Abstract:
Copy-protected content material (101) is screened (200) for an indication of the availability of an enhanced version of a screening system and forcing an upgrade to the advanced screening system by refusing to process (120) the copy-protected content material until the upgrade is performed. When security standards change, and corresponding security techniques are available for downloading to existing consumer devices, newly published content material will contain an indication to that effect. When the newly published content material is processed by an existing consumer device, the consumer device will detect this indication of an available update, and will prevent the processing of this newly published content material until the update is received. In this manner, a phased approach to enhanced security can be effected.
Abstract:
An encryption system is configured to include a combination of block (130) and stream (150) cipher generators. The block cipher generator (130) provides a changing key (149) that is used to periodically re-key one or more stream cipher generators (150). Preferably an AES block encryptor (135) provides a set of 128-bit ciphers (139) that are used to provide a stream of 576-bit keys (149) that is used to periodically re-key one or more SNO W-2 stream cipher generators (150). The output (159) of the stream cipher generators (150) are used to encrypt multiple input data streams (263-264), or 'lanes' of data, using an optimized arrangement of the block (130) and stream (150) ciphers relative to these multiple lanes of data (263-264).
Abstract:
A system and method to protect content material enforce copy protection by establishing a secure link (130-230) between two components (100, 200) that process the protected content material in different forms. This secure link (130-230) is used to communicate security information derived at a first component material from a source (101) to a second component (200) that derives corresponding security information from the material in a transformed form. If the security information from both components is not consistent, the second component (200) prevents subsequent rendering of the content material.
Abstract:
Subsets of a video image (101) are analyzed to determine whether unauthorized playback-protected image is contained within the subsets. Regions of subsequent video images are prevented (210) from being displayed based upon whether the unauthorized playback-protected image is contained within the subsets. When a watermark is detected (220) within a video image, select areas (240) of the video image are included or excluded from subsequent watermark detection operations. When the inclusion/exclusion of an area results affects the ability to detect the watermark (260), a region that includes/excludes the area is identified (270) as a region that should not be displayed (210). The detection of other areas that affect the watermark detection results causes a redefinition (270) of the region to include/exclude the other areas.
Abstract:
A transmitter (110) which transmits a signal (120) for reception by a receiving device (130). The transmitter is arranged to insert into the signal an indication of a geographical region where the signal physically can be received. Preferably the geographical region is indicated in the signal using geometrical shapes. The receiving device receives one or more signals, each of the signals carrying an indication of a respective geographical region where the respective signal physically can be received, and is arranged to determine its locale from said indications. The receiver can compute the intersection of the sets of geometrical shapes carried in the various signals it received as the geographical region it is in. Based on its determined locale the receiver can restrict access to content, if such content is restricted to certain regions.
Abstract:
A method and system modifies one or more control signals that are associated with the transmission or reception of copy-protected material. By modifying the control signals, most communication devices that rely on the protocol will prevent the transmission of the message, or will prevent or inhibit the subsequent processing or relaying of a received message. For example, if a cyclic-redundancy-code (CRC) is modified, a conventional network device that uses the received-but-modified CRC will likely reject the received material, thereby preventing it from being processed or transmitted further through the network. Select devices are configured to recognize and undo the modification, thereby allowing the material to be further processed. If the material is to be relayed, the modification is reapplied. Preferably, only local-area network devices are configured to undo the modification, while devices that provide wide-area network access are not configured to undo the modification. In this manner, protected content material with modified control signals is likely to be prevented from wide-area network distribution.
Abstract:
A truly random sequence of bits is transmitted from a transmitter, such that a receiver can receive and store a portion of the transmission for the duration of time that the receiver is within range of the transmitter. Thereafter, the stored sequence in the receiver is compared to a stored copy of the continuous transmission to determine the time that the stored sequence was transmitted. If the sequence of bits is truly random, the security of the system is assured.
Abstract:
An access-control system includes a counter, and a secure memory location that is configured to contain a parameter that binds the contents of the counter to the data that is being protected. Each time the data is accessed, the counter is incremented and the binding parameter is updated, based on this new count. When a subsequent access is requested, the stored binding parameter is compared to a value corresponding to the binding of the current value of the counter with the data. If either the current value of the counter differs from the count that was used to produce the binding parameter, or the current data differs from the data that was used to produce the binding parameter, the new binding value will not correspond to the stored binding parameter, and access is denied. In this manner, a sequential access to the protected data can be enforced, thereby precluding a replay attack. Note that the data being protected may be data that is used to control access to other protected material, thereby expanding the scope of security protection to this other protected material.
Abstract:
An encryption system prevents a replay attack by providing a secure item that is unique for each recording of copy-protected content material. A memory element is provided in the recording medium that is readable but not writeable by external devices, and whose content changes each time material is recorded onto the medium. The content of this memory element is used to form a unique encryption key that is used to encrypt the content encryption key. This unique encryption of the content encryption key is further encrypted using a public key that corresponds to a private key of the intended rendering device. Although the unique encryption key is determinable by reading and processing the content of the memory element, the decryption of the content encryption key requires both the unique encryption key and the private key of the intended rendering device. Because the unique encryption key is based on a content value of the memory element that is unique to each recording to the recording medium, a subsequent replay attack will not provide the same unique encryption key used to originally encrypt the content encryption key. Consequently used to encrypt the content encryption key, the rendering device will be unable to decrypt the content encryption key, and thereby will be unable to decrypt the content material.