摘要:
A smart card includes a plurality of function blocks, and a laser attack detector configured to detect an external laser attack on at least one of the plurality of function blocks. The laser attack detector may include a plurality of chain blocks connected in a chain configuration, and each of the chain blocks is configured to change the level of a detection value stored therein in response to an external laser attack.
摘要:
An integrated circuit includes a detector circuit including a sensor configured to sense an alteration to a physical characteristic of a substrate and to generate an alarm signal indicating such alteration and a circuit configured to respond to the generation of the alarm signal by implementing countermeasures. A smart card may include such a circuit to counteract a back side attack.
摘要:
A detection circuit, including a sensing circuit configured to sense whether there is an external attack and generate second data from first data, a data conversion circuit configured to convert the first data to third data, and a comparator configured to compare the second data with the third data.
摘要:
Example embodiments of present invention disclosed herein are directed to an IC chip card capable of detecting an external attack on data of a memory device. An IC chip card may include a memory device adapted to store data including a stored integrity identification value, an integrity identification value generating unit adapted to calculate an integrity identification value of the data, and a microprocessor adapted to compare the stored integrity identification value with the calculated integrity identification value to determine whether the data of the memory device has been compromised.
摘要:
A demodulator for near field communication may include: a scale down circuit configured to receive first and second modulated signals from first and second power electrodes, and configured to provide a scale down signal to a first node by scaling down magnitudes of the first and second modulated signals; a current source coupled between the first node and a ground voltage, and configured to generate a constant current flowing from the first node to the ground voltage; a charge store circuit coupled between the first node and ground voltage, and configured to perform charge and discharge operations alternately, based on the scale down signal and constant current, to output an envelope signal, which corresponds to an envelope of the scale down signal; and/or an edge detector configured to generate input data, which correspond to the first and second modulated signals, based on a transition of the envelope signal.
摘要:
A demodulator for near field communication may include: a scale down circuit configured to receive first and second modulated signals from first and second power electrodes, and configured to provide a scale down signal to a first node by scaling down magnitudes of the first and second modulated signals; a current source coupled between the first node and a ground voltage, and configured to generate a constant current flowing from the first node to the ground voltage; a charge store circuit coupled between the first node and ground voltage, and configured to perform charge and discharge operations alternately, based on the scale down signal and constant current, to output an envelope signal, which corresponds to an envelope of the scale down signal; and/or an edge detector configured to generate input data, which correspond to the first and second modulated signals, based on a transition of the envelope signal.
摘要:
A smart card includes a plurality of function blocks, and a laser attack detector configured to detect an external laser attack on at least one of the plurality of function blocks. The laser attack detector may include a plurality of chain blocks connected in a chain configuration, and each of the chain blocks is configured to change the level of a detection value stored therein in response to an external laser attack.
摘要:
A detection circuit, including a sensing circuit configured to sense whether there is an external attack and generate second data from first data, a data conversion circuit configured to convert the first data to third data, and a comparator configured to compare the second data with the third data.