Abstract:
A communication system includes a plurality of communication terminals that form a communication group and a node device that carries out an authentication process on each of the communication terminals. The node device derives first keys unique to the respective communication terminals by using information shared between the node device and each communication terminal through the authentication process, derives a second key common to the communication group, calculates an exclusive OR between each first key and the second key, and transmits respective XOR values obtained through the calculation to the respective communication terminals. Each communication terminal reproduces the second key by calculating an exclusive OR of between the first key unique to the own communication terminal derived by using the information and the XOR value received from the node device. Thus, the keys used in group communication are managed more securely.
Abstract:
An SeNB informs an MeNB that it can configure bearers for the given UE. At this time, the MeNB manages the DRB status, and then sends a key S-KeNB to the SeNB. The MeNB also sends a KSI for the S-KeNB to both of the UE and the SeNB. After this procedure, the MeNB informs an EPC (MME and S-GW) about the new bearer configured at the SeNB, such that the S-GW 50 can start offloading the bearer(s) to the SeNB 30. Prior to the offloading, the EPC network entity (MME or S-GW) performs verification that: 1) whether the request is coming from authenticated source (MeNB); and 2) whether the SeNB is a valid eNB to which the traffic can be offload.
Abstract:
In order for efficiently managing communications between a UE (10) and multiple SCSs (20_1-20_n), the UE (10) includes, in one message, multiple pieces of data to be transmitted to the SCSs (20_1-20_n), and sends the message to an MTC-IWF (30). The MTC-IWF (30) receives the message from the UE (10), and distributes the date to the SCSs (20_1-20_n). Each of the SCSs sends (20_1-20_n), to the MTC-IWF (30), data to be transmitted to the UE (10) and an indicator that indicates for the SCSs (20_1-20_n) the time tolerance until the data is transmitted to the UE (10). The MTC-IWF (30) receives the data and the indicators from the SCSs (20_1-20_n), and determines when to forward the data to the UE (10) based on the indicators.
Abstract:
In order for effectively ensuring security for direct communication in ProSe, a ProSe Function acquires from a 3rd party root keys for each of UEs to derive a pair of session keys for securely conducting direct communication with different UEs, and distributes the acquired root keys to each of the UEs. Each of the UEs derives the session keys by using one of the distributed root keys. Moreover, a plurality of UEs, which form a communication system, and are allowed to conduct direct communication with each other when the UEs are in proximity to each other, share public keys of the UEs therebetween through a node which supports the direct communication upon successfully registering the UEs with the node. Each of the UEs verifies at least a request for the direct communication by using one of the public keys.
Abstract:
In order for charging SDT and MTC device trigger over control plane, there is provided a network node (40) that relays messages over a control plane (T5 and Tsp) between an MTC device (10) and an SCS (50). The network node (40) counts the number of messages successfully relayed, and generates a CDR in accordance with the counted number. The messages are SDT messages delivered from the MTC device (10) to the SCS (50), SDT messages delivered from the SCS (50) to the MTC device (10), or MTC device trigger messages delivered from the SCS (50) to the MTC device (10). The network node (40) transfers the CDR to an OCF (31) or a CDF (32).
Abstract:
A method of performing authentication and authorization in Proximity based Service (ProSe) communication by a requesting device which sends a request of a communication and a receiving device which receives the request from the requesting device, the method including deriving session keys Kpc and Kpi from an unique key Kp at the requesting and receiving devices, using the session keys Kpc and Kpi for ProSe communication setup and direct communication between the requesting and receiving devices, starting the direct communication with the requesting and receiving devices. The key Kpc is confidentiality key and the key Kpi is integrity protection key.
Abstract:
A method for integrity protection scheme by a mobile communication device or a core network entity according to a first exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes configuring settings and parameters for integrity protection for user data with another party; receiving user plane data from the other party, calculating Message Authentication Code for Integrity (MAC-I) for a part of the data and checking integrity of the part of the data.
Abstract:
Accordingly, embodiments herein disclose a method and base station for preventing a User Equipment (UE) from attaching to a false base station. The method includes: generating, by a source base station, a UE specific Anonymity Challenge Parameter to the UE based on sensitive information from the UE, cell information, source base station information and initial Anonymity Challenge Parameter assigned to the particular base station; and sending, by the source base station, a measurement command message including the UE specific Anonymity Challenge Parameter to the UE. Further, the method includes receiving, by the source base station, an Anonymity Challenge Parameter acknowledgement as a response from the UE; and negotiating, by the source base station, the UE specific Anonymity Challenge Parameter with the UE to prevent the UE from attaching to the false base station.
Abstract:
In order for charging SDT and MTC device trigger over control plane, there is provided a network node (40) that relays messages over a control plane (T5 and Tsp) between an MTC device (10) and an SCS (50). The network node (40) counts the number of messages successfully relayed, and generates a CDR in accordance with the counted number. The messages are SDT messages delivered from the MTC device (10) to the SCS (50), SDT messages delivered from the SCS (50) to the MTC device (10), or MTC device trigger messages delivered from the SCS (50) to the MTC device (10). The network node (40) transfers the CDR to an OCF (31) or a CDF (32).
Abstract:
An object is to provide a key generation method capable of maintaining a high security level in each of sliced networks when network slicing is applied to a core network. A key generation method according to this disclosure specifies network slice identification information indicating a network slice system that provides a service to be used by a communication terminal (50) among a plurality of network slice systems included in a core network (10) and, using the network slice identification information, generates a service key to be used for security processing in the network slice system indicated by the network slice identification information.