Abstract:
A method and apparatus include conductive material doped within a microchip that accumulates a detectable charge in the presence of ions. Such ions may result from a focused ion beam or other unwelcome technology exploitation effort. Circuitry sensing the charge buildup in the embedded, doped material may initiate a defensive action intended to defeat the tampering operation.
Abstract:
Apparatus, method and program product may detect an attempt to tamper with a microchip by detecting an unacceptable alteration in a measured capacitance associated with capacitance structures proximate the backside of a microchip. The capacitance structures typically include metallic shapes and may connect using through-silicon vias to active sensing circuitry within the microchip. In response to the sensed change, a shutdown, spoofing, self-destruct or other defensive action may be initiated to protect security sensitive circuitry of the microchip.
Abstract:
An apparatus and method detect microchip tampering by including a capacitance circuit that comprises a protective cover. Dielectric material may be sandwiched between the cover and a backside metal layer, which may be proximate a protected surface of the microchip. Changes in the capacitance of the above circuit caused by alteration of the cover or other component of the capacitance circuit may be sensed and prompt defensive action.
Abstract:
A method, program product and apparatus include resistance structures positioned proximate security sensitive microchip circuitry. Alteration in the position, makeup or arrangement of the resistance structures may be detected and initiate an action for defending against a reverse engineering or other exploitation effort. The resistance structures may be automatically and selectively designated for monitoring. Some of the resistance structures may have different resistivities. The sensed resistance may be compared to an expected resistance, ratio or other resistance-related value. The structures may be intermingled with false structures, and may be overlapped or otherwise arranged relative to one another to further complicate unwelcome analysis.
Abstract:
System and method for designing an electronic package. A placement manager receives a physical design of an electronic package from a packaging design tool. The placement manager receives design constraints regarding the physical design for the electronic package. The placement manager inserts specifications for at least one de-gassing opening in the physical design for the electronic package, wherein the specification for at least one de-gassing opening are created in accordance with said design constraints regarding said physical design of said electronic package. The placement manager outputs an updated physical design of the electronic package.
Abstract:
A double-data-rate two synchronous dynamic random access (DDR2) memory circuit includes a low-speed input path and a high-speed input path coupled thereto by an input coupling and forming a common input, the common input coupled to a memory core, the memory core having a common output wherein a high-speed output path and a low-speed output path are coupled together by an output coupling and further coupled to the common output of the memory core.
Abstract:
Apparatus, method and program product detect an attempt to tamper with a microchip by determining that an electrical path comprising one or more connections and a metal plate attached to the backside of a microchip has become disconnected or otherwise altered. A tampering attempt may also be detected in response to the presence of an electrical path that should not be present, as may result from the microchip being incorrectly reconstituted. Actual and/or deceptive paths may be automatically selected and monitored to further confound a reverse engineering attempt.
Abstract:
An integrated circuit assembly and associated method of detecting microchip tampering may include multiple connections in electrical communication with a conductive layer. Defensive circuitry may inhibit analysis of the microchip where a connection no longer connects to the conductive layer. The defensive circuitry may similarly be initiated where a connection unintended to be in electrical communication with the conductive layer is nonetheless connected.
Abstract:
A circuit assembly includes a functional chip and a first capacitor. The functional chip includes a first logic island and a second logic island. The first capacitor is configured to be selectively coupled (e.g., at different times) to a first power supply terminal of the first logic island and a second power supply terminal of the second logic island.
Abstract:
A circuit assembly includes a functional chip and a first capacitor. The functional chip includes a first logic island and a second logic island. The first capacitor is configured to be selectively coupled (e.g., at different times) to a first power supply terminal of the first logic island and a second power supply terminal of the second logic island.