Abstract:
In an electronic component using a secret key cryptographic algorithm K whereof the operation comprising several successive computing cycles T1, T16 to supply from initial input data L0, R0 applied at the first cycle, final output data L16, R16 at the last cycle, the method consists in applying a first random value u to the computing means designed for each cycle (TCM) to obtain in output unpredictable data (a(+)u). The invention is characterised in that it consists further in applying a second random value v to said initial input data L0 and R0 applied in input of the first cycle T1.
Abstract:
Inferences to the processed data of the internal microchip can be effected on the contacts of the external power supply for a smart card by using appropriate measuring techniques - Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In order prevent misusage of smart cards, the DPA has to be effectively disabled. The invention permits a disabling of a DPA by decoupling the power supply voltage for the active computer chip from the external power supply for the smart card during calculation of confidential data. The technical solution can be attained by means of an integrated battery, a direct current stabilization, or by an integrated HF switched-mode power supply unit. When using direct current stabilization or an HF switched-mode power supply unit, the power supply voltage for the active computer chip can be conducted over a randomly controlled electronic switch so that the pulses still to be measured on the smart card contacts are additionally concealed.
Abstract:
The invention concerns a countermeasure method in an electronic component using a secret key K cryptographic algorithm with sixteen computing cycles to supply an encrypted message (C) from an input message (M), each cycle using first means TC0 to supply an output information from an input information, Said method consists in applying by selection a sequence with the first means or another sequence with other means TC1, TC2 to a group G1 comprising the first three cycles at least and another group G4 comprising the last three cycles at least. Whatever the sequence, the output result of the last cycle of each group is the same for the same input message (M).
Abstract:
The invention concerns a countermeasure method in an electronic component using a secret key K cryptographic algorithm, wherein the algorithm implementation comprises the use of first means TC0 for supplying output data from input data, the output information and/or derived data being manipulated by critical instructions. Said countermeasure method provides for the use of other means TC1 and/or TC2, such that the output information and the derived data are unpredictable.
Abstract:
A data carrier device (3) includes data storage means (13) for storing key data (SD), processing means (14) for processing key data (SD), data bus means (15) which include a data bus (16) with a number of N parallel data leads which connects the data storage means (13) to the processing means (14), and via which N-bit key data (SD) can be transmitted in parallel during each transmission operation, and power supply means (E) for supplying the data carrier device (3) with power (UB); transmission data (ÜD-SD), containing key data (SD), can be stored in the data storage means (13) and the data bus means (15) are arranged to transmit N-bit transmission data (ÜD-SD) in each transmission operation, which transmission data (ÜD-SD) has a number of M bits of value 1 which is always the same and independent of the key data (SD); the data bus means (15) have a power consumption which is independent of the key data (SD) and include selection means (29, 31) which are arranged to select, after a transmission operation, a number of K bits, constituting the key data (SD), from the total number of N transmitted bits of the transmission data (ÜD-SD).
Abstract:
The invention relates to a data processing device (100) and to a method for operating a data processing device, notably a chip card. The device comprises an integrated circuit (10) which in accordance with a first clock pulse carries out useful calculations, notably cryptographic operations. To this end a second clock pulse is randomly derived from the first clock pulse and supplied to the integrated circuit (10) instead of the first clock pulse. Distances between the edges of the second clock pulse vary randomly over time. To this end the invention provides for a clock control unit (14) which is linked to the integrated circuit (10) as well as for a random generator (12) which is connected to the clock pulse control unit (14). The clock control unit (14) is configured such that it generates a second clock (20) in accordance with the random generator (12) and the first clock pulse (18), and the second clock pulse varies randomly and controls the integrated circuit (10).
Abstract:
Cryptographic devices that leak information about their secrets through externally monitorable characteristics (such as electromagnetic radiation and power consumption) may be vulnerable to attack, and previously-known methods that could address such leaking are inappropriate for smartcard and many other cryptographic applications. Methods and apparatuses are disclosed for performing computations in which the representation of data, the number of system state transitions at each computational step, and the Hamming weights of all operands are independent of computation inputs, intermediate values, or results. Exemplary embodiments (figure 6) implemented using conventional hardware elements such as electronic components (611, 613) and logic gates (610, 620, 630, 640) as well as software executing on conventional microprocessors are described.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatuses are disclosed for improving DES and other cryptographic protocols against external monitoring attacks by reducing the amount (and signal-to-noise ratio) of useful information leaked during processing. An improved DES implementation of the invention instead uses two 56-bit keys (K1 and K2) and two 64-bit plaintext messages (M1 and M2), each associated with a permutation (i.e., K1P, K2P and M1P, M2P) such that K1P {K1} XOR K2P {K2} equals the "standard" DES key K, and M1P {M1} XOR M2P {M2} equals the "standard" message. During operation of the device, the tables are preferably periodically updated, by introducing fresh entropy into the tables faster than information leaks out, so that attackers will not be able to obtain the table contents by analysis of measurements. The technique is implementable in cryptographic smartcards, tamper resistant chips, and secure processing systems of all kinds.
Abstract:
A method for controlling physical security of a computer removably coupled to a network wherein a security administrator associated with a server invokes a timer in a client computer and disables the client computer if the computer is not operated within the network with a frequency preset by the security administrator. Techniques are provided in the client computer to inhibit breach of the security of the timer.
Abstract:
A computer system (10) comprises computer apparatus (12) incorporating the first and second electronic components (20, 22) and is electrically connected to a security device (14) which is associated with a non-volatile store (16) and components (12 and 14) are interconnected via a security bus (18). The security device (14) is used to protect at least one of the first electronic component (20) and the second electronic component (22) from theft and unauthorised re-use. Typically component (20) is a microprocessor for generating instructions and component (22) is a memory module for receiving instructions and outputting signals in consequence, the components (20, 22) being interconnected by a further bus (24).