Abstract:
Methods, systems, and devices are described for wireless communication at a wireless station. Specifically, the present disclosure prevents a station from decrypting unauthorized messages transmitted by wireless device(s) impersonating an AP. In some examples, the AP may continuously and periodically alter the keys for each transmitted message transmitted to prevent malicious interference by unauthorized devices. In some examples, the method may use a symmetric cipher (e.g., Message Integrity Code) for a message using an undisclosed MIC key.
Abstract:
A method, an apparatus, and a computer program product for wireless communication are provided. A method includes transmitting a request to a serving network with a nonce and a signature request directed to a network function of the serving network, receiving a response to the request from the serving network, and authenticating the serving network based on the signature of the network function. The nonce may provide replay protection. The response may include a signature of the network function. The request sent to the serving network may include a radio resource control (RRC) message or a tracking area update (TAU) request. The serving network may be authenticated using a trusted third party to verify a certificate associated with the serving network.
Abstract:
In a first configuration, a UE receives, from a service provider, a certificate authority list. The certificate authority list is at least one of integrity protected or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and the service provider and stored on a smartcard in the UE. The UE authenticates a server using the received certificate authority list. In a second configuration, the UE receives a user service discovery/announcement including a reception report configuration and an address of a server. The UE sends a protected reception report to the server based on the reception report configuration. In a third configuration, the UE receives a protected broadcast announcement and communicates based on the broadcast announcement. The broadcast announcement is at least one of integrity protected or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and stored on a smartcard in the UE.
Abstract:
Systems and methods for control and triggering of machine to machine (M2M) devices (e.g., smart meters). More specifically how to allow an M2M service provider (e.g., utility company) to use an operator's network to communicate with the M2M device connected with a UE/GW associated with the operator's network. The M2M service provider may receive identification of the UE/GW, but not for the M2M device. By transmitting an identifier for the M2M device along with an identifier for the UE/GW, the network operator may define establish and maintain a communication path specific to M2M devices. Similar techniques may be incorporated to allow the M2M service provider to locate and trigger the M2M device.
Abstract:
One feature pertains to a method for secure wireless communication at an apparatus of a network. The method includes receiving a user equipment identifier identifying a user equipment and a cryptographic key from a wireless wide area network node, and using the cryptographic key as a pairwise master key (PMK). A PMK identifier (PKMID) is generated based on the PMK and the two are stored at the network. A PMK security association is initialized by associating the PMK with at least the PMKID and an access point identifier identifying an access point of the apparatus. An association request is received that includes a PMKID from the user equipment, and it's determined that the PMKID received from the user equipment matches the PMKID stored. A key exchange is initiated with the user equipment based on the PMK to establish a wireless local area network security association with the user equipment.
Abstract:
Aspects directed towards steering of roaming (SoR) are disclosed. In one example, a communication from a public land mobile network (PLMN) is received by a user equipment (UE) in which the communication indicates an acceptance of a UE registration with the PLMN. This example further includes performing a determination of whether an SoR indicator associated with a home PLMN (HPLMN) is embedded within the communication. The UE then manages PLMN selection according to the determination. In another example, a UE is configured to operate according to an SoR configuration in which the UE is configured to ascertain whether an SoR indicator is embedded within a communication from a PLMN. An SoR indicator associated with an HPLMN is then generated and subsequently transmitted from the HPLMN to the UE via the PLMN.
Abstract:
Techniques are described for wireless communication. A method for wireless communication at a user equipment (UE) includes performing an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) procedure with an authentication server via an authenticator. The EAP procedure is based at least in part on a set of authentication credentials exchanged between the UE and the authentication server. The method also includes deriving, as part of performing the EAP procedure, a master session key (MSK) and an extended master session key (EMSK) that are based at least in part on the authentication credentials and a first set of parameters; determining a network type associated with the authenticator; and performing, based at least in part on the determined network type, at least one authentication procedure with the authenticator. The at least one authentication procedure is based on an association of the MSK or the EMSK with the determined network type.
Abstract:
One feature pertains to a method that includes establishing a radio communication connection with a first radio access node (RAN) that uses control plane signaling connections to carry user plane data. The method also includes determining that the wireless communication device is experiencing radio link failure (RLF) with the first RAN and that the radio communication connection should be reestablished with a second RAN. A reestablishment request message is transmitted to the second RAN that includes parameters that enable a core network node communicatively coupled to the second RAN to authenticate the wireless communication device and allow or reject reestablishment of the radio communication connection. The parameters include at least a message authentication code (MAC) based in part on one or more bits of a non-access stratum (NAS) COUNT value maintained at the wireless communication device.
Abstract:
Certain aspects provide a method for wireless communication. The method generally includes deriving a network specific identifier (NSI) in a network access identifier (NAI) format, the NSI including a network identifier (NID) stored at the UE, generating a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) based on the NSI for authentication of the UE with a non-public network (NPN), and sending the SUCI to a network entity for the authentication of the UE with the NPN.
Abstract:
In an aspect, the present disclosure includes a method, apparatus, and computer readable medium for wireless communications for configuring of a NAS COUNT value of a mapped EPS security context associated with an intersystem change of a UE from a 5G system to an EPS. The aspect includes generating, by a UE, a mapped EPS security context associated with an intersystem change of the UE from a 5G system to an EPS, wherein the mapped EPS security context comprises security parameters created based a 5G security context used for the 5G system, the security parameters enabling security-related communications between the UE and a network entity; determining an UL NAS COUNT value and the DL NAS COUNT value for the mapped EPS security context; and transmitting, by the UE, a NAS message to the network entity, the NAS message including the UL NAS COUNT value of the mapped EPS security context.