DETERMINING VIOLATION OF A NETWORK INVARIANT

    公开(公告)号:US20200186429A1

    公开(公告)日:2020-06-11

    申请号:US16721274

    申请日:2019-12-19

    Abstract: Example implementations relate to determining whether network invariants are violated by flow rules to be implemented by the data plane of a network. In an example, a verification module implemented on a device receives a flow rule transmitted from an SDN controller to a switch, the flow rule relating to an event. The module determines whether the flow rule matches any of a plurality of network invariants cached in the device. If determined that the flow rule matches one of the plurality of network invariants, the verification module determines whether the flow rule violates the matched network invariant. If determined that the flow rule does not match any of the plurality of network invariants, the verification module (1) reports the event associated with the flow rule to a policy management module, (2) receives a new network invariant related to the event from the policy management module, and (3) determines whether the flow rule violates the new network invariant. The verification module generates an alarm if determined that the flow rule violates any of the network invariants.

    VIRTUALIZED NETWORK FUNCTION PLACEMENTS
    3.
    发明申请

    公开(公告)号:US20170318097A1

    公开(公告)日:2017-11-02

    申请号:US15142141

    申请日:2016-04-29

    Abstract: Example implementations relate to virtualized network function (VNF) placements. For example, VNF placements may include generating an initial mapping of a plurality of VNFs among a plurality of nodes of a network infrastructure, wherein the initial VNF mapping distributes each of a plurality of service chains associated with the plurality of VNFs to different top-of-rack switches. VNF placement may include generating an alternate VNF mapping of the plurality of VNFs among a portion of the plurality of nodes, wherein the alternate VNF mapping corresponds to a metric associated with node resource utilization and a particular amount of servers utilized by distributing the plurality of service chains according to the alternate VNF mapping. VNF placement may include placing the plurality of VNFs according to a selected placement from the initial VNF mapping and the alternate VNF mapping.

    Determining violation of a network invariant

    公开(公告)号:US11095518B2

    公开(公告)日:2021-08-17

    申请号:US16721274

    申请日:2019-12-19

    Abstract: Example implementations relate to determining whether network invariants are violated by flow rules to be implemented by the data plane of a network. In an example, a verification module implemented on a device receives a flow rule transmitted from an SDN controller to a switch, the flow rule relating to an event. The module determines whether the flow rule matches any of a plurality of network invariants cached in the device. If determined that the flow rule matches one of the plurality of network invariants, the verification module determines whether the flow rule violates the matched network invariant. If determined that the flow rule does not match any of the plurality of network invariants, the verification module (1) reports the event associated with the flow rule to a policy management module, (2) receives a new network invariant related to the event from the policy management module, and (3) determines whether the flow rule violates the new network invariant. The verification module generates an alarm if determined that the flow rule violates any of the network invariants.

    SELECTIVELY MONITORING A NETWORK OF NETWORK FUNCTION CHAINS BASED ON PROBABILITY OF SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT VIOLATION

    公开(公告)号:US20200084152A1

    公开(公告)日:2020-03-12

    申请号:US16685877

    申请日:2019-11-15

    Abstract: In some implementations, a method includes conducting, by a network device, a query associated with a network function chain comprising a plurality of switches and middleboxes to verify whether a service performed by the network function chain complies with a Service Level Agreement (SLA); computing, by the network device, based on a result of the query, a difference in metric value between an actual performance metric of a packet passing through a path in the network function chain and an expected performance metric of the packet passing through the path; deriving, by the network device, a probability of SLA violation associated with the path based on the difference in metric value; and selectively monitoring, by the network device, a network of network function chains by monitoring the path for passive performance measurements based on the probability of SLA violation.

    Verify a network function by inquiring a model using a query language

    公开(公告)号:US10958547B2

    公开(公告)日:2021-03-23

    申请号:US15261701

    申请日:2016-09-09

    Abstract: In some examples, a system can verify a network function by inquiring a model using a query language is described. In some examples, the system can include at least a memory and a processor coupled to the memory. The processor can execute instructions stored in the memory to transmit a plurality of packets into at least one network function that is unverifiable; describe the at least one network function using a model comprising a set of match action rules and a state machine; inquire the model using a query language comprising a temporal logic to obtain a query result indicating an expected behavior of the plurality of packets; and verify the at least one network function based on the query result and the expected behavior of the plurality of packets.

    Generating composite network policy

    公开(公告)号:US10812342B2

    公开(公告)日:2020-10-20

    申请号:US15581826

    申请日:2017-04-28

    Abstract: Example method includes: receiving, by a network device in a network, a first network policy and a second network policy configured by a network administrator, wherein the first network policy comprises a first metric and the second network policy comprises a second and different metric; detecting, by the network device, a conflict between the first network policy and the second network policy; determining, by the network device, a relationship between the first metric and the second metric; modifying, by the network device, at least one of the first network policy and the second network policy to resolve the conflict based on the relationship between the first metric and the second metric; and combining, by the network device, the first network policy and the second network policy to generate a composite network policy that is represented on a single policy graph.

    Determining violation of a network invariant

    公开(公告)号:US10541873B2

    公开(公告)日:2020-01-21

    申请号:US15775378

    申请日:2015-11-20

    Abstract: Example implementations relate to determining whether network invariants are violated by flow rules to be implemented by the data plane of a network. In an example, a verification module implemented on a device receives a flow rule transmitted from an SDN controller to a switch, the flow rule relating to an event. The module determines whether the flow rule matches any of a plurality of network invariants cached in the device. If determined that the flow rule matches one of the plurality of network invariants, the verification module determines whether the flow rule violates the matched network invariant. If determined that the flow rule does not match any of the plurality of network invariants, the verification module (1) reports the event associated with the flow rule to a policy management module, (2) receives a new network invariant related to the event from the policy management module, and (3) determines whether the flow rule violates the new network invariant. The verification module generates an alarm if determined that the flow rule violates any of the network invariants.

Patent Agency Ranking