Abstract:
Systems and methods for prospective client identification using malware attack detection are provided. A malware device is identified. The entity with the responsibility for the malware device or a potentially compromised device in communication with the malware device is determined. A message is communicated to the entity based on the determination. In various embodiments, the message comprises an offer for security related products and/or services.
Abstract:
A system and method are disclosed for network-based file analysis for malware detection. Network content is received from a network tap. A binary packet is identified in the network content. A binary file, including the binary packet, is extracted from the network content. It is determined whether the extracted binary file is detected to be malware.
Abstract:
A computer worm defense system comprises multiple containment systems tied together by a management system. Each containment system is deployed on a separate communication network and contains a worm sensor and a blocking system. In various embodiments, the computer worm may be transported from a production network, where the computer worm is not readily identifiable, to an alternate network in the worm sensor where the computer worm may be readily identifiable. Computer worm identifiers generated by a worm sensor of one containment system can be provided not only to the blocking system of the same containment system, but can also be distributed by the management system to blocking systems of other containment systems.
Abstract:
A computer worm defense system comprises multiple containment systems tied together by a management system. Each containment system is deployed on a separate communication network and contains a worm sensor and a blocking system. Computer worm identifiers generated by a worm sensor of one containment system can be provided not only to the blocking system of the same containment system, but can also be distributed by the management system to blocking systems of other containment systems.
Abstract:
A novel approach for determining an amount to be billed to a customer for the use of resources is based upon usage data and value data. The usage data indicates usage, by the customer, of a set of one or more resources during a specified period of time. The set of one or more resources may be dynamically selected and de-selected from a plurality of resources at any time. For example, the set of one or more resources may comprise a VSF as described herein. The value data indicates generally value provided by each resource from the set of one or more resources used during the specified period of time. The value provided by each resource may be expressed in service units per unit time and a charge may be applied for each service unit consumed during a specified period of time. Example billing schemes to which the approach is applicable include, without limitation, basic billing, flex billing, event flex billing and open flex billing.
Abstract:
A system for automatically encrypting and decrypting data packet sent from a source host to a destination host across a public internetwork. A tunnelling bridge is positioned at each network, and intercepts all packets transmitted to or from its associated network. The tunnelling bridge includes tables indicated pairs of hosts or pairs of networks between which packets should be encrypted. When a packet is transmitted from a first host, the tunnelling bridge of that host's network intercepts the packet, and determines from its header information whether packets from that host that are directed to the specified destination host should be encrypted; or, alternatively, whether packets from the source host's network that are directed to the destination host's network should be encrypted. If so, the packet is encrypted, and transmitted to the destination network along with an encapsulation header indicating source and destination information: either source and destination host addresses, or the broadcast addresses of the source and destination networks (in the latter case, concealing by encryption the hosts' respective addresses). An identifier of the source network's tunnelling bridge may also be included in the encapsulation header. At the destination network, the associated tunnelling bridge intercepts the packet, inspects the encapsulation header, from an internal table determines whether the packet was encrypted, and from either the source (host or network) address or the tunnelling bridge identifier determines whether and how the packet was encrypted. If the packet was encrypted, it is now decrypted using a key stored in the destination tunnelling bridge's memory, and is sent on to the destination host. The tunnelling bridge identifier is used particularly in an embodiment where a given network has more than one tunnelling bridge, and hence multiple possible encryption/decryption schemes and keys. In an alternative embodiment, the automatic encryption and decryption may be carried out by the source and destination hosts themselves, without the use of additional tunnelling bridges, in which case the encapsulation header includes the source and destination host addresses.
Abstract:
An apparatus for allowing communications to a target host on a network to be upgraded from a non-secured session to a secured session. The apparatus including a processor; a memory coupled to the processor and storing an access control list; and a network interface coupled to the processor, the network interface communicating with a target host; wherein the memory is configured to cause the processor to: (1) create an access control entry for the target host in the access control list; (2) exchange security information with the target host; (3) update the entry for the target host to include the security information; and, (4) communicate with said target host using said security information. A method for allowing communications to a target host on a network to be upgraded from a non-secured session to a secured session having the steps of: (1) creating an access control entry for the target host in the access control list; (2) exchanging security information with the target host; (3) updating the entry for the target host to include the security information; and, (4) communicating with the target host using the security information.
Abstract:
A method and apparatus for generating additional implicit keys from a key [K.sub.ij ].sub.N without the necessity of generating a new Diffie-Helman (DH) certificate or requiring communication between nodes to change implicit master keys is disclosed. A first data processing device (node I) is coupled to a private network which is in turn coupled to the Internet. A second data processing device (node J) is coupled to the same, or to a different network, which is also coupled to the Internet, such that node I communicates with node J using the Internet protocol. Node I is provided with a secret value i and a public value. Data packets (referred to as "datagrams") are encrypted to enhance network security. Each node maintains an internal value of N which is incremented based on time and upon the receipt of a data packet from another node. The key [K.sub.ij ].sub.N.sbsb.i is derived from the appropriate quantity of .alpha..sup.Nij by using high order key-sized bits of the respective quantity. The present invention then utilizes the key [K.sub.ij ].sub.N.sbsb.i to encrypt a transient key which is referred to as K.sub.p. Node I encrypts the IP data in K.sub.p and encrypts K.sub.p in [K.sub.ij ].sub.N.sbsb.i. Node I transmits the encrypted IP datagram packet in the encrypted key K.sub.p to the receiving node J. Node I further includes its current internal value of N.sub.i in the outgoing packet. The present invention also provides for the application of one-way functions to the shared secret to enhance security. Thus, either node I or node J may change the context such that if in the future [K.sub.ij ].sub.N.sbsb.i is compromised, or is not useable by a cracker to either decrypt prior encrypted packets. The present invention discloses methods and apparatus for achieving perfect forward security for closed user groups, and for the application of the SKIP methodology to datagram multicast protocols.
