Abstract:
Mediation systems and methods for restricted access item distribution are disclosed. In an embodiment, a method for facilitating payment from a user device for a restricted access item hosted by a host system is disclosed. In another embodiment, a system for facilitating payment from a user device to for a restricted access item hosted by a host system is disclosed. In another embodiment, a method for providing a mediated marketplace service is disclosed.
Abstract:
A method and system for dynamic traffic steering is described. In one embodiment, a method for dynamic traffic steering involves receiving a request for content at a steering component, comparing information in the request with steering criteria in the steering component, steering the request based on the comparing, and continuously updating the steering criteria based on requests that are subsequently received at the steering component. Other embodiments are also described.
Abstract:
Embodiments are directed towards detecting and reporting use by a domain of a message authentication mechanism, such as DomainKeys (DK), and/or DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and enabling subsequent blocking of messages based, in part, on its usage. When a message is received by an inbound message server, a message source is determined for the message. In one embodiment, the message source is a domain name associated with the sender of the message. Statistics are recorded about the message, including the message source, whether the message is suspect, includes a forged source identifier, employs DK/DKIM message authentication, and the like. The reports may ten be sent to various message sources to enable them to determine the extent of use of DK/DKIM message authentication, and to selectively block, re-direct, or forward the messages based, in part, on the use of DK/DKIM message authentication mechanism.
Abstract:
A method and system is directed to providing policies for handling authenticated messages, such as email, and the like, by combining Public Key encryption and the Internet Domain Name System (the “DNS”). The policies include system, user, statistics, new domain, unverified domain, and third party. A domain owner may validate that an email originates from an authorized sender within their domain by using a private key component to digitally sign email outbound from its domain. Employing a public key component, along with a selector, an email recipient may check the validity of the signature, and thus determine that the email originated from a sender authorized by the domain owner. In one embodiment, the public key component used to verify an email signature may be “advertised” or otherwise made available via a TXT record in the DNS.
Abstract:
A method and system is directed to providing authentication of a message, such as email, and the like, by combining Public Key encryption and the Internet Domain Name System (the “DNS”). A domain owner may validate that an email originates from an authorized sender within their domain by using a private key component to digitally sign email outbound from its domain. Employing a public key component, along with a selector, an email recipient may check the validity of the signature, and thus determine that the email originated from a sender authorized by the domain owner. In one embodiment, the public key component used to verify an email signature may be “advertised” or otherwise made available via a TXT record in the DNS.
Abstract:
A method and system is directed to providing authentication of a message, such as email, and the like, by combining Public Key encryption and the Internet Domain Name System (the “DNS”). A domain owner may validate that an email originates from an authorized sender within their domain by using a private key component to digitally sign email outbound from its domain. Employing a public key component, along with a selector, an email recipient may check the validity of the signature, and thus determine that the email originated from a sender authorized by the domain owner. In one embodiment, the public key component used to verify an email signature may be “advertised” or otherwise made available via a TXT record in the DNS.
Abstract:
An electronic mail (“e-mail”) system providing improved methodology for processing messages sent to mailing lists is described. The system include an “Injector” component which serves to “inject” messages into one or more Message Transfer Agents (MTAs). The system's Mailing List Manager (MLM), acting through the Injector, posts the address to a first MTA. If that MTA successfully processes the address, it responds with a “success” result, which may be passed back through the Injector to the MLM. If, on the other hand, that MTA is not successful, then the address is passed off to a second MTA. Again, if that MTA is successful, it will indicate that success back to the MLM; otherwise, the address is then passed off to the next MTA. The foregoing sequence continues until either the address for the given recipient is successfully processed by one of the MTAs or all of the available MTAs have been exhausted. In the event that all of the available MTAs fail, the address is then ultimately passed on to a fallback MTA, which will indicate initial success and assume any responsibility for queuing the message for that recipient. Once all addresses have been assigned to exactly one MTA, fallback or otherwise, the body of the message is passed to the MTAs for delivery to the recipients assigned to each. By dividing work among available MTAs, the system of the present invention is able to achieve optimal distribution of workload for the system. In the event of a failure at one of the MTAs, that MTA's task may be instead distributed to the other remaining MTAs, that is, applying load balancing technique for handling an MTA failure.
Abstract:
A method and system is directed to providing policies for handling authenticated messages, such as email, and the like, by combining Public Key encryption and the Internet Domain Name System (the “DNS”). The policies include system, user, statistics, new domain, unverified domain, and third party. A domain owner may validate that an email originates from an authorized sender within their domain by using a private key component to digitally sign email outbound from its domain. Employing a public key component, along with a selector, an email recipient may check the validity of the signature, and thus determine that the email originated from a sender authorized by the domain owner. In one embodiment, the public key component used to verify an email signature may be “advertised” or otherwise made available via a TXT record in the DNS.
Abstract:
An on-board chumming system and vessel using same include a generally vertically oriented downtube that connects a feed portion at the top with a comminution chamber at the bottom. A water inlet at the top of the downtube facilitates the bait falling into the comminution chamber to be pulverized and mixed with water to create the chum, which flows out of the comminution chamber through an outlet that passes through a side of the vessel.
Abstract:
An on-board chumming system and vessel using same include a generally vertically oriented downtube that connects a feed portion at the top with a comminution chamber at the bottom. A water inlet at the top of the downtube facilitates the bait falling into the comminution chamber to be pulverized and mixed with water to create the chum, which flows out of the comminution chamber through an outlet that passes through a side of the vessel.