Abstract:
An electronic assembly for an electronic device may include a detection module to detect a security anomaly of a Rich-OS operating system and a disabling module to disable at least one secure function of the electronic device in response to the detection. The disablement nevertheless allows use of the electronic device in fail-soft mode. The electronic assembly may be implemented such that these two modules are dependent on a trusted operating system, and the trusted operating system and the Rich-OS operating system may be stored in a memory of the electronic assembly and executed on the electronic assembly.
Abstract:
A system for biometrically authenticating a user includes: elements for obtaining image data that are representative of at least one user-associated biometric feature and at least one user-associated identifier, elements for extracting the at least one biometric feature in the image data, elements for extracting the at least one identifier in the image data, elements for performing a search for a reference biometric feature associated with the at least one identifier, elements for comparing the extracted biometric feature with the reference biometric feature, and elements for authenticating the user in accordance with a result of the comparison.
Abstract:
A method of testing security of an electronic device against a combination of a side-channel attack and a fault-injection attack implemented during a method of cryptographic processing that includes: delivering a message signature based on a secret parameter and implementing a recombination of at least two intermediate values according to the Chinese remainder theorem; and verifying the signature on the basis of at least one public exponent. The method of testing includes: transmitting a plurality of messages to be signed by said electronic device; disturbing each message, including modifying the message by inserting an identical error for each message, before executing a step of determining one of the intermediate values; and analyzing physical measurements, obtained during the step of verifying the signature as a function of the message to be signed, the identical error for each message, and an assumption of a value of part of the secret parameter.
Abstract:
The process according to various aspects can be executed by a terminal for selecting an application executable at least in part by a secure module incorporated into the terminal, and may include a step for obtaining location information of the terminal, from a memory of the secure module, and a selection step of an application from the obtained location information.
Abstract:
A method of managing profiles in a secure element where the secure element includes an active first profile associated with a first communication network and a second profile associated with a second communication network. The method includes deactivating the first profile and activating the second profile, where the deactivation and the activation are implemented following detection of a failure during a local verification pertaining to the first profile for the use of this the first profile. A local verification may be a verification in the secure element of the authorization of access of a user to the first profile, for example three failures of PIN or PUK code or of biometric authentication data, the local verification being performed in the secure element, and the failure being relative to a security failure of the first profile or to an operating failure of the first profile.
Abstract:
A method for the authentication of a first electronic entity (C) by a second electronic entity (H), wherein the first electronic entity (C) implements the following steps: reception of a challenge (HCH) from the second electronic entity (H); generation of a number (CCH) according to a current value of a counter (SQC) and a first secret key (K-ENC); generation of a cryptogram (CAC) according to the challenge (HCH) and a second secret key (S-MAC); and transmission of a response including the cryptogram (CAC) to the second electronic entity (H), without transmission of the number (CCH).
Abstract:
A method of executing a program by a processor, and an electronic entity including such a processor, the method includes the following steps: a calling program calling a subprogram and passing at least one parameter; the subprogram determining a return status indicator; the subprogram determining a return word by using a predetermined function to combine at least the return status indicator and the parameter; returning to the calling program with the determined return word as a result; and the calling program comparing the return word and a determined word determined by using the predetermined function to combine at least one possible value of the return status indicator and the parameter passed when calling the subprogram.
Abstract:
Method of authentication of a user via a terminal including acquisition elements for performing a biometric acquisition, includes: presentation to the acquisition elements by the user of a member to be verified by biometric comparison and triggering by the user a biometric acquisition to obtain an acquisition datum; biometric comparison of the acquisition datum with a prestored reference datum, the user being authenticated if the biometric comparison is positive and not authenticated otherwise, the method further including the following steps: providing the user with elements indicative of a first angle, the user applying a corrective rotation by a second angle so as to match an acquisition datum with the second angle, and in the biometric comparison step the reference datum is matched with the first angle, the biometric comparison being positive if the second angle is substantially equal to the first angle. Device adapted to implement such a method.
Abstract:
The fabrication of an electronic document includes the following steps: —obtaining of a flat body in which is made a cavity of globally rectangular shape including a deep portion surrounded by a countersink and which contains an electronic component having connection terminals situated on this countersink while having the shape of meanders 5A, 5B, —obtaining of a module including a support furnished on a so-called external face with a plurality of external contact zones and on a so-called internal face with a printed circuit including connection pads 4A, 4B of hefty form while being connected to certain at least of the external contact zones, the support being furthermore furnished, on this internal face, with a microcircuit connected to this printed circuit, this module being encased in the cavity by an anisotropic conducting adhesive whose overlap coefficient lies between 5 and 8%.
Abstract:
Generation of a message m of order λ(n) for a test of the integrity of the generation of a pair of cryptographic keys within the multiplicative group of integers modulo n=p·q, including: —key pair generation including, to generate p and q: a random selection of candidate integers; and a primality test; —a first search of the multiplicative group of integers modulo p for a generator a; —a second search of the multiplicative group of integers modulo q for a generator b; —a third search for a number y, as message m, verifying: 1≤γ≤n−1, where γ=a mod p and γ=b mod q, the first or second search being performed during the primality test.