Abstract:
A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.
Abstract:
Apparatuses, methods and storage medium associated with application execution enclave memory page cache management, are disclosed herein. In embodiments, an apparatus may include a processor with processor supports for application execution enclaves; memory organized into a plurality of host physical memory pages; and a virtual machine monitor to be operated by the processor to manage operation of virtual machines. Management of operation of the virtual machines may include facilitation of mapping of virtual machine-physical memory pages of the virtual machines to the host physical memory pages, including maintenance of an unallocated subset of the host physical memory pages to receive increased security protection for selective allocation to the virtual machines, for virtualization and selective allocation to application execution enclaves of applications of the virtual machines. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.
Abstract:
A processor includes a decode unit to decode an instruction that is to indicate a page of a protected container memory, and a storage location outside of the protected container memory. An execution unit, in response to the instruction, is to ensure that there are no writable references to the page of the protected container memory while it has a write protected state. The execution unit is to encrypt a copy of the page of the protected container memory. The execution unit is to store the encrypted copy of the page to the storage location outside of the protected container memory, after it has been ensured that there are no writable references. The execution unit is to leave the page of the protected container memory in the write protected state, which is also valid and readable, after the encrypted copy has been stored to the storage location.
Abstract:
A secure enclave circuit stores an enclave page cache map to track contents of a secure enclave in system memory that stores secure data containing a page having a virtual address. An execution unit is to, in response to a request to evict the page from the secure enclave: block creation of translations of the virtual address; record one or more hardware threads currently accessing the secure data in the secure enclave; send an inter-processor interrupt to one or more cores associated with the one or more hardware threads, to cause the one or more hardware threads to exit the secure enclave and to flush translation lookaside buffers of the one or more cores; and in response to detection of a page fault associated with the virtual address for the page in the secure enclave, unblock the creation of translations of the virtual address.
Abstract:
Instructions and logic support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in a secure enclave page cache (EPC). An EPC stores a secure domain control structure (SDCS) in storage accessible by an enclave for a management process, and by a domain of enclaves. A second processor checks if a corresponding version array (VA) page is bound to the SDCS, and if so: increments a version counter in the SDCS for the page, performs an authenticated encryption of the page from the EPC using the version counter in the SDCS, and writes the encrypted page to external memory. A second processor checks if a corresponding VA page is bound to a second SDCS of the second processor, and if so: performs an authenticated decryption of the page using a version counter in the second SDCS, and loads the decrypted page to the EPC in the second processor if authentication passes.
Abstract:
Implementations of the disclosure provide for supporting oversubscription of guest enclave memory pages. In one implementation, a processing device comprising a memory controller unit to access a secure enclave and a processor core, operatively coupled to the memory controller unit. The processing device is to identify a target memory page in memory. The target memory page is associated with a secure enclave of a virtual machine (VM). A data structure comprising context information corresponding to the target memory page is received. A state of the target memory page is determined based on the received data structure. The state indicating whether the target memory page is associated with at least one of: a child memory page or a parent memory page of the VM. Thereupon, an instruction to evict the target memory page from the secure enclave is generated based on the determined state.
Abstract:
Embodiments of an invention for maintaining a secure processing environment across power cycles are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes an instruction unit and an execution unit. The instruction unit is to receive an instruction to evict a root version array page entry from a secure cache. The execution unit is to execute the instruction. Execution of the instruction includes generating a blob to contain information to maintain a secure processing environment across a power cycle and storing the blob in a non-volatile memory.
Abstract:
Instructions and logic interrupt and resume paging in secure enclaves. Embodiments include instructions, specify page addresses allocated to a secure enclave, the instructions are decoded for execution by a processor. The processor includes an enclave page cache to store secure data in a first cache line and in a last cache line for a page corresponding to the page address. A page state is read from the first or last cache line for the page when an entry in an enclave page cache mapping for the page indicates only a partial page is stored in the enclave page cache. The entry for a partial page may be set, and a new page state may be recorded in the first cache line when writing-back, or in the last cache line when loading the page when the instruction's execution is being interrupted. Thus the writing-back, or loading can be resumed.
Abstract:
Secure memory repartitioning technologies are described. A processor includes a processor core and a memory controller coupled between the processor core and main memory. The main memory includes a memory range including a section of convertible pages that are convertible to secure pages or non-secure pages. The processor core, in response to a page conversion instruction, is to determine from the instruction a convertible page in the memory range to be converted and convert the convertible page to be at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page. The memory range may also include a hardware reserved section that is convertible in response to a section conversion instruction.
Abstract:
A method and apparatus for flushing and restoring core memory content to and from, respectively, external memory are described. In one embodiment, the apparatus is an integrated circuit comprising a plurality of processor cores, the plurality of process cores including one core having a first memory operable to store data of the one core, the one core to store data from the first memory to a second memory located externally to the processor in response to receipt of a first indication that the one core is to transition from a first low power idle state to a second low power idle state and receipt of a second indication generated externally from the one core indicating that the one core is to store the data from the first memory to the second memory, locations in the second memory at which the data is stored being accessible by the one core and inaccessible by other processor cores in the IC; and a power management controller coupled to the plurality of cores and located outside the plurality of cores.