Abstract:
A first data processing device (node I) is coupled to a private network which is in turn coupled to the Internet. A second data processing device (node J) is coupled to the same, or to a different network, which is also coupled to the Internet, such that node I communicates to node J using the Internet protocol. Node I is provided with a secret value i, and a public value .alpha..sup.i mod p. Node J is provided with a secret value j, and a public value .alpha..sup.j mod p. Data packets (referred to as "datagrams") are encrypted using the teachings of the present invention to enhance network security. A source node I obtains a Diffie-Helman (DH) certificate for node J, (either from a local cache, from a directory service, or directly from node J), and obtains node J's public value .alpha..sup.j mod p from the DH certificate. Node I then computes the value of .alpha..sup.ij mod p, and derives a key K.sub.ij from the value .alpha..sup.ij mod p. A transient key K.sub.p is then generated at random, and K.sub.p is used to encrypt the datagram to be sent by node I. K.sub.p is then encrypted with key K.sub.ij. Upon receipt of the encrypted datagram by the receiving node J, the node J obtains a DH certificate for node I, (either from a local cache, from a directory service, or directly from node J), and obtains the public value .alpha..sup.i mod p. Node I then computes the value of .alpha..sup.ij mod p and derives the key K.sub.ij. Node J utilizes the key K.sub.ij to decrypt the transient key K.sub.p, and using the decrypted transient key K.sub.p, node J decrypts the datagram packet, thereby resulting in the original data in unencrypted form.
Abstract translation:第一数据处理设备(节点I)耦合到专用网络,专用网络又耦合到因特网。 第二数据处理设备(节点J)被耦合到同一网络,或耦合到也耦合到因特网的不同网络,使得节点I使用因特网协议与节点J进行通信。 节点I被提供有秘密值i和公共值αi mod p。 节点J被提供有秘密值j和公共值αj mod p。 使用本发明的教导来加密数据分组(称为“数据报”)以增强网络安全性。 源节点I获得节点J的Diffie-Helman(DH)证书(来自本地高速缓存,目录服务或直接从节点J),并且从DH证书获得节点J的公共值alpha j mod p 。 节点I然后计算alpha ij mod p的值,并从值αij mod p导出密钥Kij。 然后随机产生一个瞬时密钥Kp,Kp用于加密要由节点I发送的数据报。然后使用密钥Kij加密Kp。 在接收节点J接收到加密的数据报后,节点J获得节点I的DH证书(来自本地高速缓存,目录服务,或者直接从节点J),获得公共值αi mod p。 然后,节点I计算alpha ij mod p的值并导出密钥Kij。 节点J利用密钥Kij对瞬时密钥Kp进行解密,并且使用解密的瞬时密钥Kp,节点J对数据包进行解密,从而导致未加密形式的原始数据。
Abstract:
A first data processing device (node I) is coupled to a private network which is in turn coupled to the Internet. A second data processing device (node J) is coupled to the same, or to a different network, which is also coupled to the Internet, such that node I communicates to node J using the Internet protocol. Node I is provided with a secret value i, and a public value .varies..sup.i mod p. Node J is provided with a secret value j, and a public value .varies..sup.j mod p. Data packets (referred to as "datagrams") are encrypted using the teachings of the present invention to enhance network security. A source node I obtains a Diffie-Helman (DH) certificate for node J, (either from a local cache, from a directory service, or directly from node J), and obtains node J's public value .varies..sup.j mod p from the DH certificate. Node I then computes the value of .varies..sup.ij mod p, and derives a key K.sub.ij from the value .varies..sup.ij mod p. A transient key K.sub.p is then generated at random, and K.sub.p is used to encrypt the datagram to be sent by node I. K.sub.p is then encrypted with key K.sub.ij. Upon receipt of the encrypted datagram by the receiving node J, the node J obtains a DH certificate for node I, (either from a local cache, from a directory service, or directly from node J), and obtains the public value .varies..sup.i mod p. Node J then computes the value of .varies..sup.ij mod p and derives the key K.sub.ij. Node J utilizes the key K.sub.ij to decrypt the transient key K.sub.p, and using the decrypted transient key K.sub.p, node J decrypts the datagram packet, thereby resulting in the original data in unencrypted form.
Abstract translation:第一数据处理设备(节点I)耦合到专用网络,专用网络又耦合到因特网。 第二数据处理设备(节点J)被耦合到同一网络,或耦合到也耦合到因特网的不同网络,使得节点I使用因特网协议与节点J进行通信。 节点I被提供有秘密值i和公共值PROPORTIONAL i mod p。 节点J被提供有秘密值j和公共值PROPORTIONAL j mod p。 使用本发明的教导来加密数据分组(称为“数据报”)以增强网络安全性。 源节点I获得节点J的Diffie-Helman(DH)证书(来自本地缓存,目录服务或直接来自节点J),并从DH证书获得节点J的公共价值PROPORTIONAL j mod p 。 然后,节点I计算PROPORTIONAL ij mod p的值,并从值PROPORTIONAL ij mod p导出密钥Kij。 然后随机产生一个瞬时密钥Kp,Kp用于加密要由节点I发送的数据报。然后使用密钥Kij加密Kp。 在接收节点J接收到加密数据报后,节点J获取节点I的DH证书(从本地缓存,目录服务或直接从节点J获取),并获得公共值PROPORTIONAL i mod p。 节点J然后计算PROPORTIONAL ij mod p的值并导出密钥Kij。 节点J利用密钥Kij对瞬时密钥Kp进行解密,并且使用解密的瞬时密钥Kp,节点J对数据包进行解密,从而导致未加密形式的原始数据。