Secure crypto module including optical glass security layer

    公开(公告)号:US11080222B2

    公开(公告)日:2021-08-03

    申请号:US15862030

    申请日:2018-01-04

    Abstract: An optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter and receiver are located upon a printed circuit board (PCB) glass security layer. A predetermined reference flux or interference pattern, respectively, is an expected flux or reflection pattern of EM emitted from the EM emitter, transmitted by the glass security layer, and received by the EM receiver. When the PCB is subject to an unauthorized access thereof the optical EM transmitted by glass security layer is altered. An optical monitoring device that monitors the flux or interference pattern of the optical EM received by the EM receiver detects a change in flux or interference pattern, in relation to the reference flux or reference interference pattern, respectively, and passes a tamper signal to one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized access. For example, one or more cryptographic adapter card or computer system functions or secured crypto components may be disabled.

    Employing conductive track writing in a tamper-respondent system

    公开(公告)号:US10548216B2

    公开(公告)日:2020-01-28

    申请号:US15465453

    申请日:2017-03-21

    Abstract: In some embodiments, a tamper-respondent system includes a PCB having a coating on a surface thereof, wherein the coating includes spinel-based, non-conductive metal oxide mixed into a non-conductive supporting material. The tamper-respondent system also includes a conductive track writing unit, a sensor, and an enclosure substantially enclosing the PCB, conductive track writing unit, and sensor. Responsive to a determination that a signal output from the sensor is indicative of tampering, the conductive track writing unit writes a conductive track within a predetermined portion of the coating by irradiating the predetermined portion of the coating to reduce the spinel-based, non-conductive metal oxide in the predetermined portion of the coating to metal nuclei. In some embodiments, the conductive track may modify circuit paths of the PCB and/or create electrical features on the PCB detectable by monitoring agents.

    SECURE CRYPTO MODULE INCLUDING OPTICAL GLASS SECURITY LAYER

    公开(公告)号:US20170279532A1

    公开(公告)日:2017-09-28

    申请号:US15080120

    申请日:2016-03-24

    CPC classification number: G06F13/4068 G09C1/00 H04B10/80 H04L9/004

    Abstract: An optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter and receiver are located upon a printed circuit board (PCB) glass security layer. A predetermined reference flux or interference pattern, respectively, is an expected flux or reflection pattern of EM emitted from the EM emitter, transmitted by the glass security layer, and received by the EM receiver. When the PCB is subject to an unauthorized access thereof the optical EM transmitted by glass security layer is altered. An optical monitoring device that monitors the flux or interference pattern of the optical EM received by the EM receiver detects a change in flux or interference pattern, in relation to the reference flux or reference interference pattern, respectively, and passes a tamper signal to one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized access. For example, one or more cryptographic adapter card or computer system functions or secured crypto components may be disabled.

    SECURE CRYPTO MODULE INCLUDING ELECTRICAL SHORTING SECURITY LAYERS

    公开(公告)号:US20170244756A1

    公开(公告)日:2017-08-24

    申请号:US15048024

    申请日:2016-02-19

    CPC classification number: H04L63/162 G06F13/4068

    Abstract: A security matrix layer between a first and second conductive shorting layers are located within a printed circuit board (PCB) that carries out cryptographic data handling functions. The security matrix layer includes at least two microcapsules each containing one or more reactants. When the security matrix layer is accessed, drilled, or otherwise damaged, the microcapsules rupture and the reactants react to form at least an electrically conductive material. The electrically conductive material contacts and shorts the first and second conductive shorting layers. A monitoring device that monitors whether the first and second conductive shorting layers have shorted detects the short and passes a tamper signal that is received by one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized physical access attempt.

    VERIFYING MOTION DATA FOR ACCESSING HARDWARE ELEMENTS
    10.
    发明申请
    VERIFYING MOTION DATA FOR ACCESSING HARDWARE ELEMENTS 有权
    验证用于访问硬件元件的运动数据

    公开(公告)号:US20160357995A1

    公开(公告)日:2016-12-08

    申请号:US15086488

    申请日:2016-03-31

    CPC classification number: G06F21/70 G06F21/6218 G06F21/88 G06F2221/2111

    Abstract: Aspects of the present disclosure are directed towards a method of electronic verification of motion data. This includes collecting a first set of motion data that corresponds to a first set of motion characteristics generated from physically moving a hardware element of a computer ending upon inserting the hardware element of the computer into a computer chassis. This can further include determining an approved set of motion data and comparing the first set of motion data to the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining a difference between the first set of motion data and the approved set of motion data. This can further include determining that the difference does not satisfy a threshold. This can further include executing a reaction sequence in the computer, in response to determining that the difference does not satisfy the threshold.

    Abstract translation: 本公开的方面针对运动数据的电子验证方法。 这包括收集第一组运动数据,该第一组运动数据对应于从将计算机的硬件元件插入计算机机箱中结束的物理移动计算机的硬件元件而产生的第一组运动特征。 这可以进一步包括确定一组经批准的运动数据,并将第一组运动数据与经批准的一组运动数据进行比较。 这可以进一步包括确定第一组运动数据与经批准的一组运动数据之间的差异。 这可以进一步包括确定差异不满足阈值。 这可以进一步包括响应于确定差异不满足阈值而在计算机中执行反应序列。

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