Abstract:
A device includes a microcontroller, memory including secure memory to store a private key, a set of registers, and an authentication engine. The set of registers includes a write mailbox register and a read mailbox register, and message data is to be written to the write mailbox register by a host system. The message data includes at least a portion of a challenge request, and the challenge request includes a challenge by the host system to authenticity of the device. The authentication engine generates a response to the challenge, where the response includes data to identify attributes of the device and a signature generated using the private key. The authentication engine causes at least a portion of the response to be written to the read mailbox register to be read by the host system.
Abstract:
The present application is directed to transparent execution of secret content. A device may be capable of downloading content that may include at least one secret portion, wherein any secret portions of the content may be directed to a secure workplace in the device not accessible to device operating system components, applications, users, etc. The device may then present the content in a manner that allows secret portions of the content to be executed without direct access. For example, the device may download content, and a director module in the device may direct any secret portions of the downloaded content to a secure workspace. During execution of the content, any inputs required by the secret portions may be provided to the secure workspace, and any resulting outputs from the secret portions may then be used during content presentation.
Abstract:
Method of providing a Global Platform (GP) compliant Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) starts with main processor executing an application stored in memory device. Application includes client application (CA) and trusted application (TA). Executing the application includes running CA in client process and TA in TEE host process. Client process and TEE host process are separate. Using TEE host process, a request including identifier of the TA is received from client process to open session. Using GP Trusted Services enclave included in TEE host process, TA enclave associated with the identifier is determined and loaded in the TEE host process using the GP Trusted Services enclave to establish the session. Using TEE host process, commands to be invoked in TA enclave and set of parameters needed for commands are received from client process. Using GP Internal APIs, commands in TA enclave associated with identifier are executed. Other embodiments are also described.
Abstract:
Method of providing a Global Platform (GP) compliant Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) starts with main processor executing an application stored in memory device. Application includes client application (CA) and trusted application (TA). Executing the application includes running CA in client process and TA in TEE host process. Client process and TEE host process are separate. Using TEE host process, a request including identifier of the TA is received from client process to open session. Using GP Trusted Services enclave included in TEE host process, TA enclave associated with the identifier is determined and loaded in the TEE host process using the GP Trusted Services enclave to establish the session. Using TEE host process, commands to be invoked in TA enclave and set of parameters needed for commands are received from client process. Using GP Internal APIs, commands in TA enclave associated with identifier are executed. Other embodiments are also described.
Abstract:
Various system configurations and methods for maintaining, accessing, and utilizing secure data of a web browser in a hardware-managed secure data store are disclosed herein. In an example, operations for management of sensitive data such as passwords may be provided with the use of secure enclaves operating in a trusted execution environment. For example, such secure enclaves may be used for sealing and persisting sensitive data associated with a remote service, and transmitting the sensitive data to the remote service, while an unsealed form of the sensitive data is not accessible outside of the trusted execution environment. In further examples, operations for generating a password, storing or updating existing passwords, and replacing web browser input fields with secure data are disclosed.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, an apparatus includes a wireless controller, which may include a byte stream parser to receive a stream of data from one or more wireless devices and parse the stream of data to identify a first data packet associated with a first channel identifier associated with a trusted application, and a cryptographic engine coupled to the byte stream parser to encrypt a payload portion of the first data packet in response to the identification of the first data packet associated with the first channel identifier. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
The present application is directed to transparent execution of secret content. A device may be capable of downloading content that may include at least one secret portion, wherein any secret portions of the content may be directed to a secure workplace in the device not accessible to device operating system components, applications, users, etc. The device may then present the content in a manner that allows secret portions of the content to be executed without direct access. For example, the device may download content, and a director module in the device may direct any secret portions of the downloaded content to a secure workspace. During execution of the content, any inputs required by the secret portions may be provided to the secure workspace, and any resulting outputs from the secret portions may then be used during content presentation.