Abstract:
Systems, apparatuses and methods may provide for conducting a signature verification of a mandatory access control policy and provisioning the mandatory access control policy into kernel memory if the signature verification is successful. Additionally, the kernel memory may be protected from unauthorized write operations by one or more processes having system level privileges. In one example, the mandatory access control policy is provisioned without a system reboot.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus relating to low overhead paged memory runtime protection are described. In an embodiment, permission information for guest physical mapping are received prior to utilization of paged memory by an Operating System (OS) based on the guest physical mapping. The permission information is provided through an Extended Page Table (EPT). Other embodiments are also described.
Abstract:
Systems, apparatuses and methods may provide for conducting a signature verification of a mandatory access control policy and provisioning the mandatory access control policy into kernel memory if the signature verification is successful. Additionally, the kernel memory may be protected from unauthorized write operations by one or more processes having system level privileges. In one example, the mandatory access control policy is provisioned without a system reboot.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus relating to low overhead paged memory runtime protection are described. In an embodiment, permission information for guest physical mapping are received prior to utilization of paged memory by an Operating System (OS) based on the guest physical mapping. The permission information is provided through an Extended Page Table (EPT). Other embodiments are also described.
Abstract:
Technologies for multi-level virtualization include a computing device having a processor that supports a root virtualization mode and a non-root virtualization mode. A non-root hypervisor determines whether it is executed under control of a root hypervisor, and if so, registers a callback handler and trigger conditions with the root hypervisor. The non-root hypervisor hosts one or more virtual machines. In response to a virtual machine exit, the root hypervisor determines whether a callback handler has been registered for the virtual machine exit reason and, if so, evaluates the trigger conditions associated with the callback handler. If the trigger conditions are satisfied, the root hypervisor invokes the callback handler. The callback handler may update a virtual virtualization support object based on changes made by the root hypervisor to a virtualization support object. The root hypervisor may invoke the callback handler in the non-root virtualization mode. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
Various embodiments are generally directed to instrumenting an interrupt service routine. A non-executable address may be provisioned and added to an execution stack to cause a page fault on a known address after execution of an interrupt service routine. The page fault on the known address can be used to trigger instrumentation operations and also to return to the interrupted process.
Abstract:
A copy is made of at least a part a stack. A caller return address of a calling function in the stack is verified as trusted. A caller return address of a called function in the stack is verified as matching a source address of the calling function in the copy of the stack. If verification is affirmative, then the called function may be executed in a trusted domain.
Abstract:
Apparatus, systems and methods may provide a browser interface to detect an attempt by web content to manipulate data in a local data store. In addition, the data may be classified into a category if the data is remotely accessible. Additionally, a security policy may be applied to the data based on the category. In one example, a separator may separate the data from other data based on the category, the data may be encrypted/decrypted based on the category, and/or context information and user input may be determined to apply the security policy further based on the context information and the user input.
Abstract:
Various embodiments are directed enabling anti-malware software to co-exist with protective features of an operating system. An apparatus may include a processor component including an IDT register storing an indication of size of an IDT; a monitoring component to retrieve the indication and compare the indication to a size of a guard IDT in response to modification of the IDT register to determine whether the guard routine is to inspect the IDT and a set of ISRs; and a cache component to overwrite the IDT and set of ISRs with a cached IDT and cached set of ISRs, respectively, based on the determination and prior to the inspection to prevent the guard routine from detecting a modification by an anti-malware routine, the cached IDT and cached set of ISRs generated from the IDT and set of ISRs, respectively, prior to the modification. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
Systems, apparatuses and methods may provide for conducting a signature verification of a mandatory access control policy and provisioning the mandatory access control policy into kernel memory if the signature verification is successful. Additionally, the kernel memory may be protected from unauthorized write operations by one or more processes having system level privileges. In one example, the mandatory access control policy is provisioned without a system reboot.