Abstract:
One feature pertains to a method for secure wireless communication at an apparatus of a network. The method includes receiving a user equipment identifier identifying a user equipment and a cryptographic key from a wireless wide area network node, and using the cryptographic key as a pairwise master key (PMK). A PMK identifier (PKMID) is generated based on the PMK and the two are stored at the network. A PMK security association is initialized by associating the PMK with at least the PMKID and an access point identifier identifying an access point of the apparatus. An association request is received that includes a PMKID from the user equipment, and it's determined that the PMKID received from the user equipment matches the PMKID stored. A key exchange is initiated with the user equipment based on the PMK to establish a wireless local area network security association with the user equipment.
Abstract:
Aspects of the subject matter described in this disclosure can be implemented in an implant device capable of being configured by an external hospital interrogator device when the external hospital interrogator device is authenticated, and capable of communicating data regarding a patient when paired with an external home interrogator device. The implant device includes RF communications circuitry, one or more sensors configured to measure and/or collect data regarding the patient, and a control system. The control system is configured to receive instructions from the external hospital interrogator device for configuring the implant device when the external hospital interrogator device is authenticated, and receive identification data from the external hospital interrogator device for pairing the implant device with the external home interrogator device.
Abstract:
Methods, systems, and devices are described for wireless communication at a wireless station. Specifically, the present disclosure prevents a station from decrypting unauthorized messages transmitted by wireless device(s) impersonating an AP. In some examples, the AP may continuously and periodically alter the keys for each transmitted message transmitted to prevent malicious interference by unauthorized devices. In some examples, the method may use a symmetric cipher (e.g., Message Integrity Code) for a message using an undisclosed MIC key.
Abstract:
In an aspect, a network supporting client devices includes one or more network nodes implementing network functions. Such network functions enable a client device to apply a security context to communications with the network when the client device is not in a connected mode. The client device obtains a user plane key shared with a user plane network function implemented at a first network node and/or a control plane key shared with a control plane network function implemented at a second network node. The client device protects a data packet with the user plane key or a control packet with the control plane key. The data packet includes first destination information indicating the first network node and the control packet includes second destination information indicating the second network node. The client device transmits the data packet or control packet.
Abstract:
A method for protecting data on a mobile communication device, comprising: reading existing security data from a universal integrated circuit card (UICC) during a current (second) power cycle; and utilizing the existing security data to decrypt data stored to a mobile communication device during a previous (first) power cycle.
Abstract:
At least one feature pertains to a method operational at a user device that includes receiving, from an application service provider, an application-specific certificate associated with at least one application service provided by the application service provider. The method also includes determining that a wireless communication network provides application-specific access to the application service provided by the application service provider, and transmitting a registration request including the application-specific certificate to the wireless communication network for authentication of the user device. The application-specific certificate includes a user device public key. The method further includes performing authentication and key agreement with the wireless communication network, and communicating with the application service after authentication and key agreement is successfully performed. In one aspect, authentication and key agreement with the network is performed directly between the user device and the network and independent to the application service provider.
Abstract:
Methods, systems, and devices are described for provisioning of devices, such as UEs, for service at a wireless network. One or more device parameters may be identified for use in provisioning the device on the wireless network, which may be provided to a network element. The network element may use the provided parameters to access a subscription server. The subscription server may provide verification and/or subscription parameters of the device that may then be used by the device to verify that the device is authorized to access the wireless network.
Abstract:
Methods, systems, apparatuses, and devices are described for access point privacy using media access control (MAC) address randomization. The access point may identify a MAC address for use with over-the-air (OTA) transmissions and a persistent MAC address for backend communications. The access point may communicate the OTA MAC address and the persistent MAC address to a wireless station. The access point and the wireless station may exchange data frames and perform MAC replacement techniques to map the OTA MAC address to the persistent MAC address. The persistent MAC address may provide for data routing, mobility management, etc., whereas the OTA MAC address may provide for privacy for the wireless transmissions.
Abstract:
A method for authenticating a device to a network using a device certificate is described. The method includes generating a private-public key pair on a system-on-chip (SoC) of the device. The private key is protected by a hardware-based root of trust of the SoC. The method also includes generating a device certificate that is signed using the private key. The method further includes using the device certificate to gain access to the network.
Abstract:
An example method of determining a level of service to allocate for a browser-based session includes receiving, at an operator core network, a request to establish a browser-based session for a web service. The request is from a browser executing on a user equipment (UE). The method also includes identifying an attribute value of an attribute assigned to the UE and determining, based on the attribute value assigned to the UE, whether the UE is currently registered with the operator core network. The method further includes determining, based on whether the UE is currently registered with the operator core network, a level of service to allocate for the browser-based session.