Abstract:
Organizations maintain and generate large amounts of sensitive information using computer hardware resources and services of a service provider. Furthermore, there is a need to be able to delete large amounts of data securely and quickly by encrypting the data with a key and destroying the key. To ensure that information stored remotely is secured and capable of secure deletion, cryptographic keys used by the organization should be prevented from being persistently stored during serialization operations. If the keys used to encrypt the data have not been exposed during serialization operation, they may be deleted or destroyed enabling the destruction of data encrypted with the keys.
Abstract:
Organizations maintain and generate large amounts of sensitive information using computer hardware resources and services of a service provider. Furthermore, there is a need to be able to delete large amounts of data securely and quickly by encrypting the data with a key and destroying the key. To ensure that information stored remotely is secured and capable of secure deletion, cryptographic keys used by the organization should be prevented from being persistently stored during serialization operations.
Abstract:
A certificate manager for a multi-tenant environment can be authorized to automatically renew a certificate for a customer of the environment. Prior to the end of the validity period of the certificate, the certificate manager can obtain a new certificate on behalf of the customer and notify the customer that the certificate is ready to be deployed. The certificate will not be deployed until the customer releases the hold on the certificate. If no such instruction is received, notifications can be sent to the customer about the upcoming end of the validity period, and those notifications can be sent with increasing frequency. If no notification is received before the validity period is to expire, the certificate manager can automatically deploy the certificate to ensure that a valid certificate remains in place for the customer on the associated resource(s).
Abstract:
A method and apparatus for renewing cryptographic material are disclosed. In the method and apparatus a cryptographic material renewal entity of a computing resource service provider detects that cryptographic material stored by a secure module is to be renewed. Renewing the cryptographic material may include rekeying a private key associated with a certificate. Further, a digital certificate may be renewed, and the renewed certificate may be provided for use by the computing resource. The cryptographic material is used to fulfill requests made by a computing resource provisioned by the computing resource service provider for a customer. The renewed cryptographic material is provided to the secure module, whereby the renewed cryptographic material is used by the secure module to fulfill further requests made by the computing resource.
Abstract:
A vendor of virtual machine images accesses a virtual computer system service to upload a digitally signed virtual machine image to a data store usable by customers of the virtual computer system service to select an image for creating a virtual machine instance. If a digital certificate is uploaded along with the virtual machine image, the virtual computer system service may determine whether the digital certificate has been trusted for use. If the digital certificate has been trusted for use, the virtual computer system service may use a public cryptographic key to decrypt a hash signature included with the image to obtain a first hash value. The service may additionally apply a hash function to the image itself to obtain a second hash value. If the two hash values match, then the virtual machine image may be deemed to be authentic.
Abstract:
A vendor of virtual machine images accesses a virtual computer system service to upload a digitally signed virtual machine image to a data store usable by customers of the virtual computer system service to select an image for creating a virtual machine instance. If a digital certificate is uploaded along with the virtual machine image, the virtual computer system service may determine whether the digital certificate has been trusted for use. If the digital certificate has been trusted for use, the virtual computer system service may use a public cryptographic key to decrypt a hash signature included with the image to obtain a first hash value. The service may additionally apply a hash function to the image itself to obtain a second hash value. If the two hash values match, then the virtual machine image may be deemed to be authentic.