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公开(公告)号:US20210067972A1
公开(公告)日:2021-03-04
申请号:US16737230
申请日:2020-01-08
Applicant: QUALCOMM Incorporated
Inventor: Charles MCGRATH , Subrato Kumar De , Ankur Bhattacharjee , Krishna Ram Budhathoki , Mattias Kaulard Huber , Brandon Luu , Sai Eshwar Prasad Muppalla
Abstract: Methods for detecting and responding to unauthorized alert messages. In an example embodiment, a wireless device may detect a first system information block (SIB1) broadcast from a base station that includes an alert message flag that indicates that an emergency alert message is scheduled for broadcast in another system information block (e.g., in one of SIBs 10-14, etc.). The wireless device may detect an unauthorized alert based on inconsistent inputs from various base stations, and the server may detect fake or unauthorized base stations or detect unauthorized alerts based on inconsistent inputs from various UEs about same Cell ID, or same PLMN and geolocation, etc.
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公开(公告)号:US11729225B2
公开(公告)日:2023-08-15
申请号:US17456527
申请日:2021-11-24
Applicant: QUALCOMM Incorporated
Inventor: Ankur Bhattacharjee , Cherng-Shung Hsu , Subrato Kumar De , Mattias Kaulard Huber , Krishna Ram Budhathoki
IPC: H04L65/1076 , H04W76/30 , H04L65/1096 , H04L65/1046 , H04L65/1016
CPC classification number: H04L65/1079 , H04L65/1016 , H04L65/1046 , H04L65/1096 , H04W76/30
Abstract: Various embodiments may include methods and systems for avoiding connecting an illegitimate call within a telecommunications network. Various embodiments may include receiving, from a telecommunications network, an incoming call initiating message notifying the first wireless device of an incoming call, in which the incoming call initiating message includes caller information. Some embodiments may further include transmitting a provisional response message including callee information of the first wireless device in response to receiving the incoming call initiating message, transmitting a request message to a second wireless device based on the caller information and the callee information, determining whether the second wireless device initiated the incoming call based on a response message from the second wireless device, if received, in response to the request message, and taking an action to prevent connection of the incoming call in response to determining that the second wireless device did not initiate the incoming call.
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公开(公告)号:US11265700B2
公开(公告)日:2022-03-01
申请号:US16546582
申请日:2019-08-21
Applicant: QUALCOMM Incorporated
Inventor: Mattias Kaulard Huber , Subrato Kumar De , Ankur Bhattacharjee
Abstract: Methods for countering a shared paging channel hijack attack. In an example embodiment, a wireless device may monitor the shared paging channel during a paging occasion in a DRX cycle to detect a first IMSI-based paging message in the paging occasion, and continue monitoring for IMSI-based paging in subsequent radio subframes in the paging frame and radio subframes in subsequent radio frames within the DRX cycle to determine whether there are indications of a paging channel hijack attack. In an example embodiment, this monitoring may be to determine whether one or more subframes that are not the paging occasion receive IMSI-based paging messages, in response to which a threat probability may be increased. The wireless device may perform an operation (e.g., an actuation operation such as disabling monitoring of, and preventing connection attempts to, the base station, etc.) to protect against a shared paging channel hijack attack.
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公开(公告)号:US11218881B1
公开(公告)日:2022-01-04
申请号:US17070300
申请日:2020-10-14
Applicant: QUALCOMM incorporated
Inventor: Subrato Kumar De , Sivasubramanian Ramalingam , Ankur Bhattacharjee , Rahul Chandrashekar Sahukar , Muralidharan Murugan , Mattias Kaulard Huber , Krishna Ram Budhathoki , Syam Prasad Reddy Battula , Sattwik Nandi , Harshpreet Singh , Gaurav Singh , Rishika Tindola , Arvind Vardarajan Santhanam , Nitin Pant
Abstract: In various embodiments, a wireless device processor may determine a threat score for a first cell, determine whether the first cell threat score is below a first threat score threshold, update a good neighbor cell data structure using neighbor cell information from the first cell in response to determining that the first cell threat score is below the first threat score threshold, performing cell reselection to a second cell, determine whether the second cell transmits a system information block message indicating fake neighbor cell information, and increase a threat score for the second cell in response to determining that the second cell provides the SIB message indicating fake neighbor cell information and that a good neighbor cell data structure includes an indication of one or more good neighbor cells that are within the time threshold and the location threshold and doing countermeasures in a response to the determination.
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公开(公告)号:US11638152B2
公开(公告)日:2023-04-25
申请号:US16699075
申请日:2019-11-28
Applicant: QUALCOMM Incorporated
Inventor: Xuepan Guan , Subrato Kumar De , Nitin Pant , Mattias Kaulard Huber , Krishna Ram Budhathoki , Ankur Bhattacharjee
Abstract: Various embodiments include methods, components and wireless devices configured to identify illegitimate base station. The processor of the wireless device may determine that a device in communication with the wireless device is a suspect base station. The processor may send a fabricated message to the device, and may receive one or more response messages from the device. The processor may determine whether one or more of the response messages received from the device is an appropriate response or an inappropriate response to the fabricated message. In response to determining that a response message is an inappropriate response, the processor may determine that the device is an illegitimate base station. In response to determining that the device is an illegitimate base station, the wireless device may perform a protective action.
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公开(公告)号:US20200178065A1
公开(公告)日:2020-06-04
申请号:US16546582
申请日:2019-08-21
Applicant: QUALCOMM Incorporated
Inventor: Mattias Kaulard HUBER , Subrato Kumar De , Ankur Bhattacharjee
Abstract: Methods for countering a shared paging channel hijack attack. In an example embodiment, a wireless device may monitor the shared paging channel during a paging occasion in a DRX cycle to detect a first IMSI-based paging message in the paging occasion, and continue monitoring for IMSI-based paging in subsequent radio subframes in the paging frame and radio subframes in subsequent radio frames within the DRX cycle to determine whether there are indications of a paging channel hijack attack. In an example embodiment, this monitoring may be to determine whether one or more subframes that are not the paging occasion receive IMSI-based paging messages, in response to which a threat probability may be increased. The wireless device may perform an operation (e.g., an actuation operation such as disabling monitoring of, and preventing connection attempts to, the base station, etc.) to protect against a shared paging channel hijack attack.
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