Abstract:
A method of extraction of a key from a physical unclonable function exploiting the states of cells of a volatile memory after a powering on, wherein: cells are read according to addresses stored in a non-volatile memory; an error-correction code corrects the read states; and, in case an error has been corrected, the address of the cell providing an erroneous state is replaced in the non-volatile memory with that of another cell providing the non-erroneous state.
Abstract:
The disclosure relates to a method for detecting an attack in an electronic microcircuit, comprising: forming the microcircuit in a substrate, forming in the substrate a first well electrically isolated from the substrate, by a second well and an embedded well, forming in the first and second wells a data processing circuit comprising a ground terminal formed in the first well and a power supply terminal formed in the second well, and activating a detection signal when a voltage at the ground or power supply terminal of the data processing circuit crosses a threshold voltage.
Abstract:
The component comprises a first memory (MM) comprising a first portion (P1) having a content modified with a first modification entity (K1) and a second portion (P2) having a content modified with a second entity (K2), a storage means (MS) configured to store the first entity (K1) secretly, a non-volatile memory (NVM) storing an item of entity information representative of the second entity (K2) in a location (END) designated by a first indication (INDK2) contained in the said first portion of the first memory.
Abstract:
A method for protecting, against laser attacks, an integrated circuit chip formed inside and on top of a semiconductor substrate and including in the upper portion of the substrate an active portion in which are formed components, this method including the steps of: forming in the substrate a gettering area extending under the active portion, the upper limit of the area being at a depth ranging between 5 and 50 μm from the upper surface of the substrate; and introducing diffusing metal impurities into the substrate.
Abstract:
An integrated circuit chip formed inside and on top of a semiconductor substrate and including: in the upper portion of the substrate, an active portion in which components are formed; and under the active portion and at a depth ranging between 5 and 50 μm from the upper surface of the substrate, an area comprising sites for gettering metal impurities and containing metal atoms at a concentration ranging between 1017 and 1018 atoms/cm3.
Abstract:
The generation of a chip identifier supporting at least one integrated circuit, which includes providing a cutout of least one conductive path by cutting the chip, the position of the cutting line relative to the chip conditioning the identifier.
Abstract:
A method for protecting an integrated circuit. According to the method, the start-up of all, or part, of the circuit is determined in the presence of a key which is recorded in a non-volatile manner in the circuit, following the production thereof, and depends on at least one first parameter which is present in a non-volatile manner in the circuit after the production thereof.
Abstract:
The generation of a chip identifier supporting at least one integrated circuit, which includes providing a cutout of least one conductive path by cutting the chip, the position of the cutting line relative to the chip conditioning the identifier.
Abstract:
Before a predetermined processing sequence, the integrated circuit detects the state of at least one timer. The circuit controls the activation of the timer if it is not activated, and disables itself if the timer is activated.
Abstract:
A method and a circuit for protecting at least one element of an integrated circuit, including conditioning the operation of the element to be protected to the state of a signal conditioned by an irreversibly programmable element, the state of which is set during a probe test of the integrated circuit.