Abstract:
Methods and systems are provided for bypassing an authenticity check for a secure control module. In one embodiment, a method includes: receiving authenticity data from a secure source, wherein the authenticity data includes a signature and an identifier that is unique to the control module; programming the control module with the authenticity data; and bypassing the authenticity check of a control program of the control module based on the authenticity data.
Abstract:
A memory access method in a multicore processor integrated circuit (IC) is provided. The method comprises partitioning local memory on the IC into a plurality of memory regions wherein each memory region comprises one or more memory segments and assigning each memory region to one or more processing entities or applications wherein each processing entity comprises a processor core or a processing device that is under the control of a processor core and wherein the application is capable of being performed by one of the processing entities. The method further comprises monitoring, with each processing entity, the usage of each memory segment in each region assigned to the processing entity and assigned to the applications performed by the processing entity and swapping the data in a memory segment from a memory region experiencing a miss for desired data when the miss causes a data access with external memory.
Abstract:
Methods are provided for securely loading software objects into an electronic control unit. The methods include receiving a first software object comprising a second level public key certificate, a first encryption signature and a first set of software. Once the first software object is received, validating the first second level public key is validated with the embedded root public key, the first encryption signature with the first second level public key certificate, and the first set of software with the first encryption signature. When the first set of software is valid, then the first second level public key certificate and the first set of software are stored to non-volatile memory. Once stored, a consecutive software object is received comprising only a consecutive encryption signature and a consecutive set of software from the programming source. The consecutive encryption signature is validated with the stored second level public key certificate, and the consecutive set of software is validated with the consecutive encryption signature.