares in ramp secret sharing to shares in homomorphic secret sharing. On a data distribution apparatus, a division part divides information a into N shares fa(n) using an arbitrary ramp secret sharing scheme S1. On each of distributed data transform apparatuses, a random number selecting part generates a random number vector ri whose elements are L random numbers ri1. A first random number division part divides the random number vector into N shares fri(n) using a ramp secret sharing scheme S1. A second random number division part divides each of the L random numbers ri1 into N shares gri,1(n) using an arbitrary secret sharing scheme S2. A disturbance part generates a share Ui by using a share fa(i) and shares frλ(i). A reconstruction part reconstructs L pieces of disturbance information c1 from shares Uλ by using the ramp secret sharing scheme S1. A redivision part divides each piece of disturbance information c1 into N using the secret sharing scheme S2 to generate shares gc1(n). A transform part generates shares ga1(i) of the information a by using a share gc1(i) and the shares grλ,1(i).
Abstract:
Access to an array is efficiently performed without reveling an accessed position. A storage 10 stores an array of concealed values [x′→] of an array x′→ and an array of addresses a′→ corresponding to respective elements of the array of concealed values [x′→]. A refresh unit 11 determines a concealed value [F] of a random parameter F, an array of concealed values [x→] of an array x→ generated by permutating the array x′→ with random permutation ρ, and an array of public tags b→ calculated from respective elements of the array of addresses a→ with the function TagF. An access unit 12 performs a desired access to an element of the array of concealed values [x→] corresponding to a tag that is calculated from a concealed value [j] of an access position j with the function Tag and the concealed value [F] of the parameter.
Abstract:
A secure joining system is a secure joining system including a plurality of secure computing apparatuses. The plurality of secure computing apparatuses include a vector joining unit 11n, a first vector generation unit 12n, a first permutation calculation unit 13n, a first permutation application unit 14n, a second vector generation unit 15n, a third vector generation unit 16n, a second permutation calculation unit 17n, a second permutation application unit 18n, a fourth vector generation unit 19n, a fifth vector generation unit 110n, a first inverse permutation application unit 111n, a first vector separation unit 112n, a second inverse permutation application unit 113n and a second vector separation unit 114n, a third permutation application unit 115n, a fourth permutation application unit 116n, and a first joined table generation unit 117n.
Abstract:
The present invention provides a technique for performing confidential sort at a faster speed than in the prior art. A confidential sort system comprises first to Mth apparatuses. The first to Mth apparatuses obtain inverse substitution [[σ0−1]] of L-bit stable sort of {→k0}. The first to Mth apparatuses perform, on i=1, . . . , N−1, a process of converting [[σi-1−1]] to hybrid substitution to obtain {σi-1−1}, a process of inversely substituting {→ki} with {σi-1−1} to obtain {σi-1→ki}, a process of obtaining inverse substitution [[σ′i−1]] of L-bit stable sort of [[σi-1→ki]], a process of synthesizing {σi-1−1} with [[σ′i−1]] to obtain [[σi−1]]:=[[σi-1−1σ′i−1]], and a process of converting [[σN-1−1]] to hybrid substitution to obtain {σN-1−1}. The first to Mth apparatuses inversely substitute [[→v]] with {σN-1−1} and output [[σN-1→v]].