Abstract:
Technologies are generally described for masking power usage of co-processors on field-programmable gate arrays. In some examples, one or more moat brick circuits may be implemented around a co-processor loaded on a held-programmable gate array (FPGA). The moat brick circuits may be configured to use negative feedback and/or noise to mask the power usage variations of the co-processor from other co-processors on the FPGA.
Abstract:
Technologies related to mobile device prevention of contactless card attacks are generally described. In some examples, a mobile computing device may monitor for electromagnetic signals at frequencies used for short range communications with contactless cards. Detection of such electromagnetic signals by the mobile computing device may indicate an attack attempt on a proximal contactless card. In response to detection of such electromagnetic signals, the mobile computing device may automatically generate a disruption signal effective to disrupt communications between contactless card readers and any proximal contactless cards, to thereby foil the attack before sensitive contactless card data is stolen.
Abstract:
Technologies related to dynamic reconfiguration of programmable hardware are generally described. In some examples, coprocessor regions in programmable hardware such as a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) may be dynamically assigned to transition the FPGA from a starting arrangement of coprocessor regions to an efficient arrangement. A placement algorithm may be executed to determine the efficient arrangement, and a path finding algorithm may be executed to determine path finding operations leading from the starting arrangement to the efficient arrangement. The path finding operations may be performed to implement the transition.
Abstract:
Technologies for virtual machine placement within a data center are described herein. An example method may include determining a shared threat potential for a virtual machine based, at least in part, on a degree of co-location the virtual machine has with a current virtual machine operating on a physical machine, determining a workload threat potential for the virtual machine based, at least in part, on a level of advantage associated with placing the virtual machine on the physical machine, determining a threat potential for the virtual machine based, at least in part, on a combination of the shared threat potential and the workload threat potential, and placing the virtual machine on the physical machine based on the threat potential.
Abstract:
Technologies related to secure system time reporting are generally described. In some examples, responses to some system time requests may be manipulated to prevent leaking information that may be of interest for timing attacks, while responses to other system time requests need not be manipulated. In particular, responses to system time requests that are separated from a previous system time request by a predetermined minimum value, or less, may be manipulated. Responses to system time requests that are separated from a previous system time request by more than the predetermined minimum value need not be manipulated. Furthermore, secure system time reporting may be adaptively deployed to servers in a data center on an as-needed basis.
Abstract:
Technologies related to acceleration benefit estimation are generally described. In some examples, data centers may identify applications that may benefit from Programmable Hardware Accelerators (PHAs), and test the identified applications by running accelerated versions thereof, i.e., versions that use one or more identified PHAs, and comparing performance of the accelerated versions to reference versions, i.e., versions that do not use the one or more identified PHAs. Data centers may report comparison results may be reported to data center customers to encourage customer adoption of PHAs.
Abstract:
Technologies related to secure system time reporting are generally described. In some examples, responses to some system time requests may be manipulated to prevent leaking information that may be of interest for timing attacks, while responses to other system time requests need not be manipulated. In particular, responses to system time requests that are separated from a previous system time request by a predetermined minimum value, or less, may be manipulated. Responses to system time requests that are separated from a previous system time request by more than the predetermined minimum value need not be manipulated. Furthermore, secure system time reporting may be adaptively deployed to servers in a data center on an as-needed basis.
Abstract:
Technologies for virtual machine placement within a data center are described herein. An example method may include determining a shared threat potential for a virtual machine based, at least in part, on a degree of co-location the virtual machine has with a current virtual machine operating on a physical machine, determining a workload threat potential for the virtual machine based, at least in part, on a level of advantage associated with placing the virtual machine on the physical machine, determining a threat potential for the virtual machine based, at least in part, on a combination of the shared threat potential and the workload threat potential, and placing the virtual machine on the physical machine based on the threat potential.
Abstract:
Technologies related to intermediary graphics rendition are generally described. In some examples, one or more devices in a local network may be equipped to serve as real-time graphics rendering intermediary computing devices for clients in the local network. A graphics rendering manager for the local network may collect graphics processing capability information of the devices in a local network, and may select computing device(s) in the local network to serve as intermediary computing device(s). The graphics rendering manager may interact with a system controller at a server or datacenter to direct compositing flow(s) to the selected computing device(s), responsive to system controller requests to initiate intermediary graphics rendering for clients in the local network.
Abstract:
Technologies are generally described for masking power usage of co-processors on field-programmable gate arrays. In some examples, one or more moat brick circuits may be implemented around a co-processor loaded on a held-programmable gate array (FPGA). The moat brick circuits may be configured to use negative feedback and/or noise to mask the power usage variations of the co-processor from other co-processors on the FPGA.