Abstract:
An apparatus is provided for protecting a basic input/output system (BIOS) in a computing system. The apparatus includes a BIOS read only memory (ROM), an event detector, and a tamper detector. The BIOS ROM has BIOS contents that are stored as plaintext, and an encrypted message digest, where the encrypted message digest comprises an encrypted version of a first message digest that corresponds to the BIOS contents, and where and the encrypted version is generated via a symmetric key algorithm and a key. The event detector is configured to generate a BIOS check interrupt that interrupts normal operation of the computing system upon the occurrence of an event, where the event includes one or more occurrences of an operating system call. The tamper detector is operatively coupled to the BIOS ROM and is configured to access the BIOS contents and the encrypted message digest upon assertion of the BIOS check interrupt, and is configured to direct a microprocessor to generate a second message digest corresponding to the BIOS contents and a decrypted message digest corresponding to the encrypted message digest using the symmetric key algorithm and the key, and is configured to compare the second message digest with the decrypted message digest, and configured to preclude the operation of the microprocessor if the second message digest and the decrypted message digest are not equal. The microprocessor includes a dedicated crypto/hash unit disposed within execution logic, where the crypto/hash unit generates the second message digest and the decrypted message digest, and where the key is exclusively accessed by the crypto/hash unit. The microprocessor further has a random number generator disposed within the execution logic, where the random number generator generates a random number at completion of a current BIOS check, which is employed by the event detector to randomly set a number of occurrences of the event that are to occur before a following BIOS check.
Abstract:
An apparatus is provided for protecting a basic input/output system (BIOS) in a computing system. The apparatus includes a BIOS read only memory (ROM), an event detector, and a tamper detector. The BIOS ROM has BIOS contents that are stored as plaintext, and an encrypted message digest, where the encrypted message digest comprises an encrypted version of a first message digest that corresponds to the BIOS contents, and where and the encrypted version is generated via a symmetric key algorithm and a key. The event detector is configured to generate a BIOS check interrupt that interrupts normal operation of the computing system upon the occurrence of an event, where the event includes one or more occurrences of a PCI Express access. The tamper detector is operatively coupled to the BIOS ROM and is configured to access the BIOS contents and the encrypted message digest upon assertion of the BIOS check interrupt, and is configured to direct a microprocessor to generate a second message digest corresponding to the BIOS contents and a decrypted message digest corresponding to the encrypted message digest using the symmetric key algorithm and the key, and is configured to compare the second message digest with the decrypted message digest, and configured to preclude the operation of the microprocessor if the second message digest and the decrypted message digest are not equal. The microprocessor includes a dedicated crypto/hash unit disposed within execution logic, where the crypto/hash unit generates the second message digest and the decrypted message digest, and where the key is exclusively accessed by the crypto/hash unit. The microprocessor further has a random number generator disposed within the execution logic, where the random number generator generates a random number at completion of a current BIOS check, which is employed by the event detector to randomly set a number of occurrences of the event that are to occur before a following BIOS check.
Abstract:
An apparatus is provided for protecting a basic input/output system (BIOS) in a computing system. The apparatus includes a BIOS read only memory (ROM), an event detector, and a tamper detector. The BIOS ROM has BIOS contents that are stored as plaintext, and an encrypted message digest, where the encrypted message digest comprises an encrypted version of a first message digest that corresponds to the BIOS contents, and where and the encrypted version is generated via a symmetric key algorithm and a key. The event detector is configured to generate a BIOS check interrupt that interrupts normal operation of the computing system upon the occurrence of an event, where the event includes one or more occurrences of a change in virtual memory mapping. The tamper detector is operatively coupled to the BIOS ROM and is configured to access the BIOS contents and the encrypted message digest upon assertion of the BIOS check interrupt, and is configured to direct a microprocessor to generate a second message digest corresponding to the BIOS contents and a decrypted message digest corresponding to the encrypted message digest using the symmetric key algorithm and the key, and is configured to compare the second message digest with the decrypted message digest, and configured to preclude the operation of the microprocessor if the second message digest and the decrypted message digest are not equal. The microprocessor includes a dedicated crypto/hash unit disposed within execution logic, where the crypto/hash unit generates the second message digest and the decrypted message digest, and where the key is exclusively accessed by the crypto/hash unit. The microprocessor further has a random number generator disposed within the execution logic, where the random number generator generates a random number at completion of a current BIOS check, which is employed by the event detector to randomly set a number of occurrences of the event that are to occur before a following BIOS check.
Abstract:
An apparatus is provided for protecting a basic input/output system (BIOS) in a computing system. The apparatus includes a BIOS read only memory (ROM), an event detector, and a tamper detector. The BIOS ROM has BIOS contents that are stored as plaintext, and an encrypted message digest, where the encrypted message digest comprises an encrypted version of a first message digest that corresponds to the BIOS contents, and where and the encrypted version is generated via a symmetric key algorithm and a key. The event detector is configured to generate a BIOS check interrupt that interrupts normal operation of the computing system upon the occurrence of an event, where the event includes one or more occurrences of a hard disk access. The tamper detector is operatively coupled to the BIOS ROM and is configured to access the BIOS contents and the encrypted message digest upon assertion of the BIOS check interrupt, and is configured to direct a microprocessor to generate a second message digest corresponding to the BIOS contents and a decrypted message digest corresponding to the encrypted message digest using the symmetric key algorithm and the key, and is configured to compare the second message digest with the decrypted message digest, and configured to preclude the operation of the microprocessor if the second message digest and the decrypted message digest are not equal. The microprocessor includes a dedicated crypto/hash unit disposed within execution logic, where the crypto/hash unit generates the second message digest and the decrypted message digest, and where the key is exclusively accessed by the crypto/hash unit. The microprocessor further has a random number generator disposed within the execution logic, where the random number generator generates a random number at completion of a current BIOS check, which is employed by the event detector to randomly set a number of occurrences of the event that are to occur before a following BIOS check.
Abstract:
A multi-core microprocessor supports a plurality of operating states that provide different levels of performance and power consumption to the microprocessor and its cores. A control unit puts selected cores into selected operating states at selected times. A core-specific synchronization register is provided for each core external to the core and readable by the control unit. Each core responds to an instruction to target an operating state by writing a value identifying the target operating state to the synchronization register. The control unit causes power saving actions that affect shared resources provided that the actions do not reduce performance of any core sharing the resources below the core's target operating state.
Abstract:
A microprocessor includes a plurality of registers that holds an architectural state of the microprocessor and an indicator that indicates a boot instruction set architecture (ISA) of the microprocessor as either the x86 ISA or the Advanced RISC Machines (ARM) ISA. The microprocessor also includes a hardware instruction translator that translates x86 ISA instructions and ARM ISA instructions into microinstructions. The hardware instruction translator translates, as instructions of the boot ISA, the initial ISA instructions that the microprocessor fetches from architectural memory space after receiving a reset signal. The microprocessor also includes an execution pipeline, coupled to the hardware instruction translator. The execution pipeline executes the microinstructions to generate results defined by the x86 ISA and ARM ISA instructions. In response to the reset signal, the microprocessor initializes its architectural state in the plurality of registers as defined by the boot ISA prior to fetching the initial ISA instructions.
Abstract:
A microprocessor performs an If-Then (IT) instruction and an associated IT block by extracting condition information from the IT instruction and for each instruction of the IT block: determining a respective condition for the instruction using the extract condition information, translating the instruction into a microinstruction, and conditionally executing the microinstruction based on the respective condition. For a first instruction, the translating comprises fusing the IT instruction with the first IT block instruction. A hardware instruction translation unit performs the extracting, determining and translating. Execution units conditionally execute the microinstructions. The hardware instruction translation unit and execution units are distinct hardware elements and are coupled together. The hardware translation unit performs the extracting, fusing and for each instruction of the IT block the determining and translating without writing intermediate results to a system memory, without execution of other architectural instructions by the microprocessor, and/or in six clock cycles or less.
Abstract:
An apparatus is provided for protecting a basic input/output system (BIOS) in a computing system. The apparatus includes a BIOS read only memory (ROM), an event detector, and a tamper detector. The BIOS ROM has BIOS contents that are stored as plaintext, and an encrypted message digest, where the encrypted message digest comprises an encrypted version of a first message digest that corresponds to the BIOS contents, and where and the encrypted version is generated via a symmetric key algorithm and a key. The event detector is configured to generate a BIOS check interrupt that interrupts normal operation of the computing system upon the occurrence of an event, where the event includes one or more occurrences of a power glitch exceeding a specified threshold within a specified time period. The tamper detector is operatively coupled to the BIOS ROM and is configured to access the BIOS contents and the encrypted message digest upon assertion of the BIOS check interrupt, and is configured to direct a microprocessor to generate a second message digest corresponding to the BIOS contents and a decrypted message digest corresponding to the encrypted message digest using the symmetric key algorithm and the key, and is configured to compare the second message digest with the decrypted message digest, and configured to preclude the operation of the microprocessor if the second message digest and the decrypted message digest are not equal. The microprocessor includes a dedicated crypto/hash unit disposed within execution logic, where the crypto/hash unit generates the second message digest and the decrypted message digest, and where the key is exclusively accessed by the crypto/hash unit. The microprocessor further has a random number generator disposed within the execution logic, where the random number generator generates a random number at completion of a current BIOS check, which is employed by the event detector to randomly set a number of occurrences of the event that are to occur before a following BIOS check.
Abstract:
A microprocessor includes an indicator and a plurality of processing cores. Each of the plurality of processing cores is configured to generate a default core ID and to sample the indicator. When the indicator indicates a first predetermined value, the default core ID generated by a default one of the plurality of processing cores designates the default processing core to be a bootstrap processor. When the indicator indicates a second predetermined value distinct from the first predetermined value, the plurality of processing cores are configured to generate alternate core IDs that are different from the default core IDs. One of the alternate core IDs designates an alternate processing core, other than the default processing core, to be the bootstrap processor.
Abstract:
A microprocessor includes a plurality of cores, a shared cache memory, and a control unit that individually puts each core to sleep by stopping its clock signal. Each core executes a sleep instruction and responsively makes a respective request of the control unit to put the core to sleep, which the control unit responsively does, and detects when all the cores have made the respective request and responsively wakes up only the last requesting cores. The last core writes back and invalidates the shared cache memory and indicates it has been invalidated and makes a request to the control unit to put the last core back to sleep. The control unit puts the last core back to sleep and continuously keeps the other cores asleep while the last core writes back and invalidates the shared cache memory, indicates the shared cache memory was invalidated, and is put back to sleep.