Abstract:
Methods and apparatuses in a client terminal (400) and a web server (402) for enabling safe communication between said terminal and server. When the terminal obtains a web page from the server in a session, the terminal creates a context specific key, Ks_NAF', based on one or more context parameters, P1,...Pn, pertaining to said session and/or web page. The terminal then indicates the context specific key in a login request to the server, and the server determines a context specific key, Ks_NAF', in the same manner to verify the client if the context specific key determined in the web server matches the context specific key received from the client terminal. The context specific key is thus bound to and valid for the present context or session only and cannot be used in other contexts or sessions.
Abstract:
A system, method, and nodes for managing shared security keys between a User Equipment, UE, an authentication node such as an SCF/NAF, and a service node such as a BM-SC or AS. The SCF/NAF allocates to each BM-SC, a different SCF/NAF identifier such as a fully qualified domain name, FQDN, from the FQDN space the SCF/NAF administers. The SCF/NAF then locally associates these allocated FQDNs with the connected BM-SCs and with different services. The network sends the correct FQDN to the UE in a service description for a desired service, and the UE is able to derive a security key using the FQDN. When the UE requests the desired service, the SCF/NAF is able to associate the service identifier with the correct FQDN and an associated BM-SC. The SCF/NAF uses the FQDN to obtain the security key from a bootstrapping server and sends it to the associated BM-SC.As a result, the UE and the associated BM-SC share a specific security key.
Abstract:
A split architecture eMBMS with distributed BMSCs providing the same eMBMS service allows for a centralized key service where each BMSC is able to derive a set of MTKs from the MSK using the MTK-IDs as the differentiating input. This avoids the need to send MTKs to the BMSCs.
Abstract:
A method is provided for use by a user terminal (20) operating an IP-based multimedia broadcast/multicast service. The method comprises storing (S3) information relating to user service registrations performed (S2) using an IP connection such as a Packet Data Protocol, PDP, context established to enable connectivity between the user terminal (20) and a service node (40) for the broadcast/multicast service. The information is of a type to enable re-registration (S7) of at least some of any of the user services affected by a loss of the IP connection. In one embodiment, the multimedia broadcast/multicast service is a 3GPP Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service, MBMS, the user terminal (20) is a User Equipment, UE, and the service node (40) is a Broadcast/Multicast Service Center, BM-SC. In another embodiment, the multimedia broadcast/multicast service is an Open Mobile Alliance Broadcast, OMA BCAST, service, the user terminal (20) is a Terminal, and the service node (40) is an OMA BCAST Subscription Management, BSM, node.
Abstract:
A method of authenticating a client to two or more servers coupled together via a communications network, wherein the client and a first server possess a shared secret. The method comprises authenticating the client to a first server using said shared secret, signalling associated with this authentication process being sent between the client and said first server via a second server, generating a session key at the client and at the first server, and providing the session key to said second server, and using the session key to authenticate the client to the second server.
Abstract:
A method is provided for use in interworking a single sign-on authentication architecture and a further authentication architecture in a split terminal scenario. The split terminal scenario is one in which authentication under the single sign-on authentication architecture is required of a browsing agent (8) being used to access a relying party and in response, due to the interworking in the split terminal scenario, an associated authentication under the further authentication architecture is performed in relation to a separate authentication agent (7). A controlling agent (4) sends (C3) a token to the authentication agent (7). The controlling agent (4) sends (C4) a request to the browsing agent (8) to return a token for comparing with the token sent to the authentication agent (7). The controlling agent (4) waits (C6) for the authentication agent (7) or a user of the authentication agent (7) to communicate (A2) the received token to the browsing agent (8) via a secure and/or trusted channel and for the browsing agent (8), in response to the earlier received request, to forward (B4) the token to the controlling agent (4). The controlling agent (4) receives (C7) the token from the browsing agent (8). The controlling agent (4) compares (C10) the received token with the token sent to the authentication agent (7) to determine whether the authentication agent (7) is authorised to perform authentication on behalf of the browsing agent (8) and/or whether the browsing agent (8) is authorised to act as a representative for the authentication agent (7). The controlling agent (4) authenticates (C11) the browsing agent (8) to the relying party based on the associated authentication performed in relation to the authentication agent (7) if it is determined in the comparing step (C10) that the authentication agent (7) and/or browsing agent (8) is so authorised.
Abstract:
Methods for cryptographic synchronization of data packets. A roll-over counter (ROC) value is periodically appended to and transmitted with a data packet when a function of the packet sequence number equals a predetermined value. The ROC effectively synchronizes the cryptographic transformation of the data packets. Although the disclosed methods are generally applicable to many transmission protocols, they are particularly adaptable for use in systems wherein the data packets are transmitted to a receiver using the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) as defined in Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 3711.
Abstract:
A method is provided of deferring part of a procedure for establishing access security, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), between a User Equipment (UE) and a Proxy Call Session Control Function (P-CSCF), and instead incorporating that part into a subsequent IP Multimedia Subsystem Authentication and Key Agreement (IMS AKA) procedure involving the User Equipment (UE) and the Proxy Call Session Control Function (P-CSCF). The deferred part is the verification by the User Equipment (UE) of a server certificate associated with the Proxy Call Session Control Function (P-CSCF). A first authorisation token (s_token) is generated (S5) at the Proxy Call Session Control Function (P-CSCF) using the server certificate and at least one session key (CK and/or IK) extracted from an authentication challenge message (SM5) sent (S4) from a Serving Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF) towards the User Equipment (UE) as part of the procedure. The first authorisation token (s_token) is sent (S6, SM6) to the User Equipment (UE). The at least one session key (CK and/or IK) is computed (S7) at the User Equipment (UE) using the challenge message (SM6) received as part of the procedure. A second authorisation token is generated at the User Equipment (UE) using the server certificate and the at least one computed session key (CK and/or IK), according to the same algorithm used to generate the first authorisation token (s_token). The server certificate is verified (S7) at the User Equipment (UE) if the first and second authorisation tokens agree. A method is also disclosed in which part of a TLS procedure is deferred to a subsequent Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) / Generic Authentication Architeture (GAA) / Generic Bootstrap Architecture (GBA) procedure.
Abstract:
A method is provided for use in interworking a single sign-on authentication architecture (Open ID) and a further authentication architecture (3GPP) in a split terminal scenario. The split terminal scenario is one in which authentication under the single sign-on authentication architecture is required of a browsing agent (8) being used to access a relying party and in response an associated authentication under the further authentication architecture is performed in relation to a separate authentication agent (7). A controlling agent (4) sends (C3) a token to the authentication agent (7). The controlling agent (4) sends (C4) a request to the browsing agent (8) to return a token for comparing with the token sent to the authentication agent (7). The controlling agent (4) waits (C6) for the authentication agent (7) or a user of the authentication agent (7) to communicate (A2) the received token to the browsing agent (8). The controlling agent (4) compares (C10) the received token with the token sent to the authentication agent (7) to determine whether the authentication agent (7) is authorised to perform authentication on behalf of the browsing agent (8).
Abstract:
A system, method, and nodes for managing shared security keys between a User Equipment, UE, an authentication node such as an SCF/NAF, and a service node such as a BM-SC or AS. The SCF/NAF allocates to each BM-SC, a different SCF/NAF identifier such as a fully qualified domain name, FQDN, from the FQDN space the SCF/NAF administers. The SCF/NAF then locally associates these allocated FQDNs with the connected BM-SCs and with different services. The network sends the correct FQDN to the UE in a service description for a desired service, and the UE is able to derive a security key using the FQDN. When the UE requests the desired service, the SCF/NAF is able to associate the service identifier with the correct FQDN and an associated BM-SC. The SCF/NAF uses the FQDN to obtain the security key from a bootstrapping server and sends it to the associated BM-SC.As a result, the UE and the associated BM-SC share a specific security key.