Abstract:
A UE (10) provides information on potential S′eNB(s). The information is forwarded from an MeNB (20_1) to an M′eNB (20_2) such that the M′eNB (20_2) can determine, before the handover happens, whether the M′eNB (20_2) will configure a new SeNB (S′eNB) and which S′eNB the M′eNB (20_2) will configure. In one of options, the MeNB (20_1) derives a key S′-KeNB for communication protection between the UE (10) and the S′eNB (30_1), and send the S′-KeNB to the M′eNB (20_2). In another option, the M′eNB (20_2) derives the S′-KeNB from a key KeNB* received from the MeNB (20_1). The M′eNB (20_2) sends the S′-KeNB to the S′eNB (30_1). Moreover, there are also provided several variations to perform SeNB Release, SeNB Addition, Bearer Modification and the like, in which the order and/or timing thereof can be different during the handover procedure.
Abstract:
An SeNB (30) informs an MeNB (20) that it can configure bearers for the given UE (10). At this time, the MeNB (20) manages the DRB status, and then sends a key S-KeNB to the SeNB (30). The MeNB (20) also sends a KSI for the S-KeNB to both of the UE (10) and the SeNB (30). After this procedure, the MeNB (20) informs an EPC (MME (40) and S-GW (50)) about the new bearer configured at the SeNB (30), such that the S-GW 50 can start offloading the bearer(s) to the SeNB 30. Prior to the offloading, the EPC network entity (MME (40) or S-GW (50)) performs verification that: 1) whether the request is coming from authenticated source (MeNB); and 2) whether the SeNB (30) is a valid eNB to which the traffic can be offload.
Abstract:
A communication system includes a plurality of communication terminals that form a communication group and a node device that carries out an authentication process on each of the communication terminals. The node device derives first keys unique to the respective communication terminals by using information shared between the node device and each communication terminal through the authentication process, derives a second key common to the communication group, calculates an exclusive OR between each first key and the second key, and transmits respective XOR values obtained through the calculation to the respective communication terminals. Each communication terminal reproduces the second key by calculating an exclusive OR of between the first key unique to the own communication terminal derived by using the information and the XOR value received from the node device. Thus, the keys used in group communication are managed more securely.
Abstract:
An SeNB informs an MeNB that it can configure bearers for the given UE. At this time, the MeNB manages the DRB status, and then sends a key S-KeNB to the SeNB. The MeNB also sends a KSI for the S-KeNB to both of the UE and the SeNB. After this procedure, the MeNB informs an EPC (MME and S-GW) about the new bearer configured at the SeNB, such that the S-GW 50 can start offloading the bearer(s) to the SeNB 30. Prior to the offloading, the EPC network entity (MME or S-GW) performs verification that: 1) whether the request is coming from authenticated source (MeNB); and 2) whether the SeNB is a valid eNB to which the traffic can be offload.
Abstract:
In order for efficiently managing communications between a UE (10) and multiple SCSs (20_1-20_n), the UE (10) includes, in one message, multiple pieces of data to be transmitted to the SCSs (20_1-20_n), and sends the message to an MTC-IWF (30). The MTC-IWF (30) receives the message from the UE (10), and distributes the date to the SCSs (20_1-20_n). Each of the SCSs sends (20_1-20_n), to the MTC-IWF (30), data to be transmitted to the UE (10) and an indicator that indicates for the SCSs (20_1-20_n) the time tolerance until the data is transmitted to the UE (10). The MTC-IWF (30) receives the data and the indicators from the SCSs (20_1-20_n), and determines when to forward the data to the UE (10) based on the indicators.
Abstract:
In order for supporting separate ciphering at an MeNB (20) and an SeNB (30), the MeNB (20) derives separate first and second keys (KUPenc-M, KUPenc-S) from a third key (KeNB). The first key (KUPenc-M) is used for confidentially protecting first traffic transmitted over U-Plane between the MeNB (20) and a UE (10). The first key (KUPenc-M) may be the same as current KUPenc or a new key. The second key (KUPenc-S) is used for confidentially protecting second traffic transmitted over the U-Plane between the UE (10) and the SeNB (30). The MeNB (20) sends the second key (KUPenc-S) to the SeNB (30). The UE (10) negotiates with the MeNB (20), and derives the second key (KUPenc-S) based on a result of the negotiation.
Abstract:
In order for effectively ensuring security for direct communication in ProSe, a ProSe Function acquires from a 3rd party root keys for each of UEs to derive a pair of session keys for securely conducting direct communication with different UEs, and distributes the acquired root keys to each of the UEs. Each of the UEs derives the session keys by using one of the distributed root keys. Moreover, a plurality of UEs, which form a communication system, and are allowed to conduct direct communication with each other when the UEs are in proximity to each other, share public keys of the UEs therebetween through a node which supports the direct communication upon successfully registering the UEs with the node. Each of the UEs verifies at least a request for the direct communication by using one of the public keys.
Abstract:
In order for charging SDT and MTC device trigger over control plane, there is provided a network node (40) that relays messages over a control plane (T5 and Tsp) between an MTC device (10) and an SCS (50). The network node (40) counts the number of messages successfully relayed, and generates a CDR in accordance with the counted number. The messages are SDT messages delivered from the MTC device (10) to the SCS (50), SDT messages delivered from the SCS (50) to the MTC device (10), or MTC device trigger messages delivered from the SCS (50) to the MTC device (10). The network node (40) transfers the CDR to an OCF (31) or a CDF (32).
Abstract:
In order to improve security upon distributing a group key, there is provided a gateway (20) to a core network for a group of MTC devices (10_1-10_n) communicating with the core network. The gateway (20) protects confidentiality and integrity of a group key, and distributes the protected group key to each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n). The protection is performed by using: a key (Kgr) that is preliminarily shared between the gateway (20) and each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n), and that is used for the gateway (20) to authenticate each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n) as a member of the group; or a key (K_iwf) that is shared between an MTC-IWF (50) and each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n), and that is used to derive temporary keys for securely conducting individual communication between the MTC-IWF (50) and each of the MTC devices (10_1-10_n).
Abstract:
A method of performing authentication and authorization in Proximity based Service (ProSe) communication by a requesting device which sends a request of a communication and a receiving device which receives the request from the requesting device, the method including deriving session keys Kpc and Kpi from an unique key Kp at the requesting and receiving devices, using the session keys Kpc and Kpi for ProSe communication setup and direct communication between the requesting and receiving devices, starting the direct communication with the requesting and receiving devices. The key Kpc is confidentiality key and the key Kpi is integrity protection key.