Abstract:
Secure memory repartitioning technologies are described. A processor includes a processor core and a memory controller coupled between the processor core and main memory. The main memory includes a memory range including a section of convertible pages that are convertible to secure pages or non-secure pages. The processor core, in response to a page conversion instruction, is to determine from the instruction a convertible page in the memory range to be converted and convert the convertible page to be at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page. The memory range may also include a hardware reserved section that is convertible in response to a section conversion instruction.
Abstract:
Embodiments of an invention for paging in secure enclaves are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes an instruction unit and an execution unit. The instruction unit is to receive a first instruction. The execution unit is to execute the first instruction, wherein execution of the first instruction includes evicting a first page from an enclave page cache.
Abstract:
Embodiments of an invention for logging in secure enclaves are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes an instruction unit and an execution unit. The instruction unit is to receive an instruction having an associated enclave page cache address. The execution unit is to execute the instruction without causing a virtual machine exit, wherein execution of the instruction includes logging the instruction and the associated enclave page cache address.
Abstract:
The entry/exit architecture may be a critical component of a protection framework using a secure enclaves-like trust framework for coprocessors. The entry/exit architecture describes steps that may be used to switch securely into a trusted execution environment (entry architecture) and out of the trusted execution environment (exit architecture), at the same time preventing any secure information from leaking to an untrusted environment.
Abstract:
The entry/exit architecture may be a critical component of a protection framework using a secure enclaves-like trust framework for coprocessors. The entry/exit architecture describes steps that may be used to switch securely into a trusted execution environment (entry architecture) and out of the trusted execution environment (exit architecture), at the same time preventing any secure information from leaking to an untrusted environment.
Abstract:
Keying materials used for providing security in a platform are securely provisioned both online and offline to devices in a remote platform. The secure provisioning of the keying materials is based on a revision of firmware installed in the platform.
Abstract:
A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.
Abstract:
Embodiments include systems, methods, computer readable media, and devices configured to, for a first processor of a platform, generate a platform root key; create a data structure to encapsulate the platform root key, the data structure comprising a platform provisioning key and an identification of a registration service; and transmit, on a secure connection, the data structure to the registration service to register the platform root key for the first processor of the platform. Embodiments include systems, methods, computer readable media, and devices configured to store a device certificate received from a key generation facility; receive a manifest from a platform, the manifest comprising an identification of a processor associated with the platform; and validate the processor using a stored device certificate.
Abstract:
A processor for supporting secure memory intent is disclosed. The processor of the disclosure includes a memory execution unit to access memory and a processor core coupled to the memory execution unit. The processor core is to receive a request to access a convertible page of the memory. In response to the request, the processor core to determine an intent for the convertible page in view of a page table entry (PTE) corresponding to the convertible page. The intent indicates whether the convertible page is to be accessed as at least one of a secure page or a non-secure page.
Abstract:
Encryption interface technologies are described. A processor can include a system agent, an encryption interface, and a memory controller. The system agent can communicate data with a hardware functional block. The encryption interface can be coupled between the system agent and a memory controller. The encryption interface can receive a plaintext request from the system agent, encrypt the plaintext request to obtain an encrypted request, and communicate the encrypted request to the memory controller. The memory controller can communicate the encrypted request to a main memory of the computing device.