Abstract:
Methods and systems for analyzing flows of communication packets. A front-end processor associates input packets with flows and forwards each flow to the appropriate unit, typically by querying a flow table that holds a respective classification for each active flow. In general, flows that are not yet classified are forwarded to the classification unit, and the resulting classification is entered in the flow table. Flows that are classified as requested for further analysis are forwarded to an appropriate flow analysis unit. Flows that are classified as not requested for analysis are not subjected to further processing, e.g., discarded or allowed to pass.
Abstract:
Malware detection techniques that detect malware by identifying the C&C communication between the malware and the remote host, and distinguish between communication transactions that carry C&C communication and transactions of innocent traffic. The system distinguishes between malware transactions and innocent transactions using malware identification models, which it adapts using machine learning algorithms. However, the number and variety of malicious transactions that can be obtained from the protected network are often too limited for effectively training the machine learning algorithms. Therefore, the system obtains additional malicious transactions from another computer network that is known to be relatively rich in malicious activity. The system is thus able to adapt the malware identification models based on a large number of positive examples—The malicious transactions obtained from both the protected network and the infected network. As a result, the malware identification models are adapted with high speed and accuracy.
Abstract:
A malware detection system analyzes communication traffic to and/or from a certain host. The malware detection system uses the mismatch between host name and IP address to assign a quantitative score, which is indicative of the probability that the host is malicious. The system may use this score, for example, in combination with other indications, to decide whether the host in question is malicious or innocent. The overall decision may use, for example, a rule engine, machine learning techniques or any other suitable means. The malware detection system may also analyze alerts regarding hosts that are suspected of being malicious. The alerts may originate, for example, from Command & Control (C&C) detection, from an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), or from any other suitable source. A given alert typically reports a name of the suspected host and an IP address that allegedly belongs to that host.
Abstract:
Systems and methods for malware detection techniques, which detect malware by identifying the C&C communication between the malware and the remote host. In particular, the disclosed techniques distinguish between request-response transactions that carry C&C communication and request-response transactions of innocent traffic. Individual request-response transactions may be analyzed rather than entire flows, and fine-granularity features examined within the transactions. As such, these methods and systems are highly effective in distinguishing between malware C&C communication and innocent traffic, i.e., in detecting malware with high detection probability and few false alarms.
Abstract:
Malware detection techniques that detect malware by identifying the C&C communication between the malware and the remote host, and distinguish between communication transactions that carry C&C communication and transactions of innocent traffic. The system distinguishes between malware transactions and innocent transactions using malware identification models, which it adapts using machine learning algorithms. However, the number and variety of malicious transactions that can be obtained from the protected network are often too limited for effectively training the machine learning algorithms. Therefore, the system obtains additional malicious transactions from another computer network that is known to be relatively rich in malicious activity. The system is thus able to adapt the malware identification models based on a large number of positive examples—The malicious transactions obtained from both the protected network and the infected network. As a result, the malware identification models are adapted with high speed and accuracy.
Abstract:
Methods and systems for analyzing flows of communication packets. A front-end processor associates input packets with flows and forwards each flow to the appropriate unit, typically by querying a flow table that holds a respective classification for each active flow. In general, flows that are not yet classified are forwarded to the classification unit, and the resulting classification is entered in the flow table. Flows that are classified as requested for further analysis are forwarded to an appropriate flow analysis unit. Flows that are classified as not requested for analysis are not subjected to further processing, e.g., discarded or allowed to pass.
Abstract:
Methods and systems for malware detection techniques, which detect malware by identifying the Command and Control (C&C) communication between the malware and the remote host, and distinguish between communication transactions that carry C&C communication and transactions of innocent traffic. The fine-granularity features are examined, which are present in the transactions and are indicative of whether the transactions are exchanged with malware. A feature comprises an aggregated statistical property of one or more features of the transactions, such as average, sum median or variance, or of any suitable function or transformation of the features.
Abstract:
Malware detection techniques that detect malware by identifying the C&C communication between the malware and the remote host, and distinguish between communication transactions that carry C&C communication and transactions of innocent traffic. The system distinguishes between malware transactions and innocent transactions using malware identification models, which it adapts using machine learning algorithms. However, the number and variety of malicious transactions that can be obtained from the protected network are often too limited for effectively training the machine learning algorithms. Therefore, the system obtains additional malicious transactions from another computer network that is known to be relatively rich in malicious activity. The system is thus able to adapt the malware identification models based on a large number of positive examples—The malicious transactions obtained from both the protected network and the infected network. As a result, the malware identification models are adapted with high speed and accuracy.
Abstract:
A traffic-monitoring system that monitors encrypted traffic exchanged between IP addresses used by devices and a network, and further receives the user-action details that are passed over the network. By correlating between the times at which the encrypted traffic is exchanged and the times at which the user-action details are received, the system associates the user-action details with the IP addresses. In particular, for each action specified in the user-action details, the system identifies one or more IP addresses that may be the source of the action. Based on the IP addresses, the system may identify one or more users who may have performed the action. The system may correlate between the respective action-times of the encrypted actions and the respective approximate action-times of the indicated actions. The system may hypothesize that the indicated action may correspond to one of the encrypted actions having these action-times.
Abstract:
A traffic-monitoring system that monitors encrypted traffic exchanged between IP addresses used by devices and a network, and further receives the user-action details that are passed over the network. By correlating between the times at which the encrypted traffic is exchanged and the times at which the user-action details are received, the system associates the user-action details with the IP addresses. In particular, for each action specified in the user-action details, the system identifies one or more IP addresses that may be the source of the action. Based on the IP addresses, the system may identify one or more users who may have performed the action. The system may correlate between the respective action-times of the encrypted actions and the respective approximate action-times of the indicated actions. The system may hypothesize that the indicated action may correspond to one of the encrypted actions having these action-times.