Abstract:
A computer system is disclosed that includes a primary processor and a service processor operable regardless of a power state of the computer system. A non-volatile memory device is communicatively coupled to the primary processor and the service processor. The non-volatile memory device stores firmware which includes a first list of patches required for installation on the computer system and a second list of patches previously installed on the computer system. A comparator module is provided to determine whether there are patches included in the first list that are not included in second list. A boot module is provided to boot a maintenance operating system in the event the first list includes patches not included in the second list. The maintenance operating system is configured to install, on the computer system, patches included in the first list but not the second list.
Abstract:
An apparatus, system, and method are disclosed for pre-boot policy modification. A key module exchanges a key with a server in a secure environment. A communication module receives a policy encoded with the key. A decode module decodes the encoded policy using the key and saves the policy setting prior to booting an operating system on the computer. An update module boots the computer using the policy.
Abstract:
A system, method, and program product is provided that initializes a computer system using an initialization process that identifies secrets that were stored in memory and not scrubbed during a prior use of the computer system. During the initialization process, one or more secret indicators are retrieved that identify whether one or more secrets were scrubbed from the computer system's memory during a previous use of the computer system. If the secret indicators show that one or more secrets were not scrubbed from the memory during the prior use of the computer system, then the initialization process scrubs the memory. On the other hand, if the secret indicators show that each of the secrets was scrubbed from the memory during the prior use of the computer system, then the memory is not scrubbed during the initialization process.
Abstract:
A method computer usable medium and computer system circuitry are disclosed for starting or “booting up” a computer from a remote location using a remote command device such as a cellular telephone. The method and system includes a secure means for remotely storing and transmitting security passwords.
Abstract:
An update utility requests a signature verification of the utility's signature along with a request to unlock the flash memory stored in the utility. A trusted platform module (“TPM”) performs a signature verification of the utility using a previously stored public key. Upon verification of the signature, the TPM unlocks the flash memory to permit update of the utility. Upon completion of the update, the flash utility issues a lock request to the TPM to relock the flash memory.
Abstract:
A system and method to avoid disk lube pooling is presented. A track access monitor tracks the number of times that a program accesses a particular track located on a hard drive. When the track access monitor determines that the number of track accesses to a particular track exceed a track access threshold, the track access monitor invokes a sequence of events to scan adjacent tracks in order to uniformly redistribute lubrication over the hard drive. In one embodiment, the track access monitor incrementally performs the adjacent track scanning during hard drive idle periods, such as when the system waits for a password from a user or when the operating system conserves power and idles the hard drive due to lack of activity.
Abstract:
A method and system for enabling security attestation for a computing device during a return from an S4 sleep state. When the computing device enters into the S4 state following a successful boot up, the attestation log is appended to the TPM tick count and the log is signed (with a security signature). When the device is awaken from S4 state, the BIOS obtains and verifies the log created during the previous boot. The CRTM maintains a set of virtual PCRs and references these virtual PCRs against the log. If the values do not match, the return from S4 state fails and the device is rebooted.
Abstract:
An apparatus, system, and method are disclosed for authentication of a core root of trust measurement chain. The apparatus for authentication of a CRTM chain is provided with a plurality of modules configured to carry out the steps of retrieving a decryption key from a predetermined location on the device selected for authentication, decrypting an authentication signal using the decryption key, and communicating the decrypted authentication signal to a user. In the described embodiments, these modules include a retrieval module, a decryption module, and a communication module. Beneficially, such an apparatus, system, and method would reliably verify that a link in the CRTM chain has not been corrupted, modified, or infected with a computer virus. Specifically, such an apparatus, system, and method would enable verification that the hypervisor has not been corrupted, modified, or infected with a computer virus.
Abstract:
A system, method, and program product is provided that executes a hypervisor in order to control access to a rental computer system. The hypervisor performs steps that include: reading a rental metric from a nonvolatile storage area, comparing the rental metric with a rental limit, allowing use of one or more guest operating systems by a user of the computer system in response to the rental metric being within the rental limit, and inhibiting use of the guest operating systems by the user of the computer system in response to the rental metric exceeding the rental limit.
Abstract:
A computer system is presented which provides a trusted platform by which operations can be performed with an increased level trust and confidence. The basis of trust for the computer system is established by an encryption coprocessor and by code which interfaces with the encryption coprocessor and establishes root of trust metrics for the platform. The encryption coprocessor is built such that certain critical operations are allowed only if physical presence of an operator has been detected. Physical presence is determined by inference based upon the status of registers in the core chipset